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ABSTRACT 
The Papers presented here were prepared for a Conference on The Role of 
Public Enterprises in Development in Eastern Africa, held at the Institute 
for Development Studies from 4 - 7 November 1980. The purpose of^the 
Conference was to make an assessment of the research done so farcin the 
field in Eastern Africa, to analyse and compare the role of public enter-
prises and their problem in the countries of Eastern Africa and to give 
the participating researches some orientation for their further research 
and bring activities. 
The Conference outlined background, Powers and Objectives of Male parti-
cipation and focussed on the analysis of constructions of public enter-
prises to economic development. Other section of the Conference dealt 
with the control aspect and the autonomy of public enterprises and work 
analyses for an improved performance. The participants were mainly 
researches from Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and Ethiopia, but also from 
local officials and managers from public enterprises working in Kenya. 
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KEYNOTE ADDRESS DELIVERED AT THE WORKSHOP ON 
THE ROLE OE PUBLIC ENTERPRISES IN DEVELOPMENT 
4, NOVEMBER, 1980 
By 
Prof. W.M. Senga, Director 
Institute for Development Studies 
University of Nairobi 
Ladies and Gentlemen, 
I am happy to welcome you on the occasion of our Workshop on the Role of 
Public Enterprises in Development in Eastern Africa. To those of you coming 
from other countries, I extend a special welcome to Kenya, the University of 
Nairobi and to the Institute for Development Studies in particular. We are 
honoured to have all of you with us today. 
The subject of this Workshop is completely in line with the research priorities 
of the Institute for Development Studies, which is proud to host this Workshop 
with participants from three neighbouring countries. These priorities are 
based on the Kenyan Development Plan for the period 1979-198^ and cover Rural 
and Agricultural Development, Industrialisation, Human Resources and Development, 
Natural Resource Management and the Environment as main areas for research. 
Public Enterprises represent an important factor of the economy in all our 
countries. 
Referring to the Kenyan case we can characterise the industrial structure by 
six major trends: 
a) Accumulation has hitherto predominantly followed the pattern of 
import-substitution (particularly with respect to consumer goods) 
although in recent years there has been some trend towards agro-
based industries. 
b) This import-substitution industrialisation has been based upon 
income distribution and consumption patterns similar to these 
in existence before independence. 
c) Such industrialisation has occurred in the context of the global 
domination of production, accumulation, trade, product development 
and technology generation by developed economies. 
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d) In the absence of sufficient private enterprise and because of the 
desire to further local ownership in industry (and not because of 
any ideological commitment), the State has participated heavily in 
industrial development. 
e) Most of the large-scale industrial development has been, and is, 
heavily dominated by foreign investment. Additionally much of 
small scale industry is also owned by non-citizens. 
f) Development in the service industries ha^s been dominated by 
increased localisation in the insurance and financial branches, 
and by the rapid development of tourism. 
It is therefore quite reasonable to discuss, on an academic level, how far public 
enterprises have influenced these trends, and contributed to the development in 
various areas of the economy and who has benefited from their existence and 
activities. But in this connection, the main objective of the Workshop will 
be to learn about the typical role of public enterprises in the various countries 
in Eastern Africa, discuss their problems, contributions and achievements as a 
means to promote the national development process. 
Since the State has taken up important responsibilities within our economies 
during this era of industrialisation, its function as an entrepreneur has been 
controversial and is the subject of criticism and enthusiasm as well. Discussions 
centre around the necessity and existence of public enterprises as well as 
a wide range of opinions concerning the extent of controlling or promoting 
the economy through public enterprises. At the time of independence Kenya 
inherited a framework of parastatals which we found established in many sectors 
of the economy and especially in the agricultural sector. Most of these 
parastatals have had problems concerning their regulatory, developmental or 
commercial functions and performance. That the government and public are 
well aware of these problems is shown by the appointment, by the President, 
of a parastatals Committee which reviewed the statutory boards and published 
its findings in a report submitted last year. It is expected that the 
implementation of these recommendations will have a major impact on the future 
performance and strategies of these enterprises in Kenya. 
Furthermore, possibly this Workshop could contribute to a better understanding 
of possibilities and constraints of public enterprises within the economies 
of the countries of this region. Different view points and strategies for 
the role of public enterprises should hopefully be discussed in an open-minded 
atmosphere during this Workshop so as to bring out alternative approaches. 
•It seems to me that such a comparison of experiences across the borders of 
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our own countries is a noble idea since our countries are more or less in 
the same stage of development and face similar environmental conditions. 
As you probably know, there are in existence various institutions all over 
the world concerned with research on Public Enterprises or offering specific; 
training activities. The Boston Public Enterprises Group in the U.S.A., the 
International Centre for Public Enterprises in Developing Gountries in 
Lubljana, Yugoslavia, and the Eastern and Southern Management Institute in 
Arusha/Tanzania are only a few examples. The IDS is cooperating with these 
institutions in order to promote research and mutually beneficial information 
in'this field. 
Although the IDS has been involved with different categories of problems 
related to public enterprises for many years, last year we started a specific 
project which is focussed on management and organizational aspects of Public. 
Enterprises. This gives us the chance to discuss the role of public 
enterprises, their problems and contributions in the Kenyan context. This 
very timely Workshop is an activity in line with our present research 
activities and from the kind of papers we have received we can expect that 
all of us will benefit from the wide range of approaches, opinions and 
experiences which are documented in these papers. 
We are grateful for having as our participants for this Workshop scholars 
from the University of Addis Ababa, Dar es Salaam, Makerere University and 
from the University of Nairobi. We appreciate and acknowledge the attendance 
of representatives of various public enterprises who accepted our invitation 
for it will be very interesting to get their comments and to share their 
practical experience with us. 
I note from the printed programme of the Workshop that you will start with 
papers dealing with the political and social environment of public enterprises, 
then conclude with the problems of relations between government and public 
enterprises. You will also have a session focusing on various sections 
of public enterprises' activities within the economy. Problems of financial and 
internal performance of public enterprises will receive the attention they 
deserve. In addition to listening to and discussing papers specifically 
prepared for the Workshop you will have an opportunity to visit Kiambaa 
Tea Factory, one of more than 20 tea factories associated with the Kenya Tea 
Development Authority. Apart from providing a break from the confines of this 
Seminar Room4 I trust that you will learn something worthwhile. 
4 
I am happy 1:0 acknowledge our debt to the FES of West Germany for their 
financial support towards this Workshop. To the Government of Kenya, we 
are grateful for their assistance and cooperation including the issuance 
of the necessary travel documents to our academic colleagues from the 
neighbouring countries. 
Finally, let me repeat my warm welcome to all of you and then proceed to wish 
you stimulating discussions and the achievement of results which can contribute 
to further research and an improved role of public enterprises in the 
development of our countries' economies. 
Thank you. 
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ANALYSIS AND SUMMARY OF THE WORKSHOP 
By 
Hans G„ Klaus 
Institute for Development Studies 
University of Nairobi 
INTRODUCTION 
There are several reasons, which have stimulated the Institute for 
Development Studies (IDS) to organise a Workshop on Public Enterprises in 
Development in Eastern Africa. First of all it was observed that the whole 
sector of Public Enterprises which contributes to a considerable part of the 
gross domestic product of the country, faces a lot of problems in Kenya and 
is subject to controversial discussions. It is therefore quite reasonable, 
that a Research Institution like the IDS should contribute to the analysis 
of the problems of such an important sector of the national economy. Secondly 
the Kenya Government, being aware of the difficulties of the Public Enterprises 
established a Commission to look into the problems of the Public Enterprises 
which came out with a report in early 1979 whose results it was felt should 
be discussed at academic levels. Thirdly, there is world wide recognition 
r of the importance of the performance of Public Enterprises and a lot 
of research and training in this field has been initiated. For the purpose of 
fruitful co-operation with this trend the IDS, in order to increase its research 
capacity and its information base, decide^to enter into discussions with other 
researchers of neighbouring countries whose economies and public enterprises 
face similar problems. 
The idea therefore was, to bring together researchers from 
countries like Kenya, Ethiopia, Tanzania and Uganda for an exchange of ideas 
about the actual problems of Public Enterprises to compare the various 
experiences and learn from each other how to set necessary priorities for 
research training and implementation of practical improvements. In order to 
receive the necessary feedback within the discussions of the Workshop, 
representatives of Public Enterprises and Government Officials were invited 
with the expectation that their contribution to the discussion would lead 
to more practical solutions and might be the beginning of a necessary dialogue 
between researchers, trainers and managers and Government Officials about 
how to improve the contribution of Public Enterprises to national economic 
development, a dialogue which has been badly missed up to now. 
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During the Workshop which took four days, 30 participants from Kenya, 
Ethiopia, Uganda and Tanzania discussed a wide range of problems of Public 
Enterprises in Eastern Africa, The results of these discussions and the 
contents of 14 papers presented can be summed up under the following topics: 
1) Background, forms, and objectives of state participation 
in the economy in Eastern Africa 
2) Contribution of Public Enterprises to economic development 
3) Control and autonomy of Public Enterprises 
4) Problems of Public Enterprises performance 
5) Strategies for an improved performance of Public 
Enterprises, 
A. Background, forms and objectives of state participation in the 
economies of Eastern Africa 
Public Enterprises were already in existence in Eastern Africa 
during the colonial times, but were mainly concerned with serving the 
colonial powers and excluding Africans from industrialisation. 
Absence of indigenous capital and commercial knowledge led after 
independence to a situation whereby the Public Enterprises became the most 
important instrument of the Governments to promote economic development and 
to bring the Africans a bigger share in the economy. Public Enterprises 
therefore were established to compensate the absence of private enterprises 
o 
and private investments in order to initiate private investment and entrepre-
neurship of Africans by carrying out risky, capital-intensive projects which 
were to serve public interests and social benefits. At the same time Public 
Enterprises were intended to acquire the necessary management skills and to 
get the necessary participation of foreign capital and management skills as 
means for the africanisation process. 
The reason for establishing Public Enterprises can therefore be 
o seen in the restriction of Africans in industrial participation during the 
colonial time, in the inability of Private Enterprises to solve urgent develop-
ment problems and to take over risky projects with small returns, in the provi-
sion of the necessary infrastructure for industrial activities and last 
but not least in financing the national budget ( Kinfu ). The reasons for 
- 7 - IDS/OP 39 
the establishment of Public Enterprises are therefore a mixture of political, (> 
economical and social objectives (Oyugi), 
In some socialist oriented countries, like Ethiopia and Tanzania, 
the Public Enterprises were promoted mainly for political reasons because 
they are considered to be important organs for economic decision making. 
Economically, Public Enterprises were intended to implement specific develop-
ment priorities and objectives and were established for social reasons in 
order to contribute to a better distribution of income and for the promotion 
of regionally underdeveloped areas of the country ( Moshi ). The reasons for 
"Government activity are the provision for social goods, adjustment of income 
distribution and stabilisation of employment, prices and balance of payment 
which the market mechanism alone may not optimally achieve" ( Suruma ). This 
statement indicates the economic role of Public Enterprises in supplementing 
private industries and carrying out necessary controls in order to achieve; 
the developmental objectives. 
Public Enterprises were established either as a means to shift 
» 
capital and managerial knowledge from foreigners to Africans and to enable 
them to achieve political as well as economic independence ( Moshi ), or they 
were transferred from private ownership into public hands (nationalised ) for 
the same reason. In addition they were established so that only Public 
Enterprises and government participation could be trusted with the economic 
development in the public interest. Be it either a capitalist oriented 
country ( Kenya, Uganda ) or a socialist oriented country ( Ethiopia, Tanzania) 
it is generally recognised, that the state has an important role to play in 
the national economic life, but there are of course many forms of participation 
which differ from time to time and from country to country. 
In the case of Kenya', , it was emphasised, that the establishment of 
Public Enterprises has not achieved the objectives it set out to achieve, that 
is to serve the public interest. On the contrary, it has been observed, that 
the existence of Public Enterprises contribute^to the promotion^ of an indigenous 
capitalistic class which "was educated, had revenue and know-how and above 
all power and influence which could be translated into economic advantages" 
(Kinyanjui). Therefore, where the Public Enterprises have contributed to 
africanisation they have often benefited only a small percentage of the 
population, which is the elite of the country. 
IDS/OP 39 
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It has been observed in all countries of Eastern Africa, that the 
number of Public Enterprises has increased since independence. In Tanzania 
the relative share of parastatal employment increased from 15% in 1967 to 
42% in 1974 (Mabele). Whereas there were 10 Government Companies and 35 
Boards or Corporations in 1966, there were 8 agricultural parastatals 
employing 30,540 employees out of 52,365 in the whole agricultural public 
sector in 1974 (Msambichaka). It was reported that in 1977 there were 108 
state farms in the agricultural sector alone, and altogether, three hundred 
and eighty parastatals in 1980 (Moshi). 
In 1974 there were 72 major Government Corporations established 
in Ethiopia and another 29 where the Government was the principal shareholder 
(Kinfu). 
In 1966 a hundred Public Enterprises, with an investment of over 
K£ 150 mill, were reported in Kenya, and in 1978 three Parastatals had invested 
KShs. 470 mill, in equity shares in 85 private firms. At present there are 
more than 66 Public Enterprises and country-wide Co-operatives in Kenya in 
addition to about 100 subsidiaries. 
In 1966 Uganda had about 14 major Government Corporations with 
about 53 Subsidiaries. In 1972 there was a nationalisation of foreign-owned 
firms or they were transferred to Ugandans (Atikoro). Consequently, in 1977 
thirtyfour Corporations and Government Companies existed in Uganda of which 
one third were holding companies with a large number of Subsidiaries (Suruma). 
Since the Arusha^Declaration in 1967, in Tanzania over 50% of the 
economy in the commercialised sectors have come under public ownership and 
control through public Corporations, so that only 16% of the total industrial 
investment was left to private enterprises (Moshi). 
A wide range of tasks of Public Enterprises may be demonstrated by 
the example of the Uganda Development Corporation, which is expected to fulfill 
the following tasks: Co-ordination of the activities of Public Enterprises, 
advice to the relevant Minister, providing reasonable prices and services 
Including managerial services, providing foreign exchange, assist companies 
in long-term planning, giving financial advice by carrying out control, and 
providing licences for import and export (Atikoro). 
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A Public Enterprise can be defined as a separate production and/or 
commercial organisation that the Government either owns or in which it has 
a majority participation and that are run on a commercial basis ( Moshi ). 
This definition may apply to the situation in all the Eastern African countries, 
it excludes the carrying out of services by governmental departments but 
includes the services in which the Government holds the majority shares 
together with foreign or domestic investors. The latter type of Public 
Enterprises are numerous, particulalry in Kenya, where the participation of 
foreign capital is seen as an important contribution to stimulate the growth 
of the economy. In Eastern African countries we find totally state-owned 
enterprises and mixed enterprises ( Joint - Ventures ) as well as public 
utilities which are huge Government or Public Corporations. Moreover, we have 
to include the Statutory Boards or Authorities which are mainly concerned 
with the regulation or marketing of certain products or of the products of 
specific branches of industry. In the case of Tanzania, all agricultural 
marketing activities are assigned to a Public Agricultural Enterprise 
(Msambichaka). In Tanzania, we have to mention the State Farms as agricultural 
producing enterprises and processing and manufacturing industries which are 
public companies with the objective of import substitution. In Ethiopia we 
find the socialist firm, which is considered as activity-decision-, and 
communication centre in the socialist society ( Kinfu). It faces similar 
problems like Public Enterprises in capitalistic oriented countries or in 
mixed economies although it was mentioned that in socialistic countries 
incentives for the management and the staff of Public Enterprises are better 
implemented and the role of profit utilisation is more assigned to the 
objectives of economic and social development. 
What Public Enterprises have in common is that they are separated 
from the public administration, are governed by an independent Board, receive j 
directives from a parent Ministry and have autonomous working conditions, like 
freedom from "red tape", from treasury control and from political attention. 
They are intended to be self-financed and disinterested in profit unlike 
private enterprises and are often operating as a public monopoly and are 
committed to commercial auditing. It is also typical for the Public Enterprises 
in the Eastern African countries to have many holdings for specific branches 
and products which are in turn managing many subsidiaries. 
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There is no doubt that these characteristics of state-corporations 
are in practice not in any case fulfilled and that the theoretical objectives 
and legal provisions of Public Enterprises differ sometimes totally from the 
reality. 
B. Contribution of Public Enterprises to economic development 
The contribution of Public Enterprises to economic and social 
development of the countries of Eastern Africa, all Workshop participants 
agreed, is insufficient in the overwhelming number of cases in each of the 
countries. Nonetheless, all admitted that Public Enterprises have contributed 
in the past to Africanisation. It is doubtful if Public Enterprises have been 
properly used by the Government as instruments of supporting the governmental 
policy for improvement of economic and social development. In Tanzania for 
instance, only 46 out of 71 Public Enterprises can run without Government 
grants and their capacity utilisation often amounts to 35% only of the actual 
production capacity (Moshi). 
Although it does not necessarily mean that Public Enterprises which 
are not profitable, will not contribute to the economic development in some 
other way, it has to be mentioned that in 1978/79 out of 196 trading Parastatals 
the accounts of 81 such Parastatals disclosed losses in Tanzania (Moshi), 
Suruma (Uganda) has studied 7 commercial State Enterprises which were intended 
as profit making establishments to find out their role in development. He 
found that only four of them made a profit over a period of over 10 years, 
from 1973 to 1979 and were able to add a net-value to the national treasury. 
It was even argued that due to the influence of private interests on the 
decision making and activities of Public Enterprises and Joint Ventures, Public 
Enterprises as a policy instrument might be completely inefficient, but lead 
to increased prices and decrease in quality of products (Hopcraft/Ogutu, Kenya). 
On the other hand, relating to the Tanzania experience, with the 
contribution of state-farms it has to be acknowledged that they have cont-
ributed through utilisation of large land reserves, better use of modern 
farm-techniques, increase of employment opportunities, better opportunities 
to agricultural training and development of attractive farm work to an 
improved performance in the agricultural sector (Msambichaka). 
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The Workshop participants discussed in detail the reasons for 
widespread insufficient performance of Public Enterprises: 
1. In many cases Public Enterprises are supposed to take over 
non-viable projects which are risky and have low returns. 
With cases like these, it should not be expected that the 
Public Enterprise will be able to make a profit. But in 
other cases there is a lack of pre-investment survey which 
otherwise could reveal that certain projects should not be 
initiated. 
2. There is a lack of precisely defined objectives for a 
clear company policy and the explanation of objectives as 
a guideline for the staff of Public Enterprises is therefore 
almost always missing. 
3. Organisational structure and management structure are 
inefficient and not suited to the objectives and tasks 
of the Corporations. This can be seen in connection with 
the lack of job-descriptions and job evaluations which 
leads to overstaffing in Public Enterprises. 
4. There are the problems of qualification and motivation 
of Management. In many cases there is a shortage of expertise 
and qualified manpower and also a communication gap between 
various levels of management, 
5. Public Enterprises are often unable to solve financial 
problems with an adequate financial and accounting system. 
Particularly, insufficient cost accounting, high overheads, 
prestige offices and staff houses, high administrative costs, 
a delay of preparation of accounts and relying on financing 
through Government budgets is very much in existence. 
6. They are missing an infrastructure like transport and storage 
facilities and the non-availability of material and spare pacts'1 
due to improper planning and foreign currency problems. This 
leads to the already mentioned reduced production capacities. 
7. Maintenance plans and inventory lists for machines and 
transport vehicles are hardly to be found. 
8, There are no incentives for increased sales and no control 
from outside the Public Enterprise. 
9. Staffing and recruitment are influenced by political inter-
ference which leads to a lack of motivation among the staff 
and to theiemployment of underqualified personnel. There 
is no communication or information in any department of Public 
Enterprises and particularly little knowledge to implement 
throughly prepared plans and to ensure the transfer of 
knowledge to organisational changes. 
C. Control and Autonomy of Public Enterprises 
The participants of the Workshop were critical of government 
directives and participation in Public Enterprises. The overwhelming majority 
of the participants agreed that although the "Government is in power to wind 
up the affair of any company, private or public, in the public interest 
o 
( Mabele/Tanzania ), particularly in countries with a mixed economy, the 
Government is not as powerful as the legal provisions should have expected, 
: y\ 
In many oases it is not the Government who is using Public Enterprises 
capacity for economic development purposes in a planned way. On the contrary, 
it is the private interest which are dominating the governmental activities 
concerning Public Enterprises, Particularly in some Joint Ventures private 
investors use Government involvement and relations for their own purposes. 
"Government participation means that investors hold it as a hostage to extract 
concessions of certain privileges" (Gachuki ). "Policies governing the 
operation of Parastatal organisations in Kenya are usually compromises between 
the Government and the private interests" (Oyugi). Firms, in these 
circumstances are quick to perceive their optimal strategy as involving 
government financially as much as possible and then using that involvement 
to attract further concessions which then have the appearance of being in the 
government's interest (Hopcraft/Ogutu). 
This situation does not lead to a consistent and competent policy 
guidance for the Public Enterprises through the Government, but leads to 
privately initiated government interference without long-term planning and 
co-ordination. In fact this means that the practice by the government 
leadership is very weak in terms of continuity of leadership and policy guidance. 
"Power over the affairs of the state enterprises in Uganda for instance has 
become increasingly concentrated in the manager " (Suruma). "Most of the 
managers stated that they only try to minimise government interference and 
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that decision making power, because of the absence of a clear policy, is 
more concentrated in the person of the General Manager "(Bruning). 
The Board of Public Enterprises, which legally has the power to 
manage the Public Enterprise, is often not in the position to fulfill its 
task. It was realised that there is shortage of professional knowledge and 
political independence from the Ministry or Permanent Secretary, which often 
leads to a conflict of personal and public interests which leads to inactivity 
and delay of decision making on the side of the Boards, and further contributes 
to strengthen the position of the General Manager. The information the 
General Manager gives to the Board cannot be evaluated by the Boards and taken 
as a basis for decision making and planning, because professional competence 
is lacking. 
Control and accountability of Public Enterprises and in this 
.^-v A 
connection their contribution to the national economic na social development, 
is therefore jeopardised by a lack of guidance, competence and dedication 
on the side of the Government and the Board but also by the power of the 
General Manager and by the powerlessness of other Institutions which ought 
to control the activities of Public Enterprises. First of all there is the 
Parliament which should function as control institution for Public Enterprises. 
But in practice, because of poor professional knowledge by members, and a 
strong position of the party or the Government concerning the level of 
information, Parliament is not in a position to control the performance of 
Public Enterprises. Moreover, even in cases where audit reports are discussed 
in Parliament, facts and figures are no longer up to date and therefore 
cannot act as a basis for decision making.. 
The reports of the Auditor General, who usually has to audit the 
reports of the Public Enterprises and has to evaluate their performance, 
are discussed in Parliament or by Government when the figures are no longer 
up to date and recommendations of the Auditor General are hardly implemented. 
The powerlessness of the existing insitutions concerning the control of 
Public Enterprises is even supplemented by the influence of non-governmental 
actors who have an uncontrolled impact on the Public Enterprises through 
management contracts and provision of technical assistance. 
Considering the large number of Public Enterprises in each of the 
countries in Eastern Africa, the variety and complexity of their objectives and the v 
t 
fact that they have to operate in an environment which imposes a lot of restrictions' 
- 14 - IDS,. OP 39 
on them and the Government as well, is not an easy task for the Government 
to administer and direct the Public Enterprises and to integrate them into 
a consistent and long-term development strategy. For the Kenyan case, the 
establishment of the D. Ndegwa-Commission of 1971 to come out with a report 
of the Commission of Enquiry (Public Service Structure and Remuneration 
Commission) initiated by the Kenya Government, and the P. Ndegwa-Report of 
1979 indicate the awareness of the Government to the problems of the Public 
Enterprises and demonstrate the intention to overcome the present problems. 
The recommendation of the Ndegwa-Commission in 1979 have led to the 
establishment of the Parastatal Advisory Committee by the Kenya Government 
which is authorised to look into the performance of all the Public Enterprises 
together with the Inspectorate of Statutory Boards already in existence. The 
Governments of the other East African countries have initiated similar activities 
and it is expected that these Committees will be made up of people with the 
necessary knowledge, competence and expertise to re-organise the Public 
Enterprises towards a more professional oriented performance. 
D. Strategies for an improved performance of Public Enterprise 
Among the many recommendations and proposals which were presented 
in various papers and in the discussions during the Workshop, some essentials 
may be pointed out: 
1. We have to evaluate the performance of Public Enterprises at 
a macro-economic and micro-economic level. The performance at 
the micro-economic level (internal performance) will influence 
the performance at the macro-economic level which is demonstrated 
by the contribution of the Public Enterprise to national economic 
and social development in terms of employment, income distribution, 
capital formation, provision of foreign exchange. A measure for 
a successful contribution is the profitability of the Public 
Enterprise although it is not the only one. Many of the Public 
Enterprises are not profitable and if they are, profit is often 
achieved on the basis of unjustified privileges or is misused. 
It was stated that professional management at Government and top-
level of the Public Enterprises would provide a situation where 
the funds of the Public Enterprise could be allocated in such a 
way that long-term plans are designed and implemented in line 
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with clear political objectives as an integrated part of the 
national development plan. This has to be supplemented by 
an effective and autonomous control of Public Enterprises in 
terms of professional, independent auditing and evaluation 
committees, which are able to implement" their evaluation 
results on the basis of published development criteria, indepen-
dent from personal interest and ad-hoc Government interference. 
Such an institution also has to watch for the fulfillment of 
legal provisions and has to identify necessary amendments. 
An autonomous management controlled by an objective-oriented 
auditing institution both operating on a professional basis in 
connection with the ability and duty of the Public Enterprises 
for self-financing has been seen as a means in the right 
direction to improve the performance of Public Enterprises on 
the macro-economic level. The disaggregation of huge Public 
Enterprises down to easier manageable and controllable units, 
tough restrictions for the establishment of new Public Enter-
prises and subsidiaries and the abolishment of unviable 
entities may also help to achieve these objectives. 
Concerning the internal performance of Public Enterprises 
a major problem is the creation of a competent professional 
management at all levels of the organisation. Particularly 
the Board members need a special education which enables them 
to carry out their management and control functions and enable 
them to tailor the plans of the enterprise and its policies 
according to national development needs and public interest. 
A art from the training of key management personnel in policy 
formulating, implementing and follow-up, there is a need to 
improve information and communication at all levels in public 
Enterprises. There must be a lot more of discussions and 
participation in the Public Enterprise's objectives, strategies 
and restrictions. In order to initiate this process there must 
be a strategy to increase the low motivation of staff in 
Public Enterprises by making policy and plans more transparent 
and controls less personnel-oriented. Together with financial 
incentives, and the introduction of carrier systems, particularly 
the management should participate and spend much more of its 
time in management studies and "future planning" and innovation. 
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Open discussions will probably reveal much more conflict within 
the Public Enterprises and will reveal hidden personal influence. 
But by managing these conflicts instead of suppressing them, 
a kind of behaviour in terms of motivation, solidarity, 
stabilisation, communication and internal allocation can be 
achieved which might be the only bridge which leads to essential 
improvement of internal performance. 
3. All participants of the Workshop confirmed the need for further 
discussions among researchers and research institutions concerning 
the problems of Public Enterprises. The performance of 
Government institutions and the management of Public Enterprises 
has been stated as insufficient, but it was also pointed out, 
that the researchers have to contribute much more on their own 
to an improved performance of Public Enterprises. 
There is first of all a need for more data about the specific 
problems of Public Enterprises and more detailed case studies 
and surveys should be carried out. The results should be 
readily discussed not only among researchers but with managers 
and Government Officials. All the three groups should work 
more closely together than in the past. The actual Workshop 
should therefore be followed by Conferences or informal 
discussions on more specific topics discussing problem-solving 
strategies. 
Secondly, out of these discussions, researchers should get the 
necessary information to set up the right research priorities. 
Government officials should be convinced about the utilisation of 
the research results. The establishment of small researcher-
trainer-user-circles could encourage the managers to come up 
with their problems and seek solutions in a " Joint Venture " 
without relying too much on foreign consultants and the 
management contracts, 
Finally, it was agreed that there is a need for transferring 
research results into teaching materials and teaching activities. 
Many research results lie idle because transformation was never 
carried out. This of course, demands a much more intensive 
co-operation between researchers and trainers at the level of 
Universities but also on the side of private or public management 
institutions. 
17 
IDS/OP 39 
PUBLIC ENTERPRISES AND ECONOMIC SCIENCES IN AFRICA 
By 
INGRID HEIDERMANN 
FRIEDRICH EBERT STIFTUNG 
Forum: The need for a Target Discussion 
The object of this conference is to promote communication and academic 
exchange among social scientists and development planners and administrators 
within the Eastern African region. This target group composed of economists, 
politicians and businessmen from several East African Countries, prompt me 
to make a few remarks which perhaps go a little beyond the framework of the 
actual topics to be discussed, but which for this very reason may be regarded 
as a link between the individual papers which are restricted to specific!: 
topics. 
By way of explanation I should perhaps mention that the Research Institute 
of the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation does not itself for the moment pursue 
any research on public enterprises, but does promote such activities in this 
sector, especially in Africa, for example in cooperation with the Institute 
for Development Studies (IDS) and (CARFRAD), and has long been engaged in 
the evaluation of its results. We also extend this support and observational 
activity to such self-help enterprises as co-operatives or commonweal 
enterprises. So lam justified in saying that we have secured a fair overview 
of the problems of these and other public enterprises in several African 
countries. 
The following observations are not intended as a substitute for scientific 
analysis. Nor can they be regarded as a cure-for-all. They are merely 
intended to point out certain typical findings and problems that have struck 
us time and again in Africa, in some cases in comparison with the situation in 
Europe in the light of the same topics. 
The first observation was prompted in fact by this present forum because whilst 
we are very glad that this meeting is taking place here today it is a pity that 
discussions, of this kind are extremely rare events in most African countries. 
It is a pity above all because in our view they are the only means of establi-
shing a realistic approach to economic planning and effective business policy. 
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In most cases when African countries became independent the political 
structure they adopted in the first few years also determined the extent of 
public sector involvement in the economy. The economic structures chosen 
varied considerably from country to country. They ranged from total nationa-
lisation to predominantly free enterprises. 
It is the legitimate right of every country to choose its own 
economic system and I do not intend at this meeting to explore in any way the 
extent of nationalisation or free enterprise in any one country. But it seems 
important to point out that it is not enough simply to determine who actually 
o owns a country's industry. Ownership of instrumental capital is not the sole 
criterion for effective management of the economy. 
There is quite a philosophy behind the working of a private enterprise which a 
is normally expected to see its main and sole aim in making as much profit as 
possible. But there are as well a lot of aims - besides profit making which 
are expected to be fulfilled by public enterprises. Which one whould be 
given priority? Which one is the most urgent one for the countries economy?' 
This has to be decided definitely J 
State-owned enterprises can be used in various ways as instruments of economic 
0 policy. If one assumes that they should by and large be run independently 
by their managers, the latter must have a clear picture of their priorities in 
the light of government policy. This makes a target discussion absolutely 
necessary. I shall point a few areas out as examples: 
1. State-owned enterprises as instruments of regional policy. 
State-owned enterprises can be used in many ways as instruments of regional 
policy to ensure even development. They may be power supplies companies, 
for instance, providing the energy for a remote area without which no 
development at all will be possible, or transport enterprises, whose 
route schedules and charges make a particular area an interesting propo-
sition for industrial settlement. And they may also be an instrument 
providing jobs in the particular region. 
2. State-owned enterprises as instruments of cyclical policy. 
But state-owned enterprises can also be used as instruments of cyclical 
policy, for instance, By means of anti-cyclical or pro-cyclical investment 
they can support the general economic policy, or accelerate or slow down 
- 19 - IDS/OP 39 
specific trends, depending on the time when they effectively make their 
investment. But they can also exercise considerable influence on the 
development of economic activity via their pricing policy. 
3. State-owned enterprises as instruments of competition policy. 
The same is true of their function in terms of competition policy. 
State-owned enterprises, too, find themselves gompeting with other 
concerns, whether public or private. They have to defend their position 
on the market and this gives them considerable opportunities to influence 
economic trends. Government price-fixing is certainly the worst way of 
supporting a state-owned enterprise. It narrows down the scope for 
fruitful competition and not infrequently leads to contests in a 
different framework merely for the sake of prestige. Workable competition, 
on the other hand, cannot be rated highly enough as a stimulus for internal 
rationalisation. 
4. State-owned enterprises as instruments of structural policy. 
State-owned enterprises are of decisive importance as instruments of 
structural policy. I have just referred to the use of transport and 
power supply utilities as means of creating infrastructure, but these 
public entities also have considerable influence on the capital structure 
of the economy as a whole, on the structure of employment and hence of 
income, and on the market structure. Thus they can help preserve the 
existing structure by aiming to maintain the present income levels and 
ownership status in specific branches of industry, or initiate or bring 
about a change in the actual economic structure by pursuing a-deliberate 
policy of adaptation. 
5. State-owned enterprises as instruments of social policy. 
In most countries state-owned enterprises generally serve the purposes 
of social policy. If we understand social policy as the totality of 
measures implemented to remove the disadvantages suffered by certain 
social groups or to safeguard their standard of living, a state-owned 
enterprise has quite a number of functions to perform in this respect. 
The first will be to create jobs, but they will also embrace aspects of 
labour and social law, insurance and/or distributional policy. 
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Socio-political measures can also be linked with supply policy, for 
instance by concentrating on a certain category of consumer in the 
public interest, as in the case of publicly financed housing schemes. 
But socio-political objectives can also be achieved by providing services 
for different categories of consumers at different prices. One example 
of this are the different fares charged to school children, workers, and 
other groups for public transport. 
Although one can think of a whole range of additional functions and areas 
where public enterprises can be used to direct economic activity, and one 
need only enumerate them to show that one single concern can hardly cope 
with them all, and certainly should not attempt to do so because each of 
these political functions would be bound to impair the state of affairs 
within the concern. 
It is therefore crucial for the enterprise and its managers to know 
what aims, apart from manufacturing the actual products, the government 
intends to achieve. As, on the other hand, the political organizations 
themselves are no monolithic block as regards their decision-making 
structure, a decision on the aims and purposes of a public enterprise 
can only be brought about by means of intensive discussion between 
government and management. 
The results of such discussions are usually of a temporary nature. In 
other words, once a particular economic trend has ended or if there is a 
change in the political scene, policy with regard to the enterprise's 
responsibilities and priorities is bound to change as well. Consequently, 
permanent discussion between the two sides is always necessary. 
On the other hand, it goes without saying that a public enterprise can 
only perform these political functions in addition if the government 
establishes the necessary basis, whether by providing raw materials, 
by means of special investment, or by means of government grants to 
support functions of a socio-political nature, for instance. 
There is a wide range of instruments, but we have noticed that very 
little use is made of them by politicians and business managers in most 
African countries. On the contrary, public enterprises are expected 
to pursue political objectives without any kind of previous discussion 
with the managers. The executive frequently forces such policies on the 
enterprises and this considerably limits their scope for rational 
management. 
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II. Types of enterprise 
Whilst on the subject of the political responsibilities of public enterprises,1 
we should perhaps first consider whether such entities in their present form have 
the kind of organizational set-up that is suited to their task. 
Most of the early economic programmes adopted by African countries suggest 
or specifically state that public enterprises were established as an obstacle 
to private enterprises and as a means of ensuring a more even distribution of 
income and ownership, and there appears to have been little change in this 
idea. But this is all the more reason to ask whether this aim can be achieved; 
exclusively or for the most part by keeping a public hold on the means of 
production. 
In the industrial countries as well there is considerable.discussion on the 
expedience of certain types of enterprise and a huge amount of literature has 
been written on the subject. Without wanting to embark too much on a theoretical 
or philosophical discourse, perhaps I may at least raise one question and 
mention three types of enterprise which are designed to perform a public function. 
The question simply is: Has it always to be the state itself? 
1. State-owned enterprises . There are first of all those that are totally 
owned by the public, whether this be the government itself or other state 
agencies. But such state-owned enterprises may also be under the control of 
and financed by local or regional authorities. 
There is also a sub-category known as the mixed enterprises which, as the name 
implies, means that they are financed from government and private sources 
together. In African countries the government usually has a controlling interest 
Of at least 51 per cent. 
2. Public utilities . The next category I would mention, and in many 
countries a much larger one, are the so-called public utilities which pursue 
the aims of government economic policy. The public attachment implies that 
entities in this category are subject to permanent and intensive supervision, as 
regards their economic functions. This may cover prices, investment, 
contractual terms, statutory or mandatory collective wage agreements, etc. 
The public bond is usually regulated by law, the observance of which is ensured 
by specialised committees. Public utilities in this sense are to be found 
primarily in the transport and energy sectors, but also in banking and insurance. 
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The question as to the aim and purpose of their activities is to all intents 
and purposes answered by their designation. The statutory provisions and the 
corresponding controls lay down binding guidelines requiring them to concentrate 
on certain areas of activity and to keep their business practices within the 
statutory framework. Thus they are not in a position to aim at unrestricted 
profit-making, In most cases, however, the public utilities are run along 
much the same lines as a private company. That is to say, they are for the 
most part independent economic entities and not administrative agencies. 
The question of ownership is for the most part immaterial to this category of 
enterprise. In fact, the capital may even be wholly in private hands. It may 
also take the form of a limited company with the involvement of various groups. 
The literature on the subject points to a broad discussion as to whether the 
state-owned enterprise or the public utility is the most suitable structure 
for specific functions. 
We do not wish to extend that discussion here today but to refer specifically 
to the public utility in particular because in our view it can considerably 
ease the burden of direct business management on the state without neglecting 
the aims prescribed by the state. At the same time, it may be easier to 
mobilise capital without the state itself having to invest directly. There is 
a third category, which needs to be mentioned: 
Common-weal enterprises . The term common-weal enterprise embraces a variety 
of business structures but their common feature is that they are not directly 
controlled by the state. They have opted of their own free will to perform 
public functions. Their main criterion are their articles of association which 
specify their public tasks, the aims and purposes of their business activity, 
and the nature of their corporate decision-making procedure. The enterprise 
is owned not by the state but by individuals or groups who, of their own accord, 
have chosen to pursue public aims. 
The principal entity in this category is the co-operative, not so much as 
regards the legal form, as the economic meaning, in the sense that it is a 
self-help organization, The fact that co-operative undertakings and public 
utilit ies are grouped together under the description "common-weal enter-
prices" is the result of an old tradition in German economic literature. 
As Adolf Wagner put it, it is mainly the "inner affinity" of their aims which 
unites these two types of enterprise. 
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If we ignore for a moment the fact that we are mainly discussing business 
e n t e r p r i s e s , I would briefly add that this type of organizational set-up, that 
is, owned by non-governmental groups and embracing small private holdings, is 
s u i t e d to various other purposes as well, such as common tasks in the social 
and educational field. 
The most striking feature of the common-weal enterprise in this case is that 
anyone can be invited to participate directly in the organization's economic 
activities. He may have his own financial stake in the enterprise but this is 
not a condition. Also conceivable in this category are types of enterprise in 
which the members gradually build up their own financial participation from the 
resources earned by the enterprise. But they retain a direct financial interest 
in the enterprise and are directly involved in its business operations. This 
generates a much stronger motivation than is usually the case when members are 
merely small cogs in a big wheel directly controlled by the state. 
Ill. Self-sufficiency as business criterion 
The political economy of state-owned enterprises has so far received very scant 
attention in the general literature on business management. Indeed, the 
public economy itself has done little to stimulate thinking or writing 
specifically about the management problems of such enterprises. There is 
a certain widespread complacency among state and local-authority-owned enter-
prises and the public authorities who, whilst they are mutually dependent, 
usually expect one another to come up with solutions to their own problems. 
Moreover, the lack of public criticism of the business practices of these 
enterprises is also one of the reasons why the underlying problems have seldom 
been raised. 
As regards their management, it has been said that they followed the rules of 
private enterprise or just waited for instructions from the controlling 
authorities. Considering the development of centrally controlled economies 
of various countries, it can be said with a good degree of certainty that it 
is too much to expect government to be constantly concerned with the business c 
operations of state-owned enterprises in every detail. Thus, apart from the 
target discussion, the need for which I mentioned earlier on, the state-owned 
enterprise must be enabled to carry out economic tasks on its own responsibility 
within a clear-cut framework. 
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In order to avoid any misunderstandings, let me say that I am not in any way 
denying the interdependence of all economic and political developments, but 
every enterprise needs at first a clearly defined area in which to manage 
its affairs on its own responsibility. All enterprises, irrespective of 
the political system they have to operate under, are to a certain extent self 
reliant entities that are expected to conduct their business in a rational 
manner. 
The self-sufficiency or self-reliance of an enterprise is also understood as 
the self-financing principle. To put it simply, it is assumed that the enter-
prise will itself take all the decisions necessary for its internal operations 
and itself earn the money to meet the cost of such operations. 
I mentioned in the beginning that in actual fact the economic systems of most 
countries - and this applies most particularly to African countries - expect 
public enterprises to have a decisive social influence as well. In other 
words, they have to fill in addition to normal business operations a role which 
they would certainly not accept without question if they were private 
enterprises aimed at making a profit. This role, and where appropriate the 
question of suitable renumeration for such activities, should also be decided 
upon within the scope of the target discussion. If one starts from the 
assumption that public enterprises too, should be expected to fulfill other 
tasks, it is necessary to appreciate that this normally only embraces costs 
that originate in the enterprise in the course of its autonomous production 
and marketing activities. They will definitely include costs which appear 
necessary for investment to maintain the enterprise or to finance agreed 
measures for its expansion. These the economist refers to as financial 
management costs, those incurred by an establishment being rationally and 
properly run and having as far as possible to be covered by income over a 
certain period. 
In this sense, therefore, self-sufficiency implies that the company must be 
self-financing. It is not a question of making a profit but merely of covering 
operating costs. 
There has been much discussion as to whether this principle should be 
applied in the public sector. The main argument put forward in its favour is 
that this is the only way of mitigating the inefficiency of public enterprises, 
that it would take up a lot of the organizational slack by motivating 
management and workforce. We would agree with this latter argument. 
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However, allowing enterprises a certain degree of freedom within the limits 
set out in the target discussion or the articles of association presupposes 
that they are in a position to function efficiently. But studies carried out 
so far show that they still leave much to be desired in this respect. In the 
initial phase, they usually give due regard to the problems of technology to 
the exclusion of other matters. But the widespread illusion that once a 
company has equiped itself with modern technology all other problems will take 
care of themselves has nowhere been borne out in practice. 
If we leave aside the technical problems, there are two large and typical 
problems areas. One is the question of the exchange of information within 
the enterprise, the other that of decentralization and division of respon-
sibilities, which is summed up by the term "worker participation". 
One cannot overestimate the importance of information within the enterprise, 
information which can be called upon at any time. The management of a public 
enterprise must at all times be in a position to obtain immediate information 
on all internal processes and costs. This may also be information about 
inventory control and raw material stocks, production data, the number of 
employees off sick, and many other matters. With this information the admini-
strative level, middle management, can prepare and report on material needed 
for decisions at the policy-making level. In a well functioning enterprise 
this information process works almost automatically in that information on 
specific matters can be requested and supplied at specific times. 
It will depend on the size of the enterprise and the production set-up whether 
this information is provided on a person-to-person basis or by technical means. 
The development of computer technology and its increasing use as an aid to 
such decision-making processes becomes necessary where management can no longer 
easily keep an eye on the various activities and run the place more or less 
by intuition. Although there is usually no resistance whatsoever to the use 
of modern technology in production, we have gained the impression in our 
various investigations that there is considerable opposition to its introduction 
for information purposes. 
On the other hand, an adequate supply of information is not only essential 
for external planning and target setting but equally for the decentralization 
of responsibility on the shop floor and hence as a means of motivating individual 
initiative within a framework that is known and readily grasped. 
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In both, East and West, models have been developed with a view to modifying 
power structures on the shop floor and removing authoritarian systems. I will 
only mention in this connection the YU*oslav model of worker self-government or 
the German system of worker participation, known as co-determination. 
The extremely complicated relationships between decentralization or, in other 
words, democratisation and efficiency have been the subject of various 
sociological studies in recent years. There is no disputing the connection 
between democratisation and increased efficiency, and between job satisfaction 
and productivity. Experience has shown that more factory democracy considerably 
increases an enterprises'^ scope for decision-making. This in turn has led 
to much greater initiative on the part of the individual workers and encouraged 
them to play a responsible part, again within areas of responsibility which must 
of course be clearly defined. 
If the economic structure as a whole is not to end up as an authoritarian 
bureaucracy, the system of central government control as practised in 
socialist countries, as well as the use of private sector power must be 
.counteracted by means of internal democratic systems involving a considerable 
amount of individual responsibility. 
IV. Strategies for the settlement of conflicts 
It is no secret, that there is a tendency with public enterprises in particular 
not to draw public attention to their problems and disputes, but rather to 
keep them out of sight. They attempt either to suppress discussion of such 
problems within the company or to refer them to outside organizations (ministries, 
marketing boards, etc.) on the ground that they are the competent authorities. 
There is little need to emphasise that this is no long-term solution. The 
main drawback to this attitude is always the fact that the positive, the 
motivating and the constructive element in any conflict are just not motivated. 
It seems to me important in this context to point out, that conflicts are 
almost an inevitable consequence of the inter-dependence of the economic and the 
social process, but that they must by no means be seen purely from the negative 
angle. In actual fact knowledge of the existing possibilities of resolving 
the conflict can have various positive effects. Numerous European enterprises 
using different systems of worker participation have, as I said earlier, already 
found this out. 
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We therefore deem it extremely important to emphasise that the strategy of 
conflict management should be an integral part of any management training 
within the enterprise, and especially in public utilities and their admini-
strative bodies, because co-operation among the latter, and hence the danger 
of conflict, is considerable. 
This, on the other hand, is a good opportunity to bring in the researcher who , 
through objective analysis, can provide a balanced assessment of the respective 
situation, and hence a basis for a frank and unemotional discussion on existing 
problems and possible solutions. 
Many African countries are still very sceptical about this sort of arrangement. 
There, frank professional discussion of business management problems is, 
unfortunately, still a rarity. Economic data are in many cases still treated 
as if they were classified material. No open discussion is permitted on target 
disparities and target conflicts as a result of the incompatibility of political 
requirements and the economic possibilities of the enterprise. 
Until such time as there is a change of attitude on the part of all persons 
and groups concerned there is not likely to be any substantial improvement in 
the economic process. What is required are not only the technical prerequisites 
for production but also the proper interplay of all the factors involved - man 
and material - at the right time and geared to the common objectives. This is 
essential for a smoothly operating enterprise. 
Perhaps I might emphasise in this connection that American and British authors 
have already analysed the genesis of conflicts in depth and developed extensive 
models for their solution. It involves social techniques which can definitely 
be learned. Unfortunately, we have not the time to go into the details of 
these systems except to say that a distinction has to be made between two types 
of conflict, the latent and the so-called manifest or open conflict. 
The latent or potential conflict, the more common term for which is covert 
conflict, is usually the result of divergent, incompatible targets which are 
viewed and interpreted differently by the groups concerned in each case. 
The manifest or open conflict (overt conflict) is the next stage after a latent 
conflict, with the difference that in this case one is aware of the conflict and 
of the opportunity for action. Thus the reaction to a latent conflict can be 
either its further suppression or deliberate conflict behaviour. With deliberate 
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conflict behaviour another distinction has to be made between conflict 
management or uncontrolled conflict escalation. 
Which conflict management, procedure followed in a specific case, will depend 
on the actual situation. Possible measures range from individual discussion 
via an improvement in the communication system we have already mentioned, the 
exchange of personnel, improvements in further training programmes for those 
concerned, to the appointment of permanent bodies as institutionalised forms 
of conflict management. 
In all of these cases the different groups inside and out-side the enterprise 
may take the initiative, whether through informal discussion groups within the 
establishment, organised social affairs committees, bodies concerned with worker 
participation, or, at the national level, discussion between business and 
political leaders or between the various organizations involved in the economic 
process. 
However I would like to mention, that the positive aspects of deliberate conflict 
management are self-evident and should in themselves be motive enough for action. 
Let me therefore just quickly mention those positive aspects once again: 
1. Encouragement of initiative and motivation 
(efficiency incentive function) 
2. Larger measure of solidarity among the groups or 
persons concerned (integrational function) 
3. Stabilisation of existing systems as a result of the 
demand made on them (stabilising function) 
In view of the basic organizational structure as to 
its suitability and validity, if necessary its 
modification (innovative function) 
5. Developing and testing ways of improving communication between the 
different units (communicative function) 
6. And finally considerable improvements can be made in the distribution 
of funds as between the groups concerned as a result of such intentional 
discussion of the conflict (allocative function). 
A mere glance at these favourable possibilities of settling the process for 
a deliberate solution of the conflict in motion should be reason enough to 
give it a try. Incidentally, it is a fact, and this has been established in 
many surveys, that by contrast the use of threats and means of power Is as 
a rule just as unlikely to resolve conflicts as is the suppression of the causes 
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of conflict. Use of the instruments of power is always a source of new 
conflicts which rules out the favourable possibilities of achieving a soul 
solution. And of course it is by no means adequate to a socialist economy, 
which tends to give more freedom and better working conditions to men. A 
worker's attitude to "his" firm largely depends on the extent to which he 
feels that he is consulted and able to play his part. we assume that a 
country's stability depends to a large extent on the smooth functioning of 
its economy, both businessmen and politicians should be anxious to solve the 
kind of problems I have just outlined. 
As I said in the beginning, these remarks are merely intended to stimulate 
discussion. Of course, they have been very general. In particular, I have 
not explored the specific managerial problems of a state-owned enterprise 
resulting from the exclusion of certain economic functions. One such function, 
for instance, is that of marketing. This considerably restricts the prospects 
of rational management since it leaves the enterprise no opportunity to adjust 
its position by means of a deliberate price policy. This also applies where 
only the government allocates raw materials, with the result that enterprises 
have no influence on commodity prices and/or quantities. 
Here it is above all a task for researchers to analyse, in the light of 
information from within the enterprise, the extent of the difficulties and 
problems which such restrictions on business activity entail. 
Once the self-sufficiency of the state-owned enterprise, the public utility, 
or the common-weal enterprise is to be wellcomed in principle, any restriction 
or expansion of their normal business functions calls for a frank discussion 
basei on detailed facts, among managers, politicians and researche E in order 
to ensure a smooth economic process. I appreciate the atmosphere of open minded 
discussion in IDS which I know for year's and with this in mind may I wish 
all the participants in this meeting every success. 
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THE ROLE OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISES IN DEVELOPMENT 
Or-
TOWARDS BETTER UNDERSTANDING^THE DEVELOPMENT AND 
PERFORMANCE OF STATE CORPORATION AND STATE ENTER-
PRICE - WITH REFERENCE TO ETHIOPIAN EXPERIENCE 
By 
JOHANNES KINFU 
ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR - ACCOUNTING 
AND 
FINANCE, PLANNING OFFICER - AAU 
INTRODUCTION: 
1. From Privately Owned Corporations To State Corporation 
The increase in number, size and influence of private corporations gave an 
impression that the corporate device was only employable in the private sector 
of industry and commerce, The growth of the corporate system in the private 
sector gave rise to such discontent and grudge that it was compared to the 
feudal system. Taking account of the great concentration of economic power, 
Berle and Means foresaw the private corporation as a formidable rival to the 
state. Fears were expressed that the economic organization,typified by the 
corporation, would supersede the dominant form of social organization. But little 
was known that the rivalry between the state and the corporate device would 
give rise to the former adapting the latter ,that is,the state permitting the 
growth of state corporations as the dominant form of industrial and commercial 
organization.1 
Looking at the history of corporate evolution, we must note that actually 
the state had a lot of influence in the development of corporations. In fact, 
state corporations have more antiquity than private corporations. As much as 
the state has influenced life in private Corporation by granting them the legal 
status of an artificial person, the private corporation also paved the way for 
the growth of state corporations in the present era. Giant corporations in their 
monopolistic growth technically and physically not only stifled the way for 
industrial enterpreneurs, but became inconsistent even with the ideal of free 
enterprise to the point that free enterprise became an obstacle to development, 
1. Adolfe A. Berle, fr. and Gardner C. Means: The Modern Corporation and 
Private Property, (MacMillan, New York, 1950). 
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and the causes of many grave social problems and contradictions. Thus where 
the corporate device has taken away flexibility initiative and a sense of 
responsibility to meet public need, the constitution of the state corporation 
2 made public enterprise more acceptable. When regulatory measures failed 
to protect public interest, the atmosphere was most favorable for the birth ••v.,. i.<. • 
of state corporations. With the state corporations, the passing of nationali-
zation legislation became convenient for taking over monopolistic corporations 
as a going concern. Thus state corporations were formed to be an urgent 
social necessity. 
Public Enterprise and State Corporations Definitions:- Public enterprises 
may be generally defined as any government - owned and/or controlled unit 
that produces and sells industrial, commercial, or financial goods and services. 
But such a definition tries to be nonsystem-related, very broad and general. 
It tells nothing about the development, historical evolution, type, legal and 
organizational form encountered in various countries. It does not contribute 
towards the understanding of the operations and management of state corporations 
Of course, a more rigid definition of public enterprise would definitely be 
elusive and undesirable in view of the variety of legal and organizational 
forms, encountered in various countries and systems. Public finance literature 
3 generally focuses on only two traditional types of public enterprise. 
a) Industries operated as fiscal monopolies by governments or 
their agencies, owing usually to the inelasticity of demand 
to provide a source of government revenue, such as salt and 
tobacco. 
b) Industries that cannot be operated both profitably and efficiently 
owing to the decreasing cost characteristics of production 
function (economies of scale), such as public utilities, power, 
water and some transport systems. In such cases, the government 
either undertakes production and provision of the goods and 
services in question itself, or permits the emergence of a priva-
tely owned "natural monopoly" that it regulates. Such activities 
would generate losses if operated efficiently, and losses must be 
financed from other sources. Attention in the literature has 
generally been focused on the appropriate pricing policy and the 
2. O.M. Parakash: The Theory and working of State Corporations with special 
reference to India. 
3. Robert H. Floyd: Some Aspects of Income Taxation of Public Enterprise. 
Documents of International Monetary Fund DM/77/96, 
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government subsidy of financing the deficit and not really 
on their management and organization. Public ownership of business, 
however, is no longer confined to these traditional fiscal and or 
natural monopolies as we saw earlier. Many nations have, for a 
variety of reasons and as a result of the history of corporate 
evolution, and ideological and political evolution, come to assume 
or establish the ownership of various commercial, industrial, and 
financial enterprises that have often generated profitable and 
efficient operations. This heralded the governments enter', or 
ownership into "non-traditional" enterprises, which were formerly 
the domain of private corporations. 
We should therefore identify the following definitions: 
Public Enterprise - (traditional) is a term referring to the traditional 
concepts of government-owned and or controlled enterprises operating in spheres 
of inelasticity of demand, and or "natural monopoly" conditions. 
Public Enterprise - (non-traditional) refers to government owned or government 
partnership with foreign investors in non-traditional commercial and industrial 
activities. This gives rise more to the characteristic of the modern corporate 
structure leading to the creation of state corporations, The full articulation 
of the characteristics of a state corporation depends on its system relation. 
State Corporations - in a socialist state this is used to refer to a collection 
of state enterprises. It does not matter in which sphere of activity it 
operates; while the state enterprise in a socialist state is an economic cell, 
II, Public Enterprises in Africa 
There is a growing concern in the world today over the management, effectiveness 
and usefulness of public enterprises as instruments of development and change. 
In Africa and in all underdeveloped countries, this era. has seen the rise of 
public enterprises in the form and names of State Corporations, State 
Enterprises, Development Corporations, and Public Corporations and Utility 
Marketing and Agricultural Boards, These are the various forms or names used 
when governments either enter into partnership with foreign investors or non-
traditional public enterprises, profitable and efficiently operational markets 
other than those dominated by fiscal monopolies. 
1 » 
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J.O. Undoji writes that any inquirer about public enterprises today is struck; 
not only by t>"their variety....(but also).... by the number of those public 
bodies, the rate at which they are being created, and the large amounts of 
money being channeled into them." In 1966 the Ministry of Agriculture m 
Kenya had over 100 public enterprises with an investment of over 150 million 
pounds, while Uganda had 14 major corporations of which the Development Cor-
poration had 53 subsidiaries. Tanzania had 10 government companies and 3 5 
boards and corporations with several subsidiaries; and 66 subsidiaries in the 
5 
Development Corporation. In Ethiopia in the early period of nationalization, 
the Ministry of Natural Resources (MNR) had 72 major corporations in 5 
different spheres of activities with an investment of more than Ethiopian 
$300 million. 
Chief Undoji says, "if the rate at which these bodies are being created and 
financed were indicative of economic growth of the countries, or the success 
of the bodies themselves, at least some of the countries would be near the 
stage of economic take-off. In West African at least the experience has been g 
in the opposite direction." The causes for such an experience has been 
identified as: 
a) Investment in non-viable projects or projects that reaped quick 
returns within a short period, and a lack of pre-investment survey. 
b) Scandalous and inefficient performance. 
c) No precisely-defined objectives in terms of quantitative targets. 
d) Political patronage - qualification is political acceptability, 
not the qualification of expertise or professional competency. 
e) Inefficient organizational structure and management. 
f) Lack of expertise and qualified manpower. 
g) Lack of sound financial, fiscal and monetary policy. 
h) Conflict between ministerial level, Board level, management level, 
consumer level. 
i) Failure to articulate financial and accounting procedures and 
policies. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
J.O. Undoji; Reforming the Public Enterprise in Africa, journal of AAPAM. 
Ibid. 
t
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The causes for their establishment and the raison d'etre, however, were : 
a) After the achievement of independence, the industrial and 
^ commercial sector, which was controlled by foreigners, 
restricted Africans from participation. The foreigners 
entrenched themselves on commanding heights which became 
difficult to challenge by government. 
b) Government realised that enormous and urgent problems of 
development cannot be solved by private enterprise, and 
government should get away from traditional caretaker and 
regulatory functions to move to an era of active partici-
pation. 
c) The government had to enter into fields where private investment 
would not dare because they required huge investments and small 
returns. 
d) There was the necessity for building infrastructure. 
e) Some types of Boards (Marketing Boards) had to be created in 
order to maintain a pricing policy, for martialing and 
accumulation of surpluses for financing the capital budget. 
Public enterprises and their growth in developing countries particularly in 
Africa has been astounding in their variety, size of investment, number and 
names. Their arrival heralded big expectations. They were expected to provide 
solutions for many economic difficulties, but experience showed the opposite, 
for soon they were fettered with problems. The causes for their failure to 
bring forth the expected results could be summarized as: 
a) the lack of definite and articulated goals and objectives 
b) the lack of management efficiency 
c) the lack of technical expertise in financial, organizational 
and production knowa-how. 
But despite this, one thing was definite their existence was necessary, 
continuing and assured. 
Ill• Characteristics of Public (State) Corporations 1 
A further review of literature indicates attempts were made to discern the 
characteristics of public enterprise or state corporations, and the issues and 
O problems encountered. Some of these characteristics will be briefly enumerated. 
1. Statutory Body- A public corporation (state corporations) is an embodiment 
of an expressed wish on the part of the state to create a new agency. 
7. W. Friedmann: The Public Corporation, (University of Toronto School of 
Law Series, Vol: I 1954). 
8. Parakash op.cit. 
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Insulated personality:- Because it possesses a legal personality, it is 
not only separate from persons who conduct its affairs but also from the 
state as such. "It is a child of the state who grows to maturity as 
g 
soon as it is born." This legal personality independence is not always 
consistent in application. State corporations being part of the state are 
only treated or regarded as such. The degree of insulation from the 
parent institution is, therefore, not clear. 
Independent governing board:- The affairs of public corporations are 
administered by an independent board, but there has always been a division 
of opinion whether the members of this board, specialists and others should 
be representatives of any section, class, group interests or not. In the 
Twenties, it was suggested that the boards should be composed of all the 
involved interests. Labour movements and socialist movements gave rise 
to a "workers control board", which in some socialist countries were dis-
regarded in 1944- in favor of an efficiency board of persons chosen solely 
for their ability.10 
Respectful relationship with the Minister:- A public corporation is 
responsible to the government through the appropriate Minister. The power 
given to ministers may vary according to the acts, but the powers the 
ministers would exercise concerning policy of control of nationalized 
corporations, terms of compensation, safety regulations etc. are important 
to define, though the level and extent is hard to determine. 
Autonomous working conditions:- As much as the public corporation is 
a government child it is subject to supervised control, but over-centraliz-
ation here has been held to be the root cause of inefficiency in the 
management of public undertakings. The other basic side of a public 
corporation concept, therefore, should rest on the autonomy of its normal 
(day to day) operations to ensure the following advantage: 
Parakash, op.cit. 
Ibid, also I. Wilczynski: The Economics of Socialism. Profit, Book 
and incentives under Socialist Economic Planning (George Allen and 
Unwin Ltd. 1972). 
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a. Freedom from red tape - Commercial activities require 
quick decisions, which cannot be delayed through long 
procedural notes and routes ( on time and real time)• 
b. Freedom from Treasury control - Though this may be 
neither completely possible or desirable in some situations, 
the need for 'self-contained finance' requires opportunities 
for incurring expenditures in a flexible, operational framework 
that cannot go through incompetency or unwillingness to 
assume risk which will prolong decisions. 
c. Freedom from political dictation - A public corporation is 
expected to maximise its operational efficiency, guided 
only by its charter or policy directives issued t fro vera Trent 
But if nationalized industries geteiit?.r.risd in the political 
fabric"They wiIT be in danger of losing the habit and thought 
on which efficient business depends.""^ Many nationalizing 
acts have attempted to ensure a happy blending of "business 
principles" and "public interest", though it is a herculean 
task to make a workable distinction between 'day to day 
business' and ' overall policy.' An example is a bank's 
refusal to grant loans to small cottage industry on the grounds 
of inability to furnish adequate security, which may contradict 
with terms of national policy. The Commercial Bank of 
Ethiopia's refusal to handle the payment of the university 
payroll through the fcank on the grounds that it increases its 
cost of operation is a case in point. 
6. Self-contained finance - This is a corollary of the fifth characteristic. 
The idea of autonomy remains illusory unless it is accompanied by financial 
independence. The state corporations (public corporations) to realize 
the expected income must depend upon economic factors rather than on the 
benevolence of the legislature. They should be free from inordinate delay, 
caused by excessive treasury control. They should be free from the lapse 
system which encourages lavish and imprudent spending towards the close of 
the financial year. Thus if state corporations are to adhere to proper 
"business principles" or operation, they will have to use accrual bases of 
accounting (entity accounting) and not government accounting with its cash 
11. Berle and ftfjeans, op.cit
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12 bases of accounting. True, corporations like the National Cooperative 
Development, and Rehabilitation Administration are far from the ideal of 
self-contained finance. Self-contained finance has also implications on 
the manner and account in which profits are to be disposed of, and the 
process of establishment of reserve funds, and the portion of surplus to 
be paid to the central government. 
7. Disinterestedness in Profit - The public corporation is not interested in 
maximising the profits, though it must be run efficiently, and in that 
process it may make large profits. A surplus resulting from such efficiency 
is the basis for socialized industry. 
"The public corporation must be no more capitalist business, the beginning 
and end - all of which is profit and dividends. It must have a different 
atmosphere at its Board from that of a shareholder's meeting, its board 
and its officers must regard themselves as the high custodians of public 
13 interest" (Herbert Morrison). It is hoped that the public corporation 
would "absorb the fine tradition of public service maintaining freedom 
14 at the same time, from corruption which characterise civil services." 
8. No shares and no shareholders:- It is true that the public corporation have 
no shares or shareholders, and 'the profit motive is replaced by the public 
service motive', but in financial terms the nation owns the equity in the 
case of public enterprises. The nation is therefore the enterpreneur in the 
^ ultimate analysis, it stands to gain or to lose from successful operations 
of publicly-owned industries. The gain or loss may be a monetary character, 
i.e. lower prices, reduced level of taxation, higher prices and increased 
level of taxation caused by inefficiency. The gain or loss may take the 
shape of "conveniences" and "inconveniences." 
12.Accrual bases of accounting - expenses and incomes are recognised when 
incurred irrespective of whether paid or received in cash. Cash bases of 
accounting - recognises incomes and expenses only when received and paid in 
cash, There is also modified Accrual or Cash bases. 
13.Herbert Morrison. 
lH.Parakash, op.cit. 
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9. Public Monopoly:- It is customary for the state to declare 
monopolistic rights for itself in any particular line of business 
activity. Thus public enterprises (public corporations) must have 
monopolistic rights in that particular line of business activity, 
since it would be uneconomical and wasteful to permit competing 
units by parallel lines in public undertakings. Thus there is a 
strong case for ammalgamation and monopolistic operation by state 
corporations. But to guard against the danger of a public monopoly, 
judicial control is considered necessary to provide necessary safeguards 
for adequecy of operation, for provision of services, frequency, for 
control of fares to be charged, hiring practices, fixing compensation, 
overhead and maintenance, failure to meet contractual obligation, 
corruption and discriminitery practices. Where and how should the 
state corporations be sued, and who should be the arbitrator, and 
especially between state corporations is a dilemma. 
10. Commercial A u d i t T h e public corporation is constructed to operate 
with a commercial or industrial character free from vaxatious rules 
of procedures applicable to government departments. Thus adhering 
to its efficient operation of 'business and financial principles' 
it must prepare its accounts according to well-settled commercial 
principles, including paying interest on capital outlay, taxes on 
profit, and percentages contribution to consolidated funds based on 
earnings. This would support the policy of making it to be subject 
for commercial audit instead of the usual government comptroller and 
Auditor General rule, which requires more than the pedestrian function 
of government audit, where auditors fall prey to "the penny wise, pound 
foolish" practice. They may engross themselves with such petty technical 
details that they hardly have time (or competence) to be able to pay 
attention or understand the broader questions of business efficiency, 
accounting principles and prudent management. Thus it is necessary to 
lay down the manner and form on how the state corporations account 
should be maintained and audited, defining more carefully the Auditor 
General's responsibility to these organizations, and the qualification 
and appointment of auditors for such organization. 
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IV. Characteristics of a Socialist Firm and Socialist Enterprise: 
The socialist literature identifies a socialist firm and a 
socialist enterprise characteristics as follows: 
A. Industrial firm n'n a socialist state is : 
a special, and at the same time, the principal element of the 
administration of industry. 
a specific economic production unit, organized for the purpose of 
achieving output. 
basic economic cell of the unified economy of socialist society. 
15 
The characteristics of socialist enterprise are summarised as: 
collective ownership of the means of production 
collective production 
the purpose functions and structures which are determined by the 
prevailing mode of production. 
organizational and technical cooperation 
cooperation between human labor and machines 
harmony between individual activities through cooperation 
between those who perform mental and physical work and have 
different functions. 
socialist consciousness 
unity of politics and economics 
"not only a consciously desired systematically developed form of 
organization of the collective productive force, not only the physical, 
technical basis for satisfying the needs of the whole society, 
it is at the sar,e time an essential constituent of the socio-economic 
basis for the dictatorship of the proletariat, the embodiment of socialist 
production relations. These two sides of the socialist industrial firm 
16 are inseparably bound up with each other, they form an indissolube unit" 
15. C.D. Karing: Marxism and Western Society A Comparative Encyclopedia 
(New York, Horder, 1972). 
16. Ibid. 
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influential institution for creating the "new type of man". 
- Khozraschet system, fulfilling and exceeding the state planning 
target, utilising as effectively as possible funds provided by 
the state, lowering costs as far as possible and increasing 
socialist accumulation, 
contract system 
- principle of one-man management. 
Socialist Firm. Under free enterprise, the decision-making of firms lis in 
the uncertainty about scarcity relationship between resources and products. 
These scarcity relationships depend upon the relationships between supply and 
demand. They determine the level of industrial profits, or the level of costs, 
and through these factors govern both the profit making and the nonrpro^fit 
firms. From the macro-economic standpoint, this means the economy is controlled 
according to the individual welfare function of the maximization of consumer 
satisfaction. Because of time needed for the decision-making process^-however, 
decisions on supply are already taken before demand is known. Demand i|fe based 
upon subjective valuation of commodities by the consumers. So long as free 
consumer choice exists in an economic system, the uncertainty over the governing 
factors cannot be eliminated. In socialist economic systems, the economy is 
controlled through the plan objectives which emerge from the general forward 
plans. These plans are drawn upon the basis of the "law .of proportional 
development," the object of which is to fix the proportionate growth of 
industries in such a way that the building of socialism may take place as rapidly 
as possible. The economy is thus controlled according to a collective welfare 
function and the decision-making process of the socialist firm is therefore not 
characterised by uncertainty over demand. Risk is not however eliminated. 
According to socialist economic literature this risk does not exist in socialist 
countries. This uncertainty which is "anarchy of production", is inherent 
only in a capitalist economy. But there are others who argue, despite socialist 
literature, saying the risk is not eliminated in socialism, it is only shifted 
to the central planning authority, which with free consumer choice must' fix 
prices ex-ante so high that with supply at the level of planned quantity these 
,-prices would also appear as scarcity prices ex-post in the actual subjective 
valuation of the consumers. This dilemma of the central planning authority in 
socialist countries is said to be that of'reconciling the law of value with 
the law of proportional development," To solve the problem, attempts have 
been made in East Germany with "New economic system of planning and management" 
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to pass on part of .this risk to the socialist firm.1' 
18 Socialist Enterprise The socialist enterprise thus: 
1. is an independently producing economic unit 
2. has legal personality 
3. has autonomy and contractual freedom though this depends on operative 
power (executive) or dispositive power (decision-making). 
4. its goals are: 
meeting the demand for production output at minimum 
high quality and profitability 
independent execution of the reproduction process within the 
framework of enterprises range or responsibility, 
protecting employee's health and socialist property within 
the enterprise 
improvement of socialist working and living conditions. 
5. works through communication and information (no secret as in 
capitalist competition) cybernetics 
6. its ability of conversion of above norms and goals depend on 
(a) decision-making hierarchy 
(b) production function 
7. its coordination of operational and/or central planning functions 
by simulation, game-theory of iteration 
8. tries to assure participation of labor force in decision-making 
and planning process of the enterprise. 
9. has resources at its disposal 
10. has its constitution 
11.. has a director - under principle of democratic centralism and 
principle of "one-man management". 
12. has come to be partial risk bearer 
17. 
18. 
Kering op. cit. / Wilczynski op. cit. 
Ibid. 
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19 Incentives Incentives appropriate to the socialist systems (socialist' 
enterprise) are cjiscerned to he based pn the fpllpwing factors: 
(a) Socialist consciousness 
(b) Basic economic law of socialism 
- direct t° solving problem of cpntinous expansion and 
improvement of production. 
(c) principle of material se^f"-interest 
t key to achievement of maximum economic benefit at the 
lowest social cost. Me who aphi^ves better results in 
his work should receive a greater reward, question is 
only the basis of evaluation to measure genuine production 
motivation. 
(d) Active pa^ticip^tipn of all workers in the collective managing 
of the firm, 
m pot ohly achieve planned garget but exceed^ Offer labor 
time freely. 
(e) The economy campaign 
- save time, money, resources. 
(f) Economy campaign v personal account 
- account for use of material 
(g) Profit index, As ipdex of efficiency, it is said th^t Lenin 
said managers Should be "punished with Ipng prison sentences" 
if they did not succeed in operating at 9 profit. 
T For example in the U.S.S.R. the Khozrachet system makes 
industrial accounting with profit criteria a practical 
necessity, 
- Profit in socialist firm has the function pf at} efficiency 
indicator which shows how the firm is operating and what 
contribution it is making tpwards social accumulation 
as a whple, 
(a) and (b) are considered to be moral incentives while (c) to 
(d) are supposed to be material incentives, 
19T Kering, pp.cit. 
To summarise overall the public enterprise literature: 
- a) shows traditional versus non-traditional ones, b) notes the government 
and business characteristics in public enterprises, and their amphibiousness, 
c) hints that their malaise is due to a lack of specific ideological 
objectives, and that the environment and ideological setting can determine 
more of their nature. A state corporation in a socialist setting is not 
the same as a state corporation in capitalist market and this is not only 
due to the ideological objectives, but also relative to the level of 
technological development (level of sophistication of managerial know how, 
organizational structure, and financial accountability). 
V. Critical Importance of Enterprise Performance 
It is obvious that many capitalist micro-economic concepts are in conflict 
with the labour theory of value, social justice and planned development. 
Therefore after the formation of a socialist state or the declaration of 
socialism, state enterprise independence had to be restricted in order to 
prevent the recurrence of many abuses of laissez faire capitalism, the 
absolute power of management over workers, the exploitation of the public 
disruptive competent management personnel it was desirable and necessary that 
, . . . . 2 0 
central authorities make all social decision for individual enterprises. 
This makes the enterprise play a role of passive and obedient executor of 
command, and not a decision maker for resources under its command. It is 
understandable, however, how this is necessary at the early stages of 
development in order to enhance and centralize directive planning and 
management. However, this situation paid little concern for efficiency of 
the enterprise as was seen in the Societ Union 1940 - 1960. 
In the mid 50's and 60's, therefore, there was a great debate in many 
socialist countries that led to reappraisal of micro-economics in socialist 
states particularly that of the place of the enterprise. For it came to 
be admitted and realised that even if resources were allocated at optimum at 
central planning level, there could still be wasteful utilization of resources 
on individual enterprises which would stagnate the socialist economy. 
Consequently, there was a need to free enterprises from too much inter-
ference in details of operations by central authorities, and to consider 
appropriate incentive measures, based on some criterion which would combine 
micro and macroeconomic, micro and macro management, and micro and macro 
accounting interests and objectives, so that "there is no contradiction 
21 between the interest of enterprise and that of society." In this en-
22 deavor, the "enterprise obviously represents the main battle ground." 
20. 
21. 
22. 
Wilczynski, op. cit. 
Wilczynski, op. cit. 
Ibid. 
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For economy in the use of labor, capital and equipment and raw material, the 
introduction and diffusion of technology the improvement in quality and 
variety of products, the adaption of production to demand, cost savings, 
accumulation of surpluses, all depend on the ultimate analysis of enterprise 
and its efficiency of performance. The train of economic development leads 
23 to the study of "the enterprise." 
Socialist production is. the material base of socialist finance. Its primary 
unit is the enterprise. Socialist state enterprises must work on a cost 
accounting bases since there is a direct connection between the qualitative 
and quantitative indices of the economic activity of socialist enterprises and 
their financial condition. Cost accounting thus becomes a form of planned 
management of socialist enterprise. 
Criteria for enterprise performances , The socialist enterprises should be 
involved in a constant increase of profit volume within limits and conditions 
laid down by statutory rules and economic regulations. Despite what we saw to 
be disinterestedness in profit as one of the traditional characteristics of 
state enterprise, here we see profit involvement is necessary. But profit 
involvement does not mean enterprise can dispose of its entire accumulated 
profit. The profit sharing (profit skimming) is done in many ways in socialist 
countries (a) asset-proportional (b) wage proportional (c) production tax 
(d) turnover tax (e) profit tax, or by dividing it into (a) managers fund 
(b) enterprise development fund (c) improvement fund. 
Financial involvements 
The enterprise financial involvement as well as profit involvements means that 
for the enterprise to continue operations, it must have some discretionary 
powers to use its funds for (a) material incentive and the further development 
of enterprise employees, (b) increase of volume of profit, (c) independent 
economic accounting - for cost control or improved technical development, and 
to make self-cost as the basis for official price regulation and independent 
entity for administering its funds. 
Enterprise profit involvement and financial involvement concerns 
(1) the material incentives, and the further development of financial 
(2) enterprise involvement in the increase of volume of profit. 
(3) enterprise involvement in-independent economic acitivity and 
independent entity-independently administering its funds and 
resources. 
23. Borry M. Richmen: Industrial Society in Communist China. 
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Incentive:- The collective and individual incomes of the workers are closely 
related to the afficiency of the enterprise economy. It has been realised 
that to place enterprise performance on a solid basis and yield desired 
production results, some system of material motivation and criteria for 
evaluating performance of enterprise and the persons must be established. Of 
course.j criteria for incentive payments or for evaluation of performance, may 
vary. 
Method of evaluation 
a. Goal fulfillment in terms of meeting or bettering predetermined 
targets of output, quality, and unit cost of production. 
b. Volume of output 
c. Value added 
d. Quantity fulfillment 
e. Trade turnover (sales) 
f. Cost of production 
g. Profit. 
In GOR, for example, there are 6-10 indices of performance considered as 
indicators and normatives for industry planning and measuring enterprise net 
performance.2 + 
However, of the various methods, the superiority of profit indices has come 
to be recognised, even through the means of computing it may differ. The 
superiority of profit over other criteria consists in the fact that it is a 
"synthetic indicator". Profit maximization involves not only the minimization 
of cost but also maximization of the production which is in demand - actually 
sold. It is in the interest of enterprise personnel to maximise profits 
because a portion of it is distributed to management and workers In the- form 
of bonuses and socio-cultural and housing improvements. After payments are 
made in the form of taxes and other deductions to central and local authorities, 
the remainder of enterprise profit is retained for financing further development 
and modernization of product ion, and to accumulate or replenish reserves for 
emergencies. Thus "the earnings, and application of profits provide a unique 
link combining the interest of the state, the enterprise and the individual 
worker. 
24. Edwin Pala Schewski: Indicators and Normatives in Planning Industry. 
Interregional Training Course in Industrial Planning. UN - Industrial 
Development Organisations, Berlin, GDR April, 1977. 
25. Wilczynski, 0P„ Cit 
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There are a few, however, who say that since factor costs as rent and capital 
charges have not been explicitily included as cost component, and the 
existence of a two tier - system of prices (artificially determined), an 
enterprise which may be considered micro-economically efficient could be macro-
economically inefficient. Therefore, profit in socialism is not such a synthetic 
indicator as it is generally presumed to be. 
It was only in 1960 (Prof. Libermann) that profit became accepted as criteria 
for the critical performance of enterprise in USSR. Given that the state 
corporation in socialist state is a collection of state enterprises, or is a 
complex state enterprise, then its efficiency is dependent on the strength and 
performance of the enterprise. State enterprise efficiency and performance is 
dependent on its involvement in profitability. Thus a state enterprise to operate 
efficiently must have: 
a) Profit involvement and financial involvement. 
b) Independent economic entity - (administration) - one man 
management rule. 
c) Decide on its funds-given incentive fund and development fund. 
d) Economic accountancy - Self-cost, basis for fixing price, 
cost accountacy, cost control based on entity accounting. 
e) Greater use of profit measure and profit incentive, to allow 
more decision responsibility for enterprise managers to more 
intelligently use resources and achieve greater efficiency. 
f) More income measurement and accounting practices (norms) 
as affecting economic development. Norms of rentability must 
be established. 
g) Repair and maintenance decision through its internal management 
decision with broad guidelines established for the rate of 
replacement through (h) 
h) An appropriate rate of retention of its accumulated funds for 
internal enterprise management - development fund, and workers' 
incentive fund - so that the rate of material incentive to labor 
and enterprise is fixed not by management and labor negotiation 
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but by fixing rate of "fesses"* the enterprise makes to central 
treasury, state investment fund, and thereby the rate of retention 
for enterprise management. 
VI. The Ministry of National Resources and Development (MNRb) and Enterprise 
Performance in Ethiopia. 
On February 4th 1974-, the PMAC brought under government control 72 privately-
owned industrial and commercial companies in the country, and took over 29 other 
companies as principle shareholder. 
In order to administer and control these nationalised companies and corporations 
and to centralise "all matters relating to the coordination and operation of 
public enterprise under the direction of a responsible minister,_ the Ministry 
of National Resource and Development was established by proclamation No 19/19 75 
coming into being 4th February 1975. But, since before this time there was 
no clear knowledge as to what was a public enterprise, nor was there any legal 
bases establishing a public enterprise, it was difficult to identify the public 
enterprise unit. Because of this gap, the external auditors (including Auditor1 
General's Office) of the nationalized companies, under the auspices of the 
Ethiopian Professional Association of Accountant and Auditors (EPAAA) had to 
prepare a directive (see appendix Directive No.3) guideline for the preparation 
of financial statements of these nationalised firms. It is worth noting here 
what the directive had to say concerning the heading of the financial statements 
of an enterprise. 
Thus the need for providing for the establishment and operation of public 
enterprise was effected by proclamation No. 20/1975. 
The following proclamations are important. 
1. Proclamation 19/1975 - Proclamation to establish MNRD 
2. Proclamation 20/19 75 - Public Enterprise Proclamation 
3. Proclamation 26/19 75 - Proclamation to provide for the ownership and 
and control bu government of the means of production; 
amendments and activities to be undertaken by public enterprise. 
H. Legal notice 5/1975 - Public Enterprise regulation 
5. Legal notice 7/16/1975 - Regulations establishing different 
State Coorporations. 
* Fessess" - Rate of unexpended balance. Whether Committed or Uncommitted 
funds that is returned back to the Central Treasury according to lapsing 
appropriations assumption at the end of the fiscal period. 
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By proclamation 20/1975, the minister of MNRD unlike the other ministers 
:herto known, was empowered to perform the following: 
a) to establish and operate public enterprises, engage in agri-
cultural... industrial, commercial, service (tourist), and mining 
enterprises. 
b) to direct and supervise such enterprises 
c) to amalgamate two or more enterprises when it is necessary for 
the improvement of operation and direction of such enterprises. 
d) to dissolve and liquidate any enterprises. 
e) to borrow money, use any commercial or other instrument and 
incur liability, and own any property. 
f) to issue any regulation with lease or hire of any property under 
his control, any written directives for the better carrying out of 
his function within the framework of the national development plan. 
g) to appoint general managers, deputy managers, assistant managers, 
and department heads upon the recommendation of the general 
managers. 
h) to establish reserve funds for each enterprise, approval-capital 
expenditure, dividends, and other financial transactions including 
excess funds to be returned to the Ministry of Finance. 
i) to receive externally audited statements of enterprises, though 
amended later to be audited by Auditor General, 
The law also made clear•that the enterprise was not to be exempted from payment 
of taxes, 
In June 1975, the MNRD issued legal notice 5/1975 concerning regulations of 
public enterprises whereby: 
' r • • 
a) it established public enterprises giving them juridical personality 
(legal entity) and limited liability pursuant to its power given 
by Procl. .20/1975, 
b) Under the supervision of the Ministry it gave each enterprise 
, power to invest, expend money and goods of capital undertaking, 
to borrow money, issue acceptable commercial instruments, pledge 
mortgage, possess and dispose movable property, open and maintain 
books and bank accounts and enter into contract. 
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c) it gave managers power to manage and supervise operations subject 
to the general direction of the Ministry. 
d) it required enterprises'to maintain accounts-and books, and ' 
make, reserve funds of 10% of net -profit up to 40% of capital 
It- could be seen that the MNRD was given immense power and very centralised 
authority to run the "public enterprises".to the extent that public :enterprises 
"legal 
entity" of existence was only established laterv • Therefore, not only 
direction but operational decision making was heavily concentrated tat the top 
to begin with. This was the first giant State Development Corporation that was 
established 
in Ethiopia. Its organizational structure was big and complex, *<f. 
it had large capital investment, and quite a large number of employees and 
numerous enterprises within it. -
Starting in July, 1975 the establishment of enterprises which came to be known 
as corporations, governed by the Public Enterprise Proclamation No. 20/1975 . 
and legal notice No. 5/1975, was commenced. This action brought another.layer 
of organizational structure between MNRD and the enterprise, though it created 
the economic cell known as a corporation with a legal personality.. At this 
stage a public enterprise in Ethiopia was either the plant indirectly, or the 
corporation ( a group of plants). What decision is to be at .what, level was; 
of course, unspecified. The, power of a public enterprise and its•manager, at 
the corporate level, and at the enterprise (plant) level was problematic. The 
need, for a 
new public enterprise proclamation was soon realised and a draft 
proposal was: initiated to clarify and provide for the control of operations of" 
a public enterprise. However, it never was enacted. 
The period that followed saw increasingly the establishment of state corporations, 
and the M N R D ceased to exist as of 8 September 1976, while the "Ministry of . 
Industry responsible only for industrial activities" .came into being. The 
MNRD cessation was not formally declared, but the established corporations 
became assigned to various supervising authorities - ministries from the MNRD. 
At present there 
are also various enterprises (plant) assigned to various 
ministries or supervisory authorities. However, there may still be enterprises 
which do not know who their supervisory authority is, i.e. ECAFCO. (Min. of 
Industry, ETHOF, or Min, of Agriculture - Forestry Departments or wood 
corporation). 
- 50 -
Without going into the post-mortem analysis of why the MNRD ceased to exist, 
we can understand the problem of its bigness - centralization of decision-
making for all enterprises; supervision of such huge conglomerate operations 
which were not conducive to efficient economic operation and performance of 
the enterprises, prpblems of identifying the "entity" as a centre of decision-
making. It was thus natural to ask next how and what would be the manageability, 
organization, and performance of the enterprise (state enterprise). Fortunately 
enough it did not take long to ask such questions. The pape.of the revolution 
quickly uncovered the issue, and new more manageable economic cells had to 
be recognised. 
During a working visit to three southern administrative .regions of Ethiopia 
(Megabit 3-?//' 71) Chairman Mengistu Hailemariam of PMAC, and the Council of 
Ministers, and Commander in Chief of the Revolutionary Army, noted with heavy 
concern the shortcomings of the state farms and how the performance and 
operations of the state agro-industrial, activities were far from desirable 
and at times catastrophic. He commented that following the government take-over 
the farms seemed to have turned into a consumption of available assets instead 
or producing income. The Chairman first held a nine hours meeting with the 
representatives of mass organizations .and government officials on 9 Megabit 
26 1971 (E.G) and issued an eight point policy directive. 
As a result of the working tout and acquaintance with the ill performance of 
the state agro-industrial enterprises, a high level seminar was held on 
March 28-29//1979 under the chairmanship of Comrade. Chairman Mengistu for 
two days, attended by. Derge Members, Minist&rs, Commissioners,^representatives 
of mass organizations and various development projects and agencies. The 
meeting exchanged extensive views on problems encountered by state agricultural 
enterprises and their causes: 
26. Ethiopian {lerald. 18th March, 1979. 
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The following are some of the many problems identified: 
1. Accounts not closed 
2. Asset values as of date of takeover not known 
3. Depreciation not determined 
4. Shortage of qualified manpower, general managers, 
accountants, financial management, and auditors 
5. No increase of productivity. No method of costing or 
quantified planned target of output. No way of following up, 
measuring, or evaluating performance on day-to-day or monthly 
basis. Lack of financial data, or complete lack of criteria 
for measurement of evaluating performance. 
6. Internal organizational conflict. No well-defined lines of 
responsibility and policy of management, labor unions, political 
discussion forums, and Revolutionary guards, corporations, 
state enterprises. 
7. External organizational conflict, Not well-defined policy or 
clear line of responsibility and authority of Ministry, 
supervising authority, mass organizations (AETU, POMA), courts, 
and central government. 
8. Managerial 
management fear 
lack of managerial know-how 
lack of independence in responsibility and authority. 
Management's limited power over money, material, manpower 
9. Lack of scientific and technical methods for production control, 
inventory control, replacement and maintenance technic and policy. 
10. Labor 
- Strong labor demand 
- Strong labor negotiation 
- increase in work force (employment) 
- weakness and strength of labor law 
11. No clear-cut plan on managements administrative responsibility 
over funds and resources, allocation of accumulated fund to 
a. management 
b. employee incentive 
c. expansion and contraction 
d. contribution to central treasury 
Most of the problems could be grouped into a) financial b) managerial!, 
c) production d) labor e) organization f) manpower, all of which could not be 
seen apart from the general technical, economic and political stage of 
development of the country. 
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The problems as I can see them are related to : 
1) The lack of identification of the organizational and managerial 
and financial behaviour of state corporations or state enterprises, 
or the lack of a proper understanding of the nature and characteristic |» 
of state enterprises. 
2) Problems related to the stage of revolutionary development. 
3) Lack of adoption of technical and scientific principles and 
practices of modern management, finance, production, organization. 
The first problem arises as a result of a total lack of understanding the 
characteristics of state enterprises, particularly socialist state enterprises 
or public enterprises. The literature itself is scanty. A specialised field 
of study has not concentrated on the internal managerial problems of such an 
enterprise. It has either been treated as parliamentary control, a political . 1 
issue, or showed as if any management'technique is applicable anywhere. 
• . 
Therefore, the need for clearly identifying and analysing the managerial and 
organizational behaviour of state corporations or enterprises and identifying 
solutions for them. 
• 
The second problem emanates from the stage of revolutionary development; that 
is, when the revolution is at the stage of political takeover, then consolida-
tion until reconstruction, the discipline needed for the critical performance 
of a state enterprise is not even a point of concern yet. Political expediency 
is much more important than economic rationality. Therefore, it is not until 
the latter stage of revolutionary development that the necessary attention and 
emphasis is given to the critical performance of the state corporation and 
state enterprise. 
The third problem is also related to the second. Because of the early period 
of revolutionary zeal there is a tendency and overenthusiasm to impress on the 
need to be progressive, anti-reactionary and therefore relieve oneself from 
the ties of all habits, customs, techniques, and functions attached to the 
bold order, and thus a tendency for rejecting financial and accounting 
techniques and tools as capitalist methods not useful to the socialist 
setting. To the point of forgetting that there is no capitalist steam engine 
or socialist steam engine but a running steam engine, until the time comes to 
realise that revolutionary enthusiasm cannot exhaust administration 
responsibility. Of course, this is not to say that every technique and tool is 
useful or usable or equally applicable in every environment or even socialist envi-
ronment. Management is science as well as art. The scientific aspect of management/ 1 
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administration is an essential techniques which must be used, irrespective 
of environment, but the art aspect of management may need examination in view 
of those socio-economic environments before adoption. 
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APPENDIX I 
Board of Directors1 Directive No. 3 
To all members of the Association in Public Practice. 
A committee consisting of the Board of E.P.A.A. and practicing members 
representing individual auditing firms have adopted specific accounting 
and reporting standards in respect of nationalized companies. 
The Board of Directors of E.P.A.A. therefore, recommends that members 
of the Association follow these guidelines and communicate same to 
their clients. 
1. Legal Status of Nationalised Organisations 
Subsequent to the nationalisation of companies, the proclamation for 
the creation of public enterprises was issued. Corporations were 
established pursuant to this proclamation. The public enterprices 
proclamation further empowers the Minister of MNRD to amalgamate, 
dissolve and liquidate enterprises established under this proclamation 
by regulations. Although so far eleven corporations have been established 
by legal notices and there has been a grouping of nationalised companies 
under the newly created corporations, as yet no action has been taken by 
MNRD to alter the legal status of each of the nationalised companies. 
Therefore, the previous names of these entities should continue to be 
shown i.e. with designation "share company" or "private limited company" 
as applicable. Below the name on the financial statements, the EPAA 
committee recommends that the following sentence should appear " 
"Transferred to Government ownership effective from (date of nationali-
sation). 
Similarly there has been no change whatsoever in the status of companies 
in which the Government has taken a majority shareholding. In other 
words, these organisations continue to have the legal status which they 
had prior to nationalisation, the only change being that the Government 
has a majority interest. These organisations have also been grouped 
under the newly created corporations, 
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Capital and Shares 
The committee has recommended that the word "shares" be left out of 
the share capital section of the balance sheet and the owners equity-
be shown in the balance sheet as follows: 
Eth $ ct. Eth. $ ct. 
Capital 
Registered XXX 
Paid up XXX 
Reserves and unappropriated profits at 
the date of transfer to Government ownership 
Legal reserve XXX 
General reserve XXX 
Profit and loss account XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
Profit and loss balance per account annexed XXX 
XXX 
The last item will indicate the profit or loss for the period since the 
transfer to Government ownership„ 
MNRD has informally indicated that for accounts up to 30 June or 30 
Sene, there is no need to make any appropriation to legal reserve. 
As and when resolved, transfers may be made at subsequent date. 
Land 
In view of the nationalisation of rural and urban lands, the EPAA 
committee recommended, by a majority vote, that the cost of land should 
be written off as it no longer has any marketable value. In accordance 
with generally accepted accounting principles the written-off will be made 
in the profit and loss account as an extraordinary charge for the period 
under review. 
Severance Pay 
In the province of Eritrea there has been the accounting practice of 
providing for severance pay on an annual basis. The EPAA committee 
recommended that accounting principles regarding severance pay should 
be applied consistently i.e. where severance pay had been provided in 
the past, it should continue to be provided and where it had not been 
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provided it is not necessary to do so now. However, in the latter case, 
a note should be placed in the accounting principles section of the; 
accounts indicating that severance pay is charged in the accounts as 
and when expended but that the total amount of severance pay as at 
the balance sheet date should be indicated by a way of a contigency. 
Pension Fund 
In view of the retrospective effect of the proclamation concerning the 
pension fund for the employees of Government-owned undertakings, companies 
should provide for the amount that is due to be paid by them to the 
Pensions Commission i,e,, 6% of gross basic salary but that no entry 
should be put through the books regarding the retrespective effect of 
the contributions by employees until a more definite ruling is made on 
this by the authorities. 
By order of the Board 
Yeshitla Tekeste 
Act/Executive Secretary 
GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC ENTERPRISES: SOME OBSERVATIONS ON KENYA 
By 
Dr. W.O. Oyugi 
Department of Government 
University of Nairobi 
I. INTRODUCTION. 
In the 20th Century, investment in the public enterprises accounts 
for a fairly large percentage of overall government investment in national 
economic activities. Accordingly, the government, whether in developed on 
developing polities, pays a lot of attention to the way in which such 
enterprises are run. The relationship between the government and public 
enterprises is therefore fairly close. 
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the nature 8f that relation-
ship both generally and also in the context of the Kenya experience. In doing 
so special attention will paid to; 
a) the principles or philosophy underlying the establishment of 
public enterprises both in the developed and developing countries 
b) what factors, with specific reference to Kenya, influenced their 
establishment both before and after independence. 
c) what relationships exist between the government and the enterpris 
in (i) policy - making and (ii) internal management of the 
enterprises. 
d) what role, in the final analysis the enterprises have played in 
promoting or hindering national development efforts. We shall 
be concerned here only with what in East Africa is popularly 
referred to as parastatals, that is, the statutory boards and 
corporations. 
II. THE IDEA OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISES. 
The idea that the state should actively participate in the management 
of the economy finds its major articulation in the writing of Karl Marx and his 
disciples. But it would be going too far to even suggest that the emergence 
and growth of public enterprises throughout the world is a direct import of the 
Marxian doctrine. 
Before this century, state intervention in economic life was by and 
large considered undesirable. It was an idea to be resisted. The only areas 
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where state control was accepted were defence and foreign affairs. With 
technological advancement and the resultant societal expectations and demands 
more and more people began to see the state as a major potential actor and 
mediator in national economic life. The specific factors responsible for 
the actual state interventions in economic affair have however varied from 
one country to another. The situation to day Is such that there is widespread 
acceptance that the state has a major role to play in national economic life. 
Again the form of that participation is a matter of detail. 
Although nomenclature may differ from one country to another, there 
are three major forms of government participation in the nation's economy. 
They are departmental activities, statutory boards and corporations established 
by acts of parliament or some other similar methods such as presidential 
decrees in military regimes, and public companies owned wholly or partially 
by the state and operating under company law. As we said earlier the paper is 
limited to the analysis of the activities of the state in those areas which 
lie outside the traditional civil service organization - the parastatals 
(corporations and boards) as we referred to them above. 
Factors Influencing the Establishment of Public Enterprises. 
A number of factors influence the establishment of parastatal 
organizations. Broadly speaking, they can be reduced to three, namely; 
political, economic and social. 
Political considerations are partly a function of ideological 
inclinations and partly also influenced by the "national interest" however, 
defined. A political system which is committed to an egalitarian ideology is 
more likely to participate in the economic management of the country than the 
one which is not. At a more instrumental level, political objectives are 
considered to be primary when enterprises are established for ensuring the 
economic sovereignty of the country, for eliminating foreign capital from certain 
economic branches wholly or partially nationalizing private capital in a 
specific economic branch, or for national defence.''" Considerations of political 
nature usually end up in nationalization actions. Nationalization itself is 
a political answer to the reluctance of the private sector (locally or foreign 
owned) to respond to certain government demands regarding the nature and 
objectives of private sector activities. It may also be an attempt to save 
basic industries from total collapse. 
1. See Nikola Balog Administrative Management of Public Enterprises, Final 
Report of Xlllth International Congress of Administrative Sciences Paris 
20-23rd July 1965. 
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In the 20th Century we have witnessed many cases of nationalization 
both in the developed and in the developing countries. The experience of 
Britain may be taken to represent the first case. Between the wars the economy 
of Britain experienced alot of ups and downs. (Industrial performance declined. 
The Hardest hit were the basic industries. The impact was felt by all.) Then 
came the second world war which devastated the entire economy. The mood in the 
-post war period was one of both frustration and expectation. The scale of 
destruction was such that the government could not depend entirely on the private 
investors to rehabilitate the economy. In the national interest, the state 
intervention was a welcome move. But what made the wave of nationalizations which 
occured between 1946 - 1950 possible was the political philosophy of the government 
of the day - the labour government, for elsewhere e.g. West Germany and Italy 
took a completely different course. 
In the developing countries, political consideration have played a 
major part in the establishment of parastal organizations. Nationalization 
has often been a manifestation of a "radical" ideological learning and two East 
African countries Tanzania and Uganda, represent a good case in point. In 1967 
Tanzania declared the policy of self reliance - popularly known as the Arusha 
Declaration. In a nutshell, the Declaration called for the end of an inequali-
tarian system through the use of domestic resources. The implementation of the 
policy saw widescale nationalization of key sectors of the economy and subse-
quently the proliferation of state managed public enterprises. The Tanzanian 
leadership believed that only by exercising sovereignty over the economy could 
the basic sociatal goal of eliminating socio-economic inequalities be reduced 
if not eliminated altogether. The objective was political. 
Like Tanzania, Uganda's move was manifestly political. Nationali-
zation efforts following the Nakivubo Pronouncement of May 1970 was ment to 
bring the key sectors of the economy under state control as a means of ensuring 
economic independence. 
Economic considerations 
No country in the world ever justifies her intervention in the 
management of the national economy in terms of political philosophy alone. There 
is always an economic or social explanation in addition. The primacy of politics 
aside, there is always a good economic case to be advanced in defence of state 
participation in the management of the national economy. We are for instance 
reminded by Douglas Verney that the initial impetus to public ownership in 
Sweden (other than the long established post office) was primarily economic. 
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"In a country so large, so sparcely Inhabited and so comparatively under-
developed as Sweden was in the 19th Century, only the state could provide x 
complete national network of railways and telegraph board"^ This point was I 
to be stressed later by Wc Friedmann when he observed: / " 
In thinly populated areas of vast dimensions and limited 
resources, the state must inevitably intervene to develop 
public utilities which are not attractive to private capital. 
Simply put, the state must intervene in those areas of the economy where private 
investers are reluctant to move because of economic risks involved. 
In the developing economies, a major consideration is the need to 
control the use of the profit which accrue from the activities of economic 
enterprises. The argument is that, if the enterprise is under state control 
(unlike foreign owned enterprises) it can plough back its profit or surpluses 
into its activities for purposes of expansion or improvement. Hanson submits 
further that such an enterprise if successful, can surrender part or the whole 
of its profits to the government by way of dividends, interest or tax payment, 
which funds can in turn be utilized to finance new enterprises or reinvest 
thern in other enterprises including the enterprises that provided the fund. 
Furthermore, he argues, the enterprise can extend the benefits of its efficiency 
to the consumers in the form of lower tariffs such as,.,cheaper electricity 
5 cheaper water rates etc, 
The assumptions are noble ones, but things do not usually work that 
way, for it can be demonstrated that not all 'public' enterprises serve the 
public Interest; that there are some private enterprises which may be more 
sen^ ifcLtsjfe and responsive to popular demand such as providing services in high 
risk areas, than the public enterprises. 
2. Douglas V. Verney Public Enterprises in Sweden Liverpool University 
Press 1956 P8, 
3. W, Friedmann, "Motives for the Creation of Public Enterprises' in 
A-H. Hanson (ed) Public Enterprises International Institute of Administrative 
Sciences Brussels 1955 P„l2, 
A,H» Hanson Public Enterprises and Economic Development London, 
Routledge and Keagan Paul 1959 P, 427. 
5. Loc.cit, 
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Social considerations 
Ideally, development should be oriented to the service of man. State 
participation in the management of the economy has meaning only if it can 
lead to the maximization of social benefits of economic growth. Alleviation 
of poverty, creation of more employment opportunities, bridging the income 
gaps, provision of basic services (water shelter, health, education, electri-
city) in a manner that can be afforded by different income groups are some of 
the major social considerations. Indeed, a key rationale for state parti-
cipation in the economy is the assumed interest that the state has in the 
socio-economic wellbeing of her citizens. 
An important question to ask later in the paper is, to what extent 
has state participation in the economy, taking Kenya as a case in point, 
resulted in the happiness of the majority of the people? We shall in the 
process analyse the factors that have accounted for success or failure. 
III. THE EMERGENCE OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISES IN KENYA. 
Public enterprises in Kenya have their roots in the colonial period. 
During this period the parastatals that were established were mainly intended 
to service the settler economy. Accordingly a good number of them were 
agricultural marketing and regulatory boards; and they came to prominence 
just before and after the Second World War. 
Even the few developmental boards that existed tended to confine 
their activities to the white settled areas. The Development and Reconstruc-
tion Authority (DARA) had created very little impact in the African areas 
before folding up in 1954 and its activities being assumed by the regular 
departments of the Central Government. 
The attainment of independence in 1963 saw widespread proliferation 
of parastatal organizations. As a result, there are now some sixty six 
parastatals and countrywide cooperatives.6 The Report indicates however that 
the number does not include all Government companies such as the sugar 
7 companies, nor does it include all the subsidiaries of the parastatals. 
6. Republic of Kenya Review of Statutory Boards (Chairman: Philiph 
Ndegwa) Presented to the President May 1979. Government Printer Nairobi, P2. 
7. Loc cit. 
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The establishment of new parastatals organizations in the post 
independence period has mainly been influenced by political-economic considera-
tions. At independence, Kenya inherited an economy that was dominated in 
every respect by the expatriates and foreign concerns. Major financial 
institutions such as the commercial banks and insurance companies were foreign 
owned and controlled. Agriculture, the backbone of the nations economy, was 
also dominated by the settler farmers. They were responsible for the produc-
tion and primary processing of all export crops as well as producing the bulk 
of the maize that sustained the domestic supply. Industrial enterprises were ° 
also controlled by the multinationals and the expatriate concerns. Import-export 
trade as well as retail and distributive trade were also controlled in a like 
manner. In the circumstances, something had to be done in the immediate post 
independence period. 
Africanization of the economy was the political answer to the 
problem. New organizations were established and old ones recorganized for the 
purpose. In the industrial field, the then •existing Industrial Development 
Corporation was reorganized and expanded into Industrial and Commercial 
Development Corporation (ICDC) and charged with the responsibility of, among 
other things, promoting African participation in industrial expansion by 
providing financial assistance and management. To carry out the said function, 
the ICDC established a number of subsidiaries, including the Industrial 
Estates network, whose main purpose was and has been since then, to provide 
an opportunity for Africans to take part in the industrial expansion. 
The Industrial Estates in particular entails, according to the govern-
ment, construction of factory building which are rented to the African entre-
preneurs with administrative and technical services blocks attached to them. 
Machinery and equipment are provided to entrepreneurs on a 100 per cent loan 
basis and the loans are paid back over periods ranging between 3 and 10 years. 
9 
Working capital has to be provided by the entrepreneurs themselves, it shall 
be shown later. 
8. Republic of Kenya Development Plan 1970/74-P. 316 - 318. 
9. Ibid P. 318. 
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In the commercial field, the ICDC's leading subsidiary is the Kenya 
National Trading Corporation (KNTC) established in March 19.65, to promote 
wholesale and retail trade and to assist in the transfer of commerce to 
citizens. In addition It was charged with the development of .Kenyan parti-
cipation in the export trade, principally in primary agricultural products.^ 
In the transport'sector, the state-owned ( as subsidiary of ICDC) Kenya 
National Transport Company (KENATCO) was established in 1966 to handle 
especially long distance haulage. 
In the field of Agriculture, the Agricultural Finance Corporation 
(AFC) partially inherited at independence, has been expanded and reorganized 
and has since been the major organ through which Africanization of Agriculture 
has taken place. Through AFC loans, it has been possible for wealthy Africans 
to acquire on "willing seller willing buyer" basis large scale farms formerly 
owned by white settlers. It has also provided funds for general developments 
on the acquired farms. 
Indeed, there are scores of other parastatals whose activities are 
equally important, It is not possible to mention them all here. We shall 
however, touch on the activities of some of them later on In the paper. 
A major characteristic of most of the parastatals In Kenya is that 
they depend heavily on foreign financing and management advice. The charter 
of ICDC, for instance, allows it to seek finance from abroad in promoting .small 
scale rural industries etc.,"''1 The Industrial Estates so far established are 
heavily dependent on foreign aid. In a recent study, Gatheru Wanjohi observes 
that the programme is dominated by the Germans who provide "technical 
12 assistance" and capital for investment. To circumvent the problem of capital, 
the ICDC has gone into partnership with a number of companies. By late .1978 
13 
their number exceeded sixty. Most of them are foreign owned. The partner-
ship solution appears to be more politically motivated than economic. One way 
of buying investment security in a developing country is for the invester to 
10. Ibid P. 422. 
11o Ibid P.316 
12. Gatheru Wanjohi. The Politics of Aid in Kenya 1963 - 1977 Ph.D 
University of Nairobi (Forthcoming). 
13, See special Report in The Weekly Review Nairobi 27th Oct. 1978 
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get the government to acquire an interest through buying of shares. The 
•partners' of ICDC appear to have opted for that 'solution'. 
To appreciate all this, however, one has to understand the framework 
within which development policies have been pursued in Kenya. Right from 
the time of independence, Kenya opted to adopt a mixed type of economy. 
14 
This policy was articulated in a sessional paper. published in 1965. In 
it the government rejected "nationalization for its own sake" stating in the 
process that it intended to develop an economy in which private enterprises 
and public enterprises (where the latter were necessary) would exist side 
by side. In subsequent Development Plans, joint ventures with private 
investors have been encouraged. The policy of encouraging dominance of the 
economy by the private sector may have been a prudent one considering the 
circumstances of 1960s (e.g. fear to scare foreign capital) but whether it 
has yielded positive social returns is highly questionable in the light of 
the prevailing social conditions in Kenya. 
IV THE RUNNING OF PARASTATALS IN KENYA 
The problems facing the parastatals in Kenya can be analysed at 
two levels, namely, at the level of policymaking and also at the level of 
internal management. The policymaking function is one which the enterprise 
shares with many other interested parties. In the case of a public enterprise, 
the government, at least theoretically, is a critical actor . Where the 
government fails to play its part or neglects it altogether, a public 
enterprise is likely to go astray or even collapse. 
Lack of external stimuli in the form of policy guidelines leads 
to laxity in the organization and eventually to disintegration of the organi-
zational system. The disintegration comes about as a result of the managers 
beginning to promote their own 'particularistic' interests, as opposed to the 
public interest in the absence of 'external' concern for the latter. In some 
cases the neglect may lead to goal displacement as the managers alter the 
original goals to suit their own perspectives or interests with no external 
monitor to intervene. The practice is widespread in Kenya as we shall discuss 
presently. 
14. Republic of Kenya Sessional Paper No.10 of 1965 on African Socialism 
and its Application to Planning in Kenya Government Printer, Nairobi. 
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(a) Formulation of Policies 
A major source of the policies that govern the operations of a 
parastatal in the charter or the act of parliament that gives it a legal 
personality. Such a charter or an act would normally spell out the broad 
objectives of the organization as well as its powers and limitations. 
The broad policies governing the operations of a parastatal are 
usually established at the time of its formation. At this point, many actors 
may express interests of varied nature. Who participates and to what degree 
tends to be influenced by the prevailing political ideology in the system. 
Whereas in Kenya the ideology of development encourages the growth of the 
private sector of the economy, decisions about the establishment of a public 
enterprise are often shared between the government and the relevant organi-
zations in the private sector. The government is always trying to avoid areas 
of sensitivity that might otherwise antagonize the private sector. What one 
often finds, therefore, is a lot of private influence in the running of 
parastatals in Kenya. 
Two decades ago, a British academic made an observation which is 
quite relevant to the experience of Kenya. Hanson observed that industrial 
finance and development corporations in mixed economies are formed usually 
to perform the entrepreneural function the raising of capital, the risk 
bearing, the organization of the business etc - and then at a suitable stage 
15 
sell out its holdings to private investors . Kenya's ICDC and its subsidiary, 
the Industrial Estates fall into this category. Indeed, the investment 
policies of the ICDC are so commercially oriented that It takes a lot of 
persuasion to convince a skeptic that it is in fact a public body. 
The point being allued to here is that policies governing the 
operation of parastatal organizations in Kenya are usually compromises between 
the government and the private interests. More often than not, political 
direction of such policies is usually wanting. Perhaps it may be in order at 
this point to assess the role which the various political and government 
institutions play in the formulation of the policies that govern the running 
of parastatals. 
15, A.H. Hanson Public Enterprises and Economic Development London 
Rontledge and Kaegan Paul Ltd. 1959. P. 192. 
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Parent Ministry. 
Every parastatal has a parent ministry. This is the ministry that 
formulates and pushes through parliament the relevant bill establishing the 
organization. The relationship is rather formalistic, for there are times when 
the decision to establish an enterprise may have nothing to do with the parent 
ministry; but once it is made by some powerful actors, the ministry in question 
is merely expected as a matter of course to push it through Parliament or through 
the Registration Process. This happens usually in cases where certain people 
believe their businesses stand to benefit from state protection implicit in the 
establishment of such a body. I have no data yet, but circumstantially one can 
argue that KENATCO was launched under such circumstances. Most of the long 
distance haulage vehicles the company uses are known to belong to some very power-
ful individuals in the country. It is they that reap the maximum benefit in any 
business transaction in which the company is involved. 
For those parastatals established with the initiative of government, the 
role of a parent ministry can be crucial. Whether or not the idea is accepted or 
shelved by Parliament depends entirely on the quality of the bill and the prestige 
of the ministry and of the Minister for the time being responsible for the ministry. 
In most cases , the policy making of the parent ministry tends to end once 
the bill has become an act of Parliament or when the company has been registered. 
The weakest link in the policy f^here between the parastatals and the parent ministry 
thus ocqurs in the area of policy reformulation. 
Policies can never be constant in a society. They have to be reformu-
lated in accordance with the changes that take place in the society. This requires 
somebody in the ministry to monitor very closely the activities of the parastatals 
with regard to policy implementation and thereafter to suggest what kind of policy 
changes to be introduced. This is never done. Instead the parent ministries 
tend to leave the organizations pretty much on their own. Since management 
boards are usually weak, some executives tend to run these bodies as if they 
were personal concerns. This is the point, I believe, that the Philip Ndegwa 
Report makes, where it observes: 
The committee found instances of personalized institutions 
and in addition there came to the notice of the committee cases 
where ministries had provided little guidance or expartise to 
parastatals and failed to take steps to enforce established 
operating procedures. 
16. Republic of Kenya: Review of Statutory Boards Report and Recommendations 
of the committee appointed by His Excellency the President (Chairman: Philip Ndegwa) 
Government Printer, Nairobi, May 19 79 p.22. 
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I could add that they have also failed to monitor and evaluate the imple-
mentation of the policies with a view to seeing what effect they have on 
goal attainment. 
The Legislature 
In policy making the National Assembly is not strong either. By its 
nature, the institution lacks expertise to enable it to scrutinize bills that 
come before the House. In some countries (e.g. USA) MPs have legislative 
assistants that help them to analyse technical issues that come up for debate. 
This facility does not exist in Kenya. The individual MP has therefore to be 
self reliant. Very few indeed take their work seriously. As a result,, a lot 
of debate lacks the technical and professional bite of the kind that can be 
expected to alter the policy content of a bill when presented before the 
House. This may explain why, as Bradley and McAuslan observe, the government 
17 is usually reluctant to accept the suggestions emanating from the MPs. They 
observe further that widespread membership at public corporations by MPs also" 
J.8 
affect the role of Parliament in calling the public corporations to account. 
The Boards Once a parastatal has been established, the task of running it falls 
on a board of management, which in turn is responsible for appointing the 
staff to run it on a day-to-day basis. In theory the board is usually 
responsible for making the major decisions that govern the operation of the 
organization. In practice however, this is rarely the case. There are three 
explanations to this: Firstly, the board members serve at the pleasure of the 
minister who can remove them at will without giving any reason. To retain their 
positions they must go all the way to please the minister, or his representatives, 
ilthe circumstances, they cannot take independent positions. Secondly, the 
management tends to manipulate the board by withholding relevant and critical 
decisional premises upon which the board can make 'rational' decisions. They 
often get away with this because as a government report once observed, "a 
good number of directors of various statutory boards and corporations have 
relatively poor educational background and little business experience at this 
level".19 
17. A.W. Bradley and J.P.W.B. Mc Auslan "Public Corporations in East Africa" 
in W.G. Friedmann and J.F. Garner (ed) Government and Enterprises A comparative 
study Columbia University Press 1970 p. 284. 
18. Loc cit. 
19. Republic of Kenya Report of the Commission of Inquiry (Public Service 
Structure and Remuneration Commission) Chairman: D. Ndegwa, May 1971 p. 205. 
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Thirdly, there is the conflict of interest to consider. The Philip 
Ndegwa Report observes that the shortcomings of the parastatals could, among 
other things, be traced to conflict of interest between public responsibilities 
20 
and private profit or aggrandisement. This conflict of interest is caused 
by the practice whereby board members use their positions to secure business 
with the corporation on behalf of their own companies of those of their 
friends and or relatives, A board member involved in such a transaction 
compromises his 'voice' as representative of the public interest. Such cases 
are commonplace in Kenya. In the circumstances, the board cannot be expected 6 
to play a leading role in policy administration. 
Non-governmental Actors 
We have already alluded to the influence which non-governmental bodies 
exercise on policymaking In Kenya. Indeed the weakness of public and political 
institutions in the field of policymaking in the parastals is a spill over of that 
phenomenon. Most of the parastatals have management contracts with foreign 
based firms or locally based foreign owned management consultancy firms. They 
have a lot of influence on the operational policies of the organizations. 
The role of capital is equally important. Donor countries usually 
insist on providing technical assistance for every operation they finance . 
Those parastatal organization.such as AFC, ICDC etc. that depend on financial 
assistance from donor countries, employ a number of technical assistance 
personnel, who in turn Influence the day to day administration of policies. 
Other non-governmental organizations that influence the operational 
policies of the parastatals are the local financial institutions (Still predoi-
minantly foreign owned) that also lend operational and investment capital; the 
Federation of Kenya Employers which represent the bureaucracy of the larger 
21 
foreign companies and the state owned commercial corporations; the 
Association of Kenya Manufacturers which acts as a pressure group on behalf of 
manufacturing firms whether private or 'public'. 
By being members of some of the associations mentioned above; 
parastatals have tended to operate as if they were not what they are supposed to 
public organisations„ The observation here is that most of the 
policies governing the actitivities of parastatals in Kenya ere largely influenced 
20, Republic of Kenya: Review of Statutory Boards op cit P22, 
21. See Colin Leys Underdevelopment in Kenya. London , Heinemann, 1975 
P. 139 - 146, 
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by non-governmental interests. 
Political guidance 
Kenya displays the characteristics of those societies that have 
22 been dubbed 'bureaucratic polites'. It has a very powerful bureaucracy 
that has since independence overshadowed the ruling party - KANU (Kenya 
23 
African National Union). In the regime of the late Mzee Kenyatta the 
Permanent Secretaries in the majority of cases were both the administrative 
as well as the political heads of their ministries. It was not uncommon for 
a PS to overrule his minister. A number of such instances were reported in 
the local press. In the circumstances, most of the chief executives as well 
as directors of the parastatals were infact the nominees of the Permanent 
Secretaries in whose ministries the individual corporations fell. In some 
cases very close relationship emerged, developing in some cases into business 
partnerships, especially after the adoption of the recommendation of the 
D. Ndegwa Commission Report allowing civil servants participation in private 
24 business. The conflict of interest that is referred to m the Philip Ndegwa 
25 Report can largely be traced to this development. 
The weakness of the party system means that the bureaucratic elites are 
left on their own to determine the major developmental policies and the nature 
of their implementation. The relative powerlessness of the ministers is partly 
also due to the weakness of the party system. The minister's only dependable 
source of strength is closeness to the presidency. If the closeness is not there, 
no senior civil servant cares about what he says. Here then lies a major weakness 
in the general administration of public institutions in Kenya. 
Overview 
The argument in this section of the paper has been that the public 
institutions that are supposed to formulate policies governing the operations 
of parastatals in Kenya have by and large failed in carrying out that tas^ 
primarily because of the nature of the political-economic relationships that 
have emerged in the post independence period. It is a development that has 
resulted in the displacement of public interest by private interests with the 
latter interest dominating the public policy making institutions and processes . 
22. See e.g. the works of Riggs, Pye, Apter etc. 
23. For more on this see C. Gertzel The Politics of Independent Kenya EAPH 1970. 
24. Republic of Kenya Report of the Commission of Inquiry (Public Service 
Structure and Remuneration Commission) Chairman: D. Ndegwa op cit. 
25. See footnote No. 20 above. 
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(b) Internal Management of Parastatals 
While the government has always concerned itself with efficiency 
in the Civil Service, very little direct attention has been given 
to parastatals. Consequently, In the parastatal sector, unlike o 
in the Civil Service, there are no uniform and coordinated pro-
cedures or systems for ensuring efficient management and public 
accountability (Philip Ndegwa Report P.3). 
Functionally, parastatals do enjoy a very large degree of autonomy 
with respect to investment decisions, recruitment of staff and financial manage-
ment. It is the abuse of these freedoms that has led to the problems referred 
to above. The abuse has been facilitated by the failure of the parent ministries, 
the boards and the legislature to establish an effective machinery for 
monitoring the activities of these organizations. 
Parent Ministries 
One way by which the parent ministry can ensure that a parastatal is 
properly managed is by providing professional and management guidance on a 
regular basis. This presupposes, of course, that the parent ministry itself 
is adequately possessed of such capabilities, and further that it has the 
administrative and political clout to do so. Our discussion (above) of the 
interaction between the parent ministries and the parastatals in the policy- d 
making process tended to cast a lot of doubts in the abilities of the parent 
ministries to guide the parastatals. The emergence of politically very 
powerful managing directors has steadily led to operational autonomy on the 
part of many organizations and to the tendency to run such organizations as 
personal institutions', as was sadly observed by the Philip: Ndegwa Report above. 
There are a number of areas where a parent ministry can act. These 
according to the D. Ndegwa Report include: 
(i) Scrutiny of capital and recurrent budget 
(ii) authorisation of borrowing above a certain level 
(iii) direction in regard to disposal of surplus funds 
(iv) approval of acquisition and disposal of high value assets 
such as land and buildings. o 
27 
(v) detailed formulation of pricing and marketing policies, Indeed 
Kenya has a reasonably clear policy that public corporations of 
whatever kind must be subject to strict control in the way they raise 
26. Republic of Kenya Report of the Commission of inquiry. D. Ndegwa 
Chairman op cit P. 208. 
27. See A.W. Bradley and J.P.W.B. Mc Anslan Public Corporations in East 
Africa op cit P. 277 
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and spend their money. Yet in practice a lot of irregularities 
29 
in this regard have been detected and reported, but no substantial 
actions have been taken other than retiring the culprits in a few 
selected caseS . 
Boards 
In many parastatals, the boards of management have failed to discharge 
the duties expected of them. They have failed to ensure that the running of 
the organizations' activities is not influenced by parochial or personal 
interests. They have for instance, failed to remove nepotism and tribalism 
in recruitment; they have failed to ensure proper protection of public 
property (e.g. a recent scandal involving the sale of land between the 
Management of the RailWays Corporations and the Kenya Reinsurance Corporation) 
o private real estate developers as reported in the local press). Indeed, 
most of the reported cases of corruption and inefficiency in the parastatals 
can be directly linked to the weaknesses of the boards. 
It is an irony however, that the weaknesses of many boards lie in 
the nature of the appointment of members, which tends to emphasize the 
political rather than the professional and managerial qualifications of the 
appointees. On this problem the D. Ndegwa Report warned: 
Politically motivated or interest oriented appointments generally 
sacrifice quality of membership and results in conflict of interest, 
colourization of policy decisions, all of which combine to reduce 
management efficiency 30 
The appointment of key personnel by the boards also tends to be influenced 
by such considerations. Patronage is thus well institutionalized in the 
a ^ recri*tment system of parastatal organizations, 'N 
Legislature 
By its very nature, the National Assembly is illequipped to monitor 
the way parastatals are being managed. The Assembly would normally only 
debate the situation in a parastatal after a relevant report or statement 
has been presented before it by the parent ministry. The financial reports 
presented to Parliament by the parent ministries are usually several years 
overdue. Consequently the impact of the discussion of such reports is usually los 
28. In both the D. Ndegwa and P. Ndegwa Reports. 
29. op. cit. P. 205. 
30. Republic of Kenya. Review of Statutory Boards op cit p. 2 3 
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Even efforts by backbenchers to probe some of the sick parastatals have in 
the past generated very little enthusiasm if not none at all, on the part 
of the government. 
The Exchequer and Audit Act (Cap 142) provides for the audit of 
the accounts of statutory boards and commissions by the Controller and Auditor 
General, Every year the Public Accounts Committee discusses the reports 
and makes recommendations that nobody bothers to implement. The problem is a 
political one. As we mentioned earlier on, the bureaucratic power in Kenya 
usually overshadows the formal political power on matter of this nature -
and here lies in part, the source of the problem. 
V CURRENT STATE_OF AFFAIRS 
The setting up of a committee in 1979 by his Excellency the 
President to review the state of the parastatals in Kenya was an expression 
of concern about the general running of these organizations. It is not 
possible to discuss here the state of the individual organizations in any 
meaningful detail. What appears below is only a skeletal outline of some of 
the problems responsible for the decline of the mentioned organizations: 
(i) Kenya Meat Commission (KMC) 
This is a very old organization established during the colonial 
period to service the interests of the expartriates. In the recent years it 
has faced a lot of financial and mangement problems. According to a Nairobi 
Weekly Review 30.6.78) the commission has over the years been exporting meat 
and meat products through middlemen who could be done away with. These 
middlemen were suspected to be partners of some of the Commissioners. Indeed 
a senior official of the Commission was a known exporter of meat, and it was 
suspected that he was behind the stiff competition the commission was facing 
in the export market. This is a typical case of conflict of interest leading 
to the running down of a parastatal. 
(ii) Maize_ and Produce Board 
The current shortage of maize in the country has been blamed on poor 
management of the Board. Among other things, the board has been unable to control 
the stock, and has in some cases tended to give preferential treatment to 
some millers thus resulting in over supply and consequently to the depletion of 
the strategic reserve, There must be many cases similar to the one revealed in 
the Weekly Review (1st February 1980 Pp 26-27) to the effect that a former 
minister of Agriculture had a maize mill that did business with the Board. 
It has also been reported as being one of the five major parastatals (the 
others being Kenya Cooperative Creameries, Kenya Meat Commission, Wheat 
Board & Kenya Airways) that are at present in serious financial 
31 difficulties. 
(iii) Kenya Cooperative Creameries (KCC) 
The performance has been so pathetic that a minister of Cooperative 
Development once threatened to have it absorbed into the mainsteam of 
cooperative movement to ensure more efficient management. Top management was 
also accused by former employees of gross irregularities and general mismanage-
. 32 ment. 
(iv) Cotton Lint Seed Marketing Board 
This is one of the very few boards whose senior management team has 
been twice dismissed in the last seven years for general mismanagement and 
financial irregularities. In one of the cases a general manager was dismissed 
for allegedly having entered into a questionable ploughing contract with 
private tractor owners where a cheaper deal could have been settled with the 
33 
Tractor Hire Unit in the Ministry of Agriculture. The board has also been 
unable to pay farmers for cotton actually delivered. 
(v) Kenya National Trading Corporation 
Theirs is also a management problem. The Corporation has failed to 
device a foulproof method of distributing-^specially the essential commodities. 
In some cases they have given distribution monopoly to some very powerful 
public officials that in the end turned out to be suspected smugglers. A 
cabinet minister once called for the desolution of KNTC or firing all its 
offi csrs, charging "that "the s*ta."tu"tor,y boapd had. misery ably failed "the 
34 
country. It turned out however, that the minister in question was one of 
the corporations distributors! 
Overview 
The point being made in this section of the paper is that largely as 
a result of the failure by the relevant institution in the system to control the 
management of the parastatal organizations, the latter have degenerated into 
sick organizations characterized by, in the words of a recent report, "prolonged 
35 inefficiency, financial mismanagement, waste and malpractices. 
31. The Weekly Review Nairobi 15th Dec. 1978 p. 30. 
32 . 
33. For detail see Weekly Review Nairobi 1st September, 1975. 
34. See Weekly Review 26th May 1978 p. 20. 
35. Republic of Kenya Review of Statutory Boards op cit p 3. 
r 
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The ICDC's investments in the Industrial Estates which we touched 
on above have had similar effects. Apart from generating a few employment 
opportunities, the programme is more of a burden to the economy in terms 
of the foreign exchange flight which occurs through the importation of machinery 
39 
and equipment. In other fields of ICDC's activities such as joint ventures 
with private investors, the protection given to the 'partners' is never matched 
by corresponding benefits to the public. Goods manufactured in ICDC's 
subsidiaries etc. are sometimes more expensive than imported goods of similar 
quality. One is therefore tempted to suggest that parastatals may have 40 
contributed negatively to the development of Kenya. 
CONCLUSION 
There is no doubt that all-is not well with the parastatals in Kenya, 
Basically, the problem is inherent in the nature of the society and the 
strategy of development Kenya has been pursuing since independence. The 
problem has been accentuated by the lack of effective insitutional control 
of the operations of these organizations. 
It has been established above th&t the institutions such as the parent 
ministries, the boards, the National Assembly and the political party-KANU, 
that would normally be expected to monitor the activities of these organizations 
with a view to ensuring that they are efficiently and effectively managed have 
all failed to live up to the expectation. Their guidance in the policy-making 
process has also been generally weak. All this was attributed to the nature 
of the political-economic relationships in Kenya. 
Aware of these weaknesses (but apparently not of the underlying causes) 
the Government set up a Review Committee to report on the state of these 
organizations and to suggest what remedial actions should be taken to rescue 
41 
them. Their major recommendations revolve around two major areas: how to 
improve financial management and Government supervision of the boards and 
corporations. 
39. For more on Industrial Estates see Gatheru Wanjohi. The Politics of 
Foreign Aid in Kenya op.cit. 
40. The author believes that more case studies of the type which Wanjohi 
has done on the Industrial Estates should be encouraged before a more conclusive 
position can be taken. 
41. Republic of Kenya Review of Statutory Boards op.cit. 
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It is not my intention to discuss the detail of those recommendations 
here other than simply observing that they are based on somewhat false 
premises - that the problem is one of lack of effective management and that 
adjustments in this area yjould bring about the desired effect. My submission 
is that the problem is more intricate than i-tl^ 'appears. It involves the 
restructing of the basic value orientation of the political-bureaucratic 
elites in the society. It involves the introduction and institutionalization 
of acceptable ethnical standards in public and private life if practices 
suoh as corruption, nepotism etc. have to be eradicated altogether, 
Recommendations such as strengthening the hitherto understaffed 
, c 
ms^petorate of statutory Boards by appointing more staff and giving it more 
powers and the establishment of Parastatal Advisory Committee make sense 
only if (a) the attitudes and behaviour of the men and women to man these 
organization also change accordingly. 
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THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN PUBLIC ENTERPRISES: 
A CASE OF THE UGANDA ADVISORY BOARD OF TRADE. 
By 
C. P. ATIKORO 
OF 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
MAKERERE UNIVERSITY. 
INTRODUCTION 
i 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the role of the Uganda 
Government in Public Enterprises. I am defining public Enterprises as 
business organisations set up by Acts of Parliament or Decree to undertake 
economic development in areas which are the economic life blood of the 
nation. In Uganda such bodies include the Uganda Development Corporation, 
the Uganda Electricity Board, the Marketing Boards and the Uganda Advisory 
Board of Trade. 
This type of business organizations is found mostly in developing 
countries where most producers are either small scale growers or traders. 
There is therefore a general lack of adequate capital and as such local 
businessmen tend to take a short term view of the returns on the money they 
invest and prefer small scale enterprises which yield profits quickly and 
are less risky. In agriculture, for example, the participation by indigenous 
people is on such a small scale that they usually comprise of a few acres 
of land just enough for home consumption. In this case the government would 
find it necessary to intervene and undertake a viable and large scale 
agricultural produce for commercial purposes. The government is prepared 
to take risks and accept short-term losses which the individual is usually 
unwilling to accept. 
The supplies of capital and technical skills from these countries 
is inadequate and so it becomes the duty of the government, to encourage 
industrial expansion by creating public enterprises whose role is to obtain 
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capital and the necessary manpower and spearhed economic development. 
It will not be possible in this paper to describe the role of 
the Government in all the various public enterprises in Uganda. I intend 
therefore to concentrate on the Uganda Advisory Board of Trade as a case 
example of the governments' role in Public enterprises. 
THE UGANDA ADVISORY BOARD OF TRADE 
BACKGROUND 
In its early attempts to encourage the African businessmen into 
a full participation in the country's commerce and trade, the Government, through 
the Uganda Development Corporation, (UDC) in 1963, set up the Africans Loans 
Fund to provide capital for small-scale African businessmen. On the 17th 
July, of the same year, African Businessmen Promotion Limited"'" was incorporated 
as a subsidiary company of the Uganda Development Corporation, and had the 
full backing of the Uganda Government. Its aims were to bridge the gap 
which had for a long time existed in Uganda trade between Africans and other 
races engaged in trade and secondary to look into problems and difficulties 
facing the indigenous people of the country and to find solutions. 
An early research conducted by the officials of the UDC revealed 
that the prime problems facing the African businessmen was the lack of 
adequate capital and non-availability of credit facilities. They did not 
have business know-how and that Ugandans are not born traders. Unlike the 
Asians, they virtually have no business experience heritage behind them. It 
was also found that Africans left commerce to people with every little education 
while the well educated engaged in other professions. There was the problem 
of lack of housing in towns, lack of book-keeping knowledge and the absence 
or inadequacy of the book-keepers; and price fluctuations. 
The facilities offered by this company included the assistance by 
African Business Promotion Limited in oonnecting the african businessmen to 
the right buying points and guaranteeing their accounts with the wholesalers, 
thereby enabling them to obtain goods on credit. 
1. African Business Promotion Limited registered under the Uganda 
Company Act, Laws of Uganda, 1964 ed. 
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All the foresaid were accomplished through the extension of special 
2 
facilities to the African businessmen. There was the confirming facility which 
dealt with confirming indents for imports to enable importers buy overseas. 
Guarantee scheme offered guarantee to Groups of traders and limited liability 
companies which enable them to reach the best buying points and avail them-
selves of trading and cash discounts. It also offered Discounting Bills for 
traders who had government tenders; and also encouraged the formation of limited 
liability companies free of charge except for payment of the Government 
Stamp Duty. And finally it extended the Credit Guarantee Scheme to solve the 
problem of Inadequacy of capital, under which traders were given goods on 
30 - 60 days credit. 
The benefits derived from these facilities were the general increase 
in stock of the African traders; overcoming of the quantity buying barriers 
in that the facilities enabled the traders to reach the bonfide wholesalers, 
who could give them the quantity discounts and would not inflate the prices. 
African Business Promotion Limited also appointed many more African traders 
as a gents for Nyanza products and later began supplying certain goods and 
services direct to wholesalers and retailers. 
The African Business Promotion Limited gave way to the National 
Trading Corporation which was established by an Act of Parliament in Sept. 3 
1966, to pursue the following main objectives: 
i) to engage in commerce and trade; 
ii) to organize and effect exports and imports of such goods 
and commodities as "the Board of Directors may from time to 
time determine, and the purpose, sale and transport of the 
general trade in such goods and commodities in Uganda or 1 
elsewhere. 
iii) to promote or aid in promotion of, subject to proper and 
adequate safeguards to be determined by the Board of 
Directors, any person being a citizen of Uganda in trade and 
business. 
iv) to do all such other things as are incidental ot> conducive to 
the attainment of the objective or any of them, 
2. Uganda Development Corporation Act 1952, Laws of Uganda 1964- ed. 
Vol. VIII, p. 5044. 
3. National Trading Corporation Act, Laws of Uganda 1966,P.280 
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The share capital of the National Trading Corporation was £250,000 
divided into 250,000 one Uganda pound shares, all of which were taken up by 
the Government, It was also exempted from payment of income tax, unlike 
other corporations, in respect of the discharge of its functions. By this 
same Act, all the assets, worth Us $ 3.32 million, 4 and liabilities including 
all officers and employees of the African Business Promotion Limited, were 
transferred to the National Trading Corporation. 
It was, therefore, an organization which performed quasi-Government 
functions and acted as entreprenous between the manufacturer and the retailers, 
thereby ensuring an equitable distribution of goods and fair prices to the 
consumer throughout the country. Not only that, if also tried to break the 
then monopoly exercised by the Asian community in the import and distributive 
trade and thus enable the indigenous businessmen to effectively play their 
role in the trade and commerce of the country. 
In order to achieve the above mentioned aims and objectives, the 
Government appointed the National Trading Corporation as a sole importer and 
distributor of a number of items it deemed v£> fit for the National Trading 
Corporation to handle, viz, sugar, rice, cement, onions, salt, shirts, wines 
and spirits, steel windows and door frames, spring balances, fishnets, edible 
5 
oil, Ghee and Hoes. It also had the responsibility of involving effectively 
the indigenous people in the distribution of such commodities by appointing 
them as sub-distributors throughout the country to ensure that these commodities 
are taken to rural areas where the masses of the people live. Not only that, 
it also had a network of depots throughout the country, which acted as 
reservoirs for the above commodities. It also offered special assistence to 
Uganda traders in the forms of Credit Guarantee, Discounting and confirming 
schemes. Hire Purchase Guarantee, Commercial Bank Loans and the 80 per cent 
Loans Scheme and services like Auditor/Accountant and the Training Department. 
It also developed export Markets in neighbouring countries of Kenya, Zaire, 
Rwanda and Burundi, in order to earn foreign exchange and to make extra, 
profits to further assist the development of African trade. To aid in maximum 
achievement of Africanization of trade in Uganda the Export and Import Corpora-
tion was established in 1970 in which certain firms and companies as well as 
4. 
5. 
6. 
National Trading Corporation Amendment Act, Laws of Uganda, 1969, p. 93 
National Trading Corporation Amendment Act. p. 93. 
National Trading Corporation Amendment Act, p. 94. 
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non-business institutions were specified as export and import agents of ahost 
of commodities and items in the country. 
When the Military Government came to power in January 1971, a 
Commission of Inquiry was set up to probe into the affairs of the National 
Trading Corporation. It found out that the Chairman was incompetent, corrupt 
politically minded; tribalistic; and that the Corporation was an area of 
political corruption and embezzlement leading to the misappropriation of 
funds to the tone of many millions of shillings. 
The Government therefore deemed it necessary to establish the State 
7 
Trading Corporation m 1972 with its major function stated as the sole 
exporters and importers of goods of any class or description for purposes of 
trade for the Republic of Uganda. This same decree also provided for the 
powers of the Corporation as follows. 
(a) engage in commerce and trade; 
(b) manage, develop, let, hire or buy, subscribe for or 
otherwise acquire or sell, or otherwise dispose of or yt 
hypothecate, or otherwise deal in immovable or movable 
property of any sort, including stocks, shares, bonds, 
debentures and securities of, and any interest in, any 
limited company; 
(c) Lend or advance money to, or acquire an interest in, or 
provide or by underwriting or otherwise, assist in the 
subscription of capital for any undertaking engaged in or 
proposing to establish, or to expand or modernise, any 
business in Uganda. 
(d) give guarantee in relation to the financing of any undertaking 
or the performance of any contract by any undertaking. 
(e) promote or aid in the promotion of, subject to proper and 
adequate safeguards to be determined by the Board of Directors, 
any person being a citizen of Uganda in trade or business; 
(f) acquire, take on lease, hold and enjoy any property, and 
sell let or otherwise dispose of the same. 
7. State Trading Corporation Decree 1972. 
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(g) with the prior approval of the Minister of Commerce appoint 
agents for carrying out any function of the corporation. 
(h) build or purchase business premises in furtherance of its 
objectives; 
(i) establish and maintain offices both in Uganda and abroad. 
It also provided for the transfer of all assets and liabilities 
and any property vested in the Export and Import Corporation and the National 
Trading Corporation to the State Trading Corporation. 
8 The subsidiary companies of the Corporation were: 
i) Transocean (Uganda) Limited. 
(for forwarding, clearing and transporting of goods). 
ii) Winits (Uganda) Limited 
(importation of wines and spirits, distribution of Uganda 
Waragi and bottling of certain wines). 
iii) Mercedes-Benz sales Limited, 
iv) Equatorial Pharmaceutical Supplies. 
v) Intra-African Traders (Rwanda) Limited. 
FORMATION OF THE UGANDA ADVISORY BOARD OF TRADE. 
It becomes, therefore abundantly clear that the express purpose 
for the establishment of African Business Promotion Limited, the National 
Trading Corporation and the State Trading Corporation was to Organise trade 
and commerce in Uganda. But there was a turning point in the history of the 
country with the coming into power of the military Government. The Government 
of the Second Republic clearly saw that political independence which Uganda 
had achieved in 1962, was completely meaningless without economic independence. 
Therefore, 
m August, 1972, an Economic War was declared. It primarily involved 
the expulsion of the non-citizen Asians from the country and, therefore, a 
8. Ibid 
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U total Uganization of the machinery running the country's economy. Asian • . 
firms and businesses were allocated to Ugandans while British and Israeli 
firms and companies were nationalized by the Government. What the pre-
mittary regime had endeavoured to achieve for decades was seemingly 
realized within a few months. 
However, the 'Economic War' could not be accomplished without 
hardships. The Ugandan businessmen did not have adequate capital and readily 
available credit facilities extended to them. Therefore the Government 
launched the 'Mafuta Mingi Operation' which was concerned with the granting 
of loans to the now black Uganda businessmen. This was mainly channelled 
through the Uganda Commercial Bank, the Libyan Arab Bank and the Uganda 
Development Bank. 
Another major cause of hardships was the lack of business experience 
of the new businessmen. This may be traced to the Asian traditional custom 
of treating businesses as a family affair, thereby effectively preventing 
indigenous Ugandans from acquiring business know-how. When Ugandans took 
over, this lack of experience caused a slow-down in the flow of £isj?cir'tba»ee 
and the outflow of exports. But the Government came to the' rescue of the 
country by speeding up the imports of certain goods particularly salt and: sugar', 
and finding ways of counter attacking these hardships. In April, 1974, a 
meeting of all traders and businessmen in Uganda was convened by the President, 
at the Kampala International Conference Centre. Each district submitted 
a memorandum listing the hardships they were meeting in running the abandoned 
businesses. 
The most prevent ones were:-
a) shortage of goods 
b) poor management of the State Trading Corporation 
c) slow processing of the traders' applications for import licences. 
d) Rigid Exchange Control Regulations 
e) Inadequacy of Bank Loans, 
This therefore led to the formation of the Uganda Advisory Board of 
9 Trade. This Board was established by Decree Number 9 of 1974, to carry out 
9. Uganda Advisory Board of Trade, Decree No.9, 1974. 
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the following functions: 
1, a) to supervise, and as far as possible, coordinate the activities 
of the eight companies; 
b) to serve as adviser to the Minister of Commerce concerning the 
exercise by the Minister of any powers or functions relating 
to the specified companies; 
to provide such technical and managerial services to the specified 
companies as would enhance the efficiency of those eight 
companies; and 
to perform such other functions as the Minister of Commerce 
may, by statutory order, confer upon the Board. 
c) 
d) 
2. It is also the duty of the Uganda Advisory Board of Trade 
a) to ensure that a specified company conducts its business 
on sound commercial principles; 
b) to ensure, in respect of trading activities of a specified 
company, that such company, 
i) takes such steps as may be necessary including the adoption 
of sound principles of pricing and cost structures, to avert 
excessive costs to the consumer; 
ii) avoids shortages in commodities which are essential for 
public health, the interests of agriculture of industry or 
otherwise for the economic development of Uganda; 
c) to ensure, in consultation with the Minister responsible for 
finance, that adequate provision is made for any foreign currency 
required for the operations of any of the specified companies; 
d) to advise on the criteria for the appointment and promotion 
of staff in the service of the specified companies, the terms 
and conditions of staff and the employment of staff in or for 
the purposes of the specified companies; 
e) to assist the specified companies in the formulation of the 
annual and long-term plans of the company including the pre-
paration of estimates and the investment of funds by the company; 
IDS/OP 39 
f) to give advice to the specified companies not inconsistent 
with the regulations of such company relating to financial-
administration and accounting procedures and to inspect at 
any time the accounts and.financial records of the specified 
companies; and 
g) to require any specified company to which the Board, such 
fees as the Minister of Commerce may, after consultation with 
the Minister responsible for Finance and the Minister 
responsible for planning, approve. 
The Uganda Advisory Board of Trade was the only authority in the 
1® 
country responsible 'for the issue of both export and import licence ^ from 
August 1, 1974-. "The would-be exporters shall have to submit their export 
licence application forms and form CD3 fully endorsed by their bankers to • 
the Board. Export Licence application form can be obtained from the Board 
and Form CD3 will be available from any commercial bank". Not only that, but 
it also stated that, "In case of Agricultural, forestry, animal and fishery 
products, the export licence application form will have to be accompanied 
by the necessary export permit issued by the relevant Government institutions" 
"Applications for import licence for raw materials will have to 
be submitted direct to the Uganda Advisory Board of Trade. Attached to the 
import licencing application for foreign exchange allocation in duplicate 
and four copies of declaration of payment for imports", All these forms 
were to be endorsed by the applicant's bankers. If and when the applications 
were approved, the would-be importers had to pay the necessary commission 
of one per cent of the CIF value to the Board at the premises of the 
respective company. He had also to pay import, deposit to the Bank of Uganda 
before he received the approved application. 
"After receipt of the approved application, the would-be importer 
shall be required to take immediately the necessary steps to ensure that the 
goods are imported with the minimum delay. Each import- licertCe. ieaedd -.will 
Be valid for six months only from the date of issue unless otherwise extended 
due to unavoidable circumstances". 
10. Ibid. 
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On the other hand, the organization of the Uganda Advisory Board 
of Trade was such that it was based on Functional Departmentation. This was 
done by departmentizing it into eight companies as enlisted below11. 
a) Uganda Pharmaceuticals Limited which was formed from Equatorial 
Pharmacutical Supplies Limited. This company deals with the 
importation and distribution of Medical equipment, surgical 
equipment, surgical instruments, laboratory equipment, student 
instruments, school chemicals, pharmacutical chemicals, patent 
preparations, hospital sundry requisites, veterinary medicines 
veterinary feeds, germicides and pesticides. 
b) Uganda Motors Limited formed from 
i) Ecta (Uganda) Limited, 
ii) Uganda Motor Spares Limited, 
i.ii) Gomba Motors (1973) Limited, and 
iv) D„T. Dobie and Company (Uganda) Limited. 
This company was responsible for the importation and distribution 
of Motor vehicles both private and commercial, together with the 
spare parts. 
c) Foods and Beverages Limited formed from 
i) NTC Winits Limited, and 
ii) Fresh Foods (Uganda) Limited. 
This company dealfc-with the importation of wines and spirits; 
distribution of Uganda Warangi; bottling certain kinds of wines; 
distribution of food products and essential commodities like sugar, 
soap, salt and edible oil throughout the country. It had its 
branches and depots, opened in almost all the major and minor 
towns of Uganda for this purpose. 
11. Ministry of Planning & Economic Development, The Action Programme, 
1977, p. 45. 
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d) Uganda General Merchandise Limited formed from 
i) Uganda General Merchandise Limited 
ii) Thompson Tucker (Uganda) Limited 
iii) R.O. Hamilton (Uganda) Limited. 
It imported any other kind of merchandise with which the other 
specified companies did not deal with. 
e) Uganda Industrial Machinery Ltd., formed from Uganda Company 
Ltd. It imported Industrial machinery and spare parts, such 
as engineering and electric industrial and domestic products 
together with their ancillary equipment. 
f) Uganda Hardwares Limited formed from General Equipment (U) Ltd. 
It imported hardware and building materials such as plumbing, 
fittings, GCI sheets, all types of nails, paints and other 
limits incidental there to. 
g) Transocean (Uganda) Limited which dealt with the clearence 
of imports from Mombasa destined for Uganda and distributing 
them throughout the country; handling of goods to Sudan, Zaire, 
Rwanda, and Burundi; transportation of export cargo to Mombasa 
for the purpose of export; and the clearance of air freight 
from Entebbe Airport. 
h) Intra-Africa Traders (Uganda) Limited which dealt with exporta-
tion of goods and commodities to other African countries as well 
as overseas. 
Each of these eight companies had a general Manager occupying 
the highest organizational role. 
Since its formation in 1974, the Uganda Advisory Board 
of Trade had two major problems and these are: 
1. Lack of competent managerial manpower and dishonest attitude of the 
officials. 
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The managers of the eight companies considered themselves as 
civil servants or direct appointees of the government (political appointees). 
In that capacity they were governed by civil service regulations rather than 
commercial practices. They therefore had little interest or incentive to 
run their companies on commercial lines. Many of them had never had any 
business training. But because of political connections or nepotism they had 
been offered posts in these companies when they did not have sufficient •': 
training and experience to run them effectively and efficiently. 
Due to lack of foreign exchange, companies such as Foods & Beverages, 
Uganda General Merchandise and the Uganda Motor Ltd., which imported 
essential commodities like salt, soap, sugar and cars were not able to 
bring these commodities into the country in sufficient quantities. The little 
that came in found its way into the black market due to the dishonest practices 
of the company officials. This was because prices of many of the commodities 
fixed by the government were far below the market price because of the 
scarcity of the commodities and because consumers considered these goods 
essential and so were prepared to pay any price for them. The company 
officials thus took advantage of this kind of situation and dealt directly' 
with the desperate intending buyer at the price three or four times higher 
than the government price. 
2. Lack of foreign exchange to buy the necessary input materials and 
enough commodities was the second problem. Uganda's export trade is based 
mainly on cotton, coffee and tea. These crops are now facing stiff 
competition in the world market with the result that their prices have 
drastically declined. This has rendered the Bank of Uganda helpless in 
giving financial assistance to the Uganda Advisory Board of Trade and its 
eight specified companies. Many of them may not function effectively as 
commercial undertakings for some time in the future unless foreign exchange 
becomes available. 
To solve the problems of the Uganda Advisory Board of Trade will 
need the governments re-appraisal of its ability to effectively and efficiently 
manage public enterprises. The present involvement of the government in 
almost all commercial sectors has put much strain on the Ministry concerned. 
Some of the eight companies in the Uganda Advisory Board of Trade are very 
large. Before they were taken over by the government, they were run by Asians 
as separate commercial units. As stated in the Action Programme, "The present 
arrangement which puts the various business undertakings under the Board has. -
Vill'A ,-U ,'C'^  _l-l-'!iri ;t' .; 'i o. i.«-u-J^/ vii'IN!;. i'v. V. • 1 .-..'' <'.< - " V'. '!:.) •• •'i-Vi .^'i.O•» 5 it mi• txl^ ttiUlUji . ' 
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. . . 12 tended to limit efficiency and revenue accruing to government institutions". 
In view of ttfese shortcomings it is suggested that the government 
should limit its role in public enterprises. Some of the companies durrently 
under the Advisory Board of Trade should be turned into limited liability 
public companies with 55% of the shares sold to the Public and 45% to the 
Government. Or, alternatively as stated in the Uganda People's Congress 
Party Manifesto, the original owners of some of these companies should be 
permitted to reclaim them. 
12. The Uganda Peoples Congress Party, Manifesto, 1980,p.32. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In Tanzania., public enterprises are a permanent fixture on the 
economy, IT. is 5. SO incontestable that the same scene is true in Africa 
and In the Developing Countries in general* Both capitalist and socialist 
oriented governments, in these countries„ have used and are using the mechanism 
of public enterprises for promoting, forging and pioneering development in their 
respective countries. The extensity, the varying aims and objectives and the 
varying forms of organisation of these enterprises In different countries have 
given rise to a number of conflicting definitions of "public enterprises." 
For the purpose of this study, these enterprises are defined as production and 
commercial organise-Ions that the government either owns or in which it has 
majority participation -and that are run cn a commercial basis. Their accounts 
are not integrated inxc the national budget. 
There is. a widespread interest in Tanzania on the subject of 
public enterprises (parastatals). Politicians, academicians, managers and 
the general publi have a^i questioned the performance of these enterprises 
which is understandable for since the Arusha Declaration in 1967, over fifty 
percent of the economy in the commercialised sectors has come under public 
ownership and .ontrol through puD^ic corporations. 
The extent and scope of public corporations in Tanzania aho^fO 
the. important place .hey occupy in the economic development of the country. 
The urgency and necessity oi economic development in the Third World Countries 
in general j, and Tanzania in particular,, demand that the corporations need 
not only to fot fiil their assigned roles and objectives, but also to minimise 
costs with the aim of creating and increasing surplus. It is the purpose 
of this paper to evaluate the performance of these corporations in Tanzania. 
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The paper is in two broad sections. Section one is devoted to 
a general overview of public corporations with references to other Third 
World Countries. Their roles, extent and scope of, and the reasons behind 
their formation are discussed. The section also discusses the necessity of 
positive performance on the part of the corporations in relation to surplus 
creation: owing to the latter's important contribution towards economic 
development through investment. The second section evaluates the performance 
of the corporations, and discusses the factors which contribute to the poor 
performance of the corporations, 
A. AN__Oy_E_RVIEW 0F_ PUBLIC CORPORATIONS 
The developing countries, after attaining political independence, 
realised that economic independence was the more important and urgent 
requirement. To attain that end, governments resorted to the creation of 
public corporations in an attempt to promote self-sustaining economies. 
The fundamental differences between developing countries in socio-economic 
development, size and in density of population and socio-political 
orientation are reflected in the range, number and scope of their public 
enterprises. Despite these variations, the purpose is basically the same -
promoting economic development. This primacy of objective arises out of 
the fact that colonialism and neocolonialism have remained as-the main causes 
of economic backwardness of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America, 
The creation of public corporations could thus be seen in the light of 
trying to combat the above situation. This task is important and necessarily 
warrants an examination of certain basic issues relating to public corpora-
tions in the context of economic development. 
1, The Role of Public Enterprises 
In Tanzania, during the years after the Arusha Declaration in 1967, 
public corporations assumed a new and an extremely important role in the 
country's economic development effort. New in the sense of effecting 
socialist reconstruction and important because of their role as engines 
of economic development. It's because of these roles that capital formation 
increases has been accounted for by the public sector. In 1965 the private 
sector accounted for about 60 per cent of all monetary fixed capital 
formation but this share had declined to 30 per cent by 1975, The ration 
of public sector fixed capital formation to monetary capital formation rose 
from 40 per cent to 73 per cent during the same period, i.e. from T.Shs.389 
million to T.Shs.2,057 million (National Accounts, p.31). 
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A closer look at the objectives of the public enterprises system 
in Tanzania will elucidate its central place in national planning. The 
objectives, according to the Arusha Declaration, are as follows: 
i) To achieve economic justice by controlling the principal 
means of production, 
ii) To ensure the well-being of all citizens. 
iii) To prevent the exploitation of one person by another or 
one group by another; and 
iv) To prevent accumulation of wealth to an extent which is 
inconsistent with the existence of a classless svciety. 
The above objectives are socialist in form and content. Socialist 
development, first and foremost, calls for the control of the major means 
of production by the state; and this in turn determines the relations of 
production. State control leads more easily to accomplishing objectives 
two to four, It also widens the extent of planning; and as a result places 
priority on central planning. In compliance with the foregone, most 
investment in industry was planned in the public sector under the second 
Five-Year Development Plan; only 16 per cent of the total industrial invest-
ment was left to private enterprise. The plan document stated that "the 
role of the public sector has been extended considerably as a result of 
Arusha Declaration", and that "the private sector cannot be relied upon 
to provide the main thrust in directly productive investment", (Vol.1, 
p.14). 
To implement the above, the Government nationalised a number of 
institutions, both service and "productive", acquired equity participations 
in others and created specialised public corporation like Tanzania Tourist 
Corporation (TTC), the National Agricultural and Food Corporation (NAFCO) 
and Tanzania Wood Industries Corporation (TWICO), Prior to the new set up, 
all the projects which fell under these mentioned corporations were being 
carried out by the National Development Corporation (NDC), which was 
established in 1964 by Act of Parliament (no.69). NDC is the largest parastatal 
organisation (holding company) in the country with total assets value of 
T.Shs. 383,791, 214 in 1976 (NDC, Twelveth Annual Report, 1976), The value 
of these assets indicates the importance of NDC in particular, and public 
corporations in general, in the economy of Tanzania, 
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So far, we have been providing an answer to the question, why 
public enterprises in Tanzania? We also need to know, generally, the 
reasons behind public corporations elsewhere. The most often cited reasons 
are these: 
1) Governments have specific developmental priorities and objectives 
which need public rather than private attention. The current emphasis on 
rural development in Tanzania, for example, led to the formation of the 
Tanzania Rural Development Bank (TRDB), with the primary task of financing 
rural projects. Other development priorities like the promotion of import 
substitution, the localisation of the labour force, the acquisition of 
foreign aijl and cooperation, and the injection of development into certain 
specific fields of economic activity, necessarily calls for government control. 
These are common in many countries, e.g. India, Kenya, Nigeria, Turkey, 
Uganda, although all the priorities mentioned differ in each country. For 
example, in Kenya, Uganda and Nigeria, Africanisation ranks high on the list 
of priorities. For the remaining countries other priorities become more 
applicable, 
2) Government need to supply the developmental initiative. This 
ranges from providing the initiative for investment and the promotion of 
industrial activity to developing infrastructure for basic activities, e.g., 
electricity, transport, communication and agriculture, and to supplying 
the required managerial capability to enterprises. 
3) Governments are able to pursue policies designed to redistri-
bute incomes, create employment and establish programs of social security 
through the medium of public enterprises. This applies also to Tanzania, 
where the First Five-Year Plan for economic and social development (1964) 
aimed "to see economic growth contributing to a more equitable distribution 
of income in Tanganyika society" (pp.3 and 6). The redistribution can be 
effected in the following ways: 
(a) by keeping higher salaries under check and raising 
wage levels. A progressive tax system and the establishment 
of minimum wage policies are efforts toward that end; 
(b) by carrying surplus labour as a disguised means of social 
security. This strategy tends to water down the performance 
of the corporation for1 it tends to raise costs (wages and 
salaries) at the expense of profit; 
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(c) by offering products at concessional prices to poor 
customers» For example, providing fertilizer to 
peasants at subsidised prices in Tanzania reflects 
the applicability of this scheme. 
u„ By introducing public corporations as egencies of development 
in an underdeveloped region. Corporations like Sudene, IRI and Konkan serve 
such purposes in Brazil North Eastern Region, Italy Southern Region, and 
India Western Coast region. In Tanzania the second Five Year Plan elabora-
tes regional development through public sector investment by stressing, 
"that the choice of sub-optimal location for an agricultural or industrial 
project, in the interest of regional equality may involve a cost in terms 
of efficiency" (p„2). 
The foregoing selected reasons have shown that the governments of 
the developing countries, including Tanzania, have been inspired by 
general objectives such as the promotion of economic and social justice 
and the acceleration of the developmental process, and perhaps favoured 
public corporations as a means of achieving the stipulated goals and 
intentions. Countries which have adopted socialist policies and a socialist 
political orien+ation tend to utilise public enterprises as the principal 
means of achieving the transition to socialism. But almost all developing 
countries have attempted to subordinate private corporations to public 
enterprises in certain fields of activity in the pursuit of such national 
goals, 
It seems likely that public corporations have occupied and will 
continue to occupy an important and expanding position in the economies 
of the Third World Countries, But this important and expanding role will 
be justified only if such corporations contribute to the development of 
the national economies. Unfortunately, this often has not been the case. 
In many countries there is a notable difference between objective and 
performance, As J, Udoji comments: 
If the rate at which these bodies are being created and 
financed bears any relationship to the economic growth 
of the countries or the success of the bodies themselves, 
at least some of the countries would have been near the 
stage for an economic take-off. The experience, however, 
at least in West Africa, has been in the opposite direction 
(They)have done so badly that several public inquiries have 
been conducted into their affairs, 
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Although Udoji refers specially to West Africa, his comments can 
be generalised to Tanzania and many other Third World countries. The 
question arises why these public enterprises have failed to live up to 
the ir expectations. Is it because of inadequate financing, poor systems 
of corrupti ve practices? Or are there more fundamental and structural 
reasons „? One purpose of this paper is to examine the performance of these 
corporations in Tanzania and thereby to provide some answers to these questions. 
2. Extent and Scope of Public Enterprise 
In Tanzania, not only has the public sector been expanding 
it has also been diversifying. According to the Second Five-Year Plan, 
public sector investment was projected to rise from 30 per cent in 1964 
to 70 per cent in 1973. The upward trend is reflected in the form of transfers 
to parastatals as well as in fixed capital formation. In terms of transfers 
they increased from T. Shs. 127 million in 1964 to T. Shs. 211 million in 1971 
(Annual Plan for 19 72/73,p.2). An increase of 10.7 per cent was realised in 
parastatal fixed capital formation. The increase was from T.Shs. 515.5 million 
in 1973 to T.Shs.570.8 million in 1974 (Tanzania, Economic Survey, 1974/75,p.2 
Viewed from another perspective, total public sector capital 
stock continued to rise and reached T.Shs.2,077 million or 70.7 per cent 
of total national stock. In 1972, it was T. Shs.1,809 million, an increase 
of 14.8 per cent (Annual Plan for 1976/77,p.2). The expansion in the public 
sector, a trend which is expected to continue, widens the role of the 
corporations in the economic development of Tanzania. This is emphasised 
by the point that the expansion has penetrated a number of sectors in the 
economy, that is, diversifaction. Manufacturing, processing and mining 
sector, the traditional sectors dominated by parastatals have seen other 
sectors like agriculture, livestock, natural resources, trade and tourism, 
water, power, communication, and administrative, giving rise to their para-
statals. Presently Tanzania has a total of three hundred and eighty 
parastatal organisations. One can thus safely claims that parastatals 
dominate the Tanzania's economic scene. 
The dominance of the public sector in Tanzania is a factor of the 
socialist ideology, but the public sector also plays an important role in 
some other developing countries. Iran and Pakistan show more or less the 
same trend. For Pakistan, public sector investment rose from 28 per cent 
in 1949-1950 to 48 per cent in 1964-1965 (UN,p.8). In Iran, the sector 
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Table 1. Parastatal Contribution to National Income, By Sector 1976/77 
1980/81, Shs ('OOP) 
Sector Estimated Income 
Agriculture 
Livestock 
Natural Resources 
Minerals 
Industries 
Trade and Tourism 
Water 
Works 
Power 
Communication & Transport 
Education 
Health 
Administrative & Others 
885,334 
195,779 
2,300 
174,500 
2,049,248 
314,600 
23,965 
568,948 
345,262 
659,688 
29,400 
39,957 
494,240 
SOURCE: Third Five Year Plan, Vol.I,p.10, 
Bo THE PERFORMANCE OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISES 
A number of studies are being carried by either individuals or 
institutions to evaluate the performance of the public sector in general, 
or parastatals in particular. These studies were either at the national 
or at the district level. One of these studies by S.M. Wangwe revealed that 
capacity utilisation in selected industries was very low. In some cases, 
the level was as low as 35 per cent of the actual capacity. 
Another study by J, Jedruszek, aimed at evaluating the trends in 
productivity and employment in four industrial divisions: mining, manufactu-
ring, public utilities and construction; for the 1967 - 1977 period conveyed 
the following message. One, that there was a deceleration of growth from 
13% per year in 1964 - 67 to 2,5% in 1972-1977 with an average of 3.8% per 
year in the whole period 1967 - 1977. Second, that loss due to decrease in 
productivity in the four industrial divisions amounted in 1977 to 285 million 
shillings in 1966 prices and transformed to 1977 prices to 678 million shillings; 
this means 19,2% of the actually observed value of industrial output in 1977. 
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accounts for 37 per cent of investments in agriculture, 42 per cent in oil 
and gas and 99 per cent in water and power (UN,p.9), The trend would tend 
to continue, perhaps at a faster rate, especially in those Third World 
Countries which intend to distribute more evenly both incomes and develop-
ment efforts among the people. Such a trend will necessarily mean an 
expanding role of the public sector in the economies of these countries. 
Although it's difficult to establish if there is an optimal balance between 
the public and private sector in an economy: that depends upon concrete 
situations prevailing in the country in question as well as its political 
and economic aspirations, it's worth saying that thorough planning should 
preceed their establishment and/or expansion. 
3. Surplus Generation by Public Corporations 
One of the principal components of economic development, be it 
capitalist or socialist, is investment,, But investment eventually comes 
out of savings. In promoting domestic savings and ensuring proper invest-
ment, public enterprises have an important role to play. They must operate 
in a way that will raise surpluses, which will be available for investment 
in the same enterprise or elsewhere in the economy. Profit is an import-
ant goal, though not the only one, of any business organisation, be it 
service or productive venture. For example NDC has categorically stated: 
NDC is intended to function as a profit-making organisation; 
it's charged to do all such acts and things as may be necessary 
to uphold and support the credit of the corporation and to 
obtain and justify public confidence, and to avert or minimise 
any loss to the corporation (NDC, 1976,p.1), 
Surplus is a crucial component of economic development of any C^Unt£y. 
There is a wrong belief by politicians and some managers of public corpora-
tions, that profit in socialist economies is evil. This is a wrong belief 
because for extended reproduction to take place in any country, reinvest-
ment is necessary, 
The only difference between profit in capitalist and surplus 
in socialist economies is the form it takes .in the two societies. Profit 
is the economic law of capitalism and the motive force behind any type of 
investment. It thus becomes a means for and the consequence of the 
exploitation of labour. Moreover, because of the antagonistic relations 
of production in a capitalist economy, profit is appropr'ated by those who 
own and control the means of production. Socialism entails the emancipation 
of the workers, and the surplus that is generated is appropriated by the 
state to further the welfare of the masses. The necessity and importance 
of profit remains but its character differs within the t:vo societies. 
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The failure to recognise this fact may be one of the reasons behing the 
poor performance of the public sector. For the survival and growth of 
an enterprise, surplus creation is a necessity. Survival takes place 
so long as breakeven is achieved at that point where cost equals revenue; 
but for growth to take place, which is the desired end, revenue must 
surpass costs. 
In an economy dominated by public sector, as in the Tanzania case, 
surplus from this sector remains the most important source of public 
finance after taxation, and consequently, the determinant of the rate of 
growth of the economy. This role is well presented in the Third Five-Year 
Plan where parastatal operations are estimated to have'generated an income, 
of course a great portion of this being surplus, of T.Shs.5,707 million 
between 1976/77 and 1980/81. Perhaps detailed Table 1 showing the 
contribution of parastatals in each sector could be more illustrative. 
The estimated income will be realised only if the sectors achieve 
their expected performance. To a great extent, effectiveness and 
efficiency on their part will determine the performance results. Adverse 
performance will deter the development of projects, for one cannot invest 
out of nothing. 
Although public corporations need to operate efficiently the 
performance of the public sector in West Africa, as summarized by Udoji, 
which is also typical of developing countries reveals the opposite. In 
Tanzania for example, a number of studies have been carried in the public 
sector at national level and the above picture became applicable 
(S. Wangwe, 1976), At district level, the findings were that "only 46 out of 
71 District Development Corporations in the country can run without 
government grants for paying the salaries of their general managers and 
chief accountants" (Daily News, June 22, 1977). The two studies, the latter 
being the Prime Minister's report to the budget session of the Parliament 
in 1976, reflect the poor performance of some of the public corporations. 
The succeding section looks more closely at this performance. 
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Tanzania Investment Bank (TIB) and the National Institute of 
Productivity (NIP) carried out studies in a number of manufacturing units. 
The purpose of the study was to establish some productivity norms in these 
industries. In the course of this undertaking they discovered that a 
number of industries were suffering from "under capacity utilisation and 
there was a general trend of rising operating costs. Which were attributed 
to consideration increase in payroll costs, including the cost of recruiting 
new expatriate staff, over employment in some establishments...." 
(TIB, Annual Report, p.9P. 
At the district level, in evaluating the performance of the District 
Development Corporations (DDCs), my general finding was that, the corporations 
were not adhering to sound financial management principles (H.P.B. Moshi,1978). 
The implication of the above studies on the financial performance 
of the corporations is that their profitability is either low or in some 
cases, it is not achieved. Although the criterion of profitability, in 
evaluating performance, suffers from the drawback of not being a conclusive 
measure of efficiency, the fact that the corporations ought to conduct 
their activities at the lowest cost possible over-rides the drawback. Again, 
despite the fact that public enterprises tend to be guided more by develop-
ment objectives than by pure profit motives must never waterdown the need for 
greatest economy and efficiency in utilizing the country's resources in the 
process of production. 
A poor country like Tanzania, as is true of the developing countries, 
cannot afford to waste and misuse resources; if at all we are serious with 
economic development. President Nyerere was aware of this danger when he 
cautioned that " corruption, theft and abuses of public money and goods and 
other abuses of public office or slackness in fulfilling the duties for which 
the people are being paid, could undermine our march towards socialism." 
The financial performance of the enterprises audited in the 1978/79 
period mirrors the following picture: "The out of the total 247 audited 
accounts during the year, there were about 196 trading parastatals and the 
remaining were non-trading and service institutions. Out of 196 trading 
parastatals, the accounts of 81 such parastatals disclosed losses" (TAC, 
Annual Report,p.9). 
I 
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In terms of number and the magnititude of the losses made, 
parastatals in the Ministry of Agriculture ranked highest, 30 parastatals, 
under this Ministry incurred losses, ranging Shs.98.68 million (Tanzania Cotton 
Authority to Shs.18.78 million (cashewnut Authority of Tanzania). High 
administrative costs, lack of infrastructure - transport and storage facilities 
etc. contributed most to these high assess. 
The financial performance of the district based public corporations 
(DDCs), does not portray a very different picture from the above. "52 DDCs 
out of 68 made losses during the financial year (1978/79). Most of them 
were continuously making losses ever since they started their activities. 
In some cases the loss during the year and the accumulated losses have 
completely wiped off their capital" (TAC, Position Paper on DDCs). The causes 
for so poor a performance were cited as: Irregularities in payments, misuse 
of funds, lack of control, liberal credit terms to customers, etc. 
succeeding section attempts to discuss the general factors attributed to the 
poo^r performance. 
1. Causes for the poor performance 
Although it is difficult to discuss specific causes for each 
corporation separately, because each one has its own background, resources, and 
problems, only the common causes will be discussed. 
There has been a number of explanation about the poor performance 
of public enterprises. One argument is based on the allegation that they 
do concentrate on infrastructural and slow-yielding sectors of activity and 
j that they operate on low profits if not on losses as a matter of public policy. 
Although this could be true in a few countries, not in Tanzania where the 
sector is so diversified and the government has raised so much hope in the 
public that large surpluses will be generated from these enterprises. 
Another argument has focused on the pattern and nature of public 
enterprises relationship with multinational corporations, partnership and 
management contracts which are exploitative leading to the drain of enter-
prises ' surplus. It is true that the dependency of the third world economies 
on developed economies, in terms of industrial inputs and spare parts demands 
adequate availability of foreign exchange to purchase such inputs and services. 
Inadequate supply necessarily leads to under capacity utilisation in such 
industries. The low foreign reserves in Tanzania, especially after the war, 
made some industries to either close down temporarily or to operate on very 
low capaqity. The Mwanza Textile Mills (Mwatex) and the General Tyre, ave 
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. are cases in mind. 
The causes of poor performance discussed so far have not addressed 
themselves to the internal operations of the corporations to see how efficie-
ntly or inefficiently their operations are being planned, organised and 
coordinated. We therefore intend to discuss in some detail the problems 
of management, control and accountability in public enterprises. 
The most often cited problem of the public enterprises is that 
of management. No doubt management is an important component of any form of 
organisation. This problem is a factor of many causes: One, that some 
corporations were started without proper planning in terms of manpower-
resources availability or in some cases there was no vigorous manpower 
development and training. Second, that most of the top management positions 
are by appointment and not by merit or trade of training. Third, that in 
some cases trained manpower exists, it is either misplaced or misallocated. 
Lastly, that nepotism and technical know-how are never less common. 
The above causes thus undermine the assence of managing in these 
enterprises. The role and purpose of management in an organisation is that 
of applying management concepts and principles with the aim of achieving 
maximum outputs, be it material or social with minimum inputs, while at the 
same time satisfying the needs of the consumers. This is the essence of 
managing. Inputs and outputs, these two concepts have one essential element 
embodied in them, that is cost. In a situation where the essence of 
e 
managing is undermined financial indiscipline creeps in. The net effect 
is management by crisis which is nothing more than ad hoc planning, lack of 
coordination and control of the enterprise activities. In such a situation, 
wastage, negligence and corruption would never fail to get their share. 
The problems of control and accountability are enormous in public 
enterprises. The Parliament, the Board of Directors and Auditing do control 
the activities of the corporations, in turn, the corporations are accountable 
to above. How effective are the controls? The Parliament controls the 
activities of the parastatals through the Committee on Parastaral Accounts 
which examines the accounts of parastatals and the auditors report thereon. 
This committee was formed due to deterioration in the accounts of parastatals 
and lack of an appropriate and effective organ to check and arrest the 
situation. Experience has shown that this committee is effective where 
accounts for scrutiny exist and when the "concerned" attend sessions. 
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Angther standing committee of the Central Committee of CCM has been greated 
t© deal with matters concerning parastatals. This eomir' + te© is knewn as the 
standing Committee for the Supervision of Parastatal. Activities. 
The effectiveness of the Board of Directors is questionable. Their 
role is that of providing policy guidelines to the parastatals, appointing 
senior management personnel and reviewing and appraising the problems and 
performance of their organisations. "Some Boards are inactive and do not 
hold formal meetings, sometimes even for one year," The causant of this 
phenomena ranges from lack of seriousness in performing their assigned 
roles due to being "too-busy officials" either because of being a member 
in various boards or because of other "pressing" assignments. 
Auditing is conceived, correctly of course, as the best approach 
to safeguard public funds invested in these parastatals. But this is true 
only when timely and accurate financial statements are available. It is 
also true only when the constructive suggestions made by the auditor to 
obviate or minimize weaknesses in financial reporting are implemented. 
About 100 parastatals were in areas in the preparation of their 
accounts for one year or more after the closing of their respective financial 
years. The major reasons for the delay in the preparation of accounts by 
the parastatals are inept management and lack of adequate and competent 
accounting personnel (TAG, Annual Report, p-7). 
As far as acoura cy of the statements is concern4/ out of 247 accounts 
of parastatals certified during the year (1978/79) 76 accounts got unqualified 
audit reports and 138 got qualified reports,. The qualified reports failed 
either to disclose some important items or departed from the generally 
accepted accounting procedures on some vital items, 
i 
The statutory regulations on parastals have created, yet another 
control loophole, Parastatal organisations are created under three main 
categories of statutes: Companies Ordinance (Cap.212); Public Corporation 
Act, 1969; and Special Acts of Parliament. "The Orders promulgated under 
the last two categories are not detailed enough with regard to corporate 
matters e.g. keeping proper books of accounts, audit requirements, etc. This 
apparent ambiqui ty has encouraged these parastatals to successfully argue that 
they are not legally bound to observe the regulatory provisions contained 
in the Companies Ordinance," 
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Apart from the enumerated weaknesses in public enterprises, they 
(enterprises) have an advantage, which is also a great weakness of control of 
having unrestricted access to the government budget. Disregarding the 
fact that government finances these institutions through the budget, the 
financial and non-financial institutions, it also finances in some cases, the 
cost of inefficiency in these enterprises, Through subsidies, writing-off 
loans, payment of some service charges - audit fees, as the case is for 
the DDC etc. Although in some instances the government has to finance and 
refinance these enterprises, it is necessary to tighten the ] bglts at certain 
stages if slackness and don't-care-attitude, on both management and workers, 
are to be minimised, 
2. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Public corporations have increased their economic and political 
importance in Tanzania and in many Third World Countries. In Tanzania the 
corporations have penetrated every sector of the economy. No doubt that 
public enterprises have an enormous potential for development. This potential 
can only be realised if their financial performance is positive. "It is true, 
that many of them have performed quite well, it is equally true that others 
have not fared so well," It is necessary therefore to take appropriate 
steps to make the latter group more operational effective. 
This will, however, require certain adjustments (policy and 
strategies) both at the macro and micro level. The "two-level" consideration 
is imperative if economic efficiency is to be improved. Perhaps the following 
recommendations could be of assistance. One, planning both at the national 
and corporate level should be improved. Establishment of new and expansion 
of the existing parastatals should be preceded by effective planning in terms 
of resource availability-manpower and otherwise and testing of their economic ar 
technical feasibilities. 
Second, the improved performance of the corporations will depend, 
to a large extent, upon the quality and quantity of manpower available. 
Training should thus receive priority in this organisations, The of 
training should reflect the skills-deficiency in individual organisations. 
Nevertheless, managerial trades, especially in finance need emphasis, Connected 
to the issue of manpower is the issue of motivation. Unless incentives are 
introduced in the enterprises, exodus of the trained manpower to the private 
sector cannot be avoided. 
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Third, control is necessary if the assets and the funds invested 
ip public enterprises are to be safeguarded. To this effect the government (s) 
needs to re-examine the Acts of "Establishment" inorder to formulate uniform', 
specific and effective control measures. For example, preparation and audit 
of financial statements should be a legal obligation of all the enterprises. 
Again, the composition of the Board of Directors should re-evaluated 
and minimum number of meetings per period should be stipulated and reinforced. 
The unrestricted assess of public enterprises to the government budget needs 
appraisal. It is recommended that the government spells out conditions under 
which refinancing and subsidies will be accommodated. The conditions should 
include: period of existence of the enterprise, its efficiency and the 
impact of uncontrollable factors on performance of the enterprise. 
The implementation and success of the above recommendations will 
depend upon the cooperation and coordination between the Party, Government 
and the Corporations involved. It would be necessary for all parties concerned 
to ta'ce appropriate steps to improve the operational efficiency of public 
enterprises and of the economy at large. 
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AN ASSESSMENT OF THE PROFITABILITY OF MAJOR STATE 
ENTERPRISES IN UGANDA, 1962-1980 
By 
Ezra Suruma 
Senior Lecturer, 
Dept. of Economics, Makerere University 
INTRODUCTION. 
In a Walrasion type general equilibrium model a theoretical case can 
be made for an economic system based entirely on free enterprise."'" If the 
conditions for general equilibrium are fulfilled viz many buyers and sellers 
in every industry, perfect knowledge, perfect mobility, profit-maximisation 
and utility maximisation by all firms and consumers respectively, complete 
divisibility of all economic goods and no externalities, if these conditions 
are fulfilled then social welfare is maximised and a public sector is not 
needed. However if these conditions are not satisfied then social welfare 
. . . 2 is not maximised and there is a basis for public intervention. 
3 
In their Public Finance in Theory and Practice Richard Musgrave and 
Peggy Musgrave pose the question: Why Is it that a public sector is required? 
Why is it that a substantial part of the economy is subject to governmental 
direction even in a supposedly free enterprises system such as that of the 
United States? Not only does governmental direction reflect "the presence 
of political and social ideologies which depart from the premises" of a free 
enterprise economy, but there is the added fact that the government is needed 4 
to "guide, correct, and supplement" the market mechanism. Thus the reason 
for government activity are the provision for social goods, adjustment of income 
distribution and stabilization of employment, prices and balance of payments 
which the market mechanism alone may not optimally achieve. 
If it is accepted that there are indivisible products, externalities, 
and imperfect markets, then this breakdown of the conditions for competitive 
equilibrium may be seen as the justification for the public sector. Additionally, 
the ideological biases of the society will set the balance between the public 
and private allocation of resources. 
1. Bernard P. Heber, Modern Public Finance, Richard R. Irwin, Inc. Home-
wood, Illinois, 1967. pp. 21-23. 
2. Ibid., p. 23. 
3. Richard A. Musgrave and Peggy B. Musgrave, second Edition McGraw-Hill 
Book Company, New York 1976, p. 5. 
4. Ibid. 
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State Enterprise in Uganda 
The data available indicate that there were 34 statutory corporations 
and government companies in Uganda in 1977. Of these 5 were non-profit 
making while the remainder were profit making establishments. Out of these 
29 profit making statutory organisations 11 were service establishments, 7 
were in manufacturing while 5 were financial institutions (including Bank 
of Uganda.) The other six consisted of 3 marketing boards, two tea estates 
management authorities and one farmer cooperative. It is also noteworthy that 
one third of all the establishment were holding companies with a large number 
of subsidiaries. For example the Lint Marketing Board had 17 subsidiary 
companies while the Wood Industries Corporation had 13 and the Uganda Develop-
ment Corporation had 11 subsidiaries and 7 associated (partially owned) companies. 
Organisational Structure of the State Enterprise 
The majority of the state enterprises in Uganda were formed during the 
1960s. Virtually all of them were modelled after the Uganda Development 
Corporation and the Lint Marketing Board. These two organizations were 
already in existence as government owned and controlled enterprises during 
the colonial period. The Uganda Development Corporation, for example, was 
formed under the UDC Act of 1952. Subsequent statutory companies adopted a 
structure that resembled that of the Uganda Development Corporation. 
The basic structure consists of a hierarchy headed by a Minister 
of the Uganda Government under whom the corporation's activity is considered 
to fall. Thus the Dairy Corporation falls under the Minister for Animal Industry 
while the Produce Marketing Board falls under the Minister for Cooperatives 
and Marketing. Under these parliamentary acts, the relevant Minister has the 
responsibility for nominating the Board of- Directors including the chairman. 
Following the naming of the Board, the latter proceeds to appoint the top 
management. In practice the chairman of the Board is normally the general 
manager and he appoints the staff needed to work under him .'"( The most Limportant 
of these is almost always typically the chief accountant. It is also note-worthy 
that in the instances where the government is only a partial shareholder, as 
for example in the Libyan Arab Uganda Bank, the other part-owners have the 
right to select some of the people in top managerial positions. In the Libyan 
Arab Uganda Bank which was inaugerated in November 1972 and subscribed / , il o 
by "the •government, of 'Libya1 thtough' the Libyan Arab i Foreign ,-Bank' for . v.W ..ov 
51 percent while the Uganda government paid 4-9 percent of the capitalization, (5) 
the bank was actually almost entirely controlled by Libyan officials. In 
contrast, the Uganda Development Bank which was also formed In November 1972 
but which is fully owned by the Uganda Government, had its entire Board 
selected by the Minister of finance. Its composition was entirely Ugandan, 
but the basic organizational structure wab the same as the others. 
The evidence obtained on the major corporations suggests that the 
General Manager and his staff wield the most influence over the affairs of 
the corporation. Whereas the Boards are usually appointed for a two-year- term, 
there are many Instances of managers and accountants who have stayed on their 
jobs for more than 10 years. The managers thus tend to have operational 
decision-making power while the Board of Director's appears transitory or even 
merely honorary. There are also reported instances when corporations have 
operated without a Board of Directors especially when a Board's term ends and 
the Minister fails to appoint a new Board. This was the case in 1968 and 
1970 when the Produce Marketing Board operated without a Board of Directors. 
There is also an increasing body of evidence to suggest conclusively that 
power o/er the affairs of the state enterprise in Uganda has become 
increasingly concentrated In the manager and his immediate stewards that 
management has become virtually immune from public control as specified by the 
statutes. 
In addition to the powers exercised by the minister concerned, every 
statutory corporation is required to report annually to the Secretary to 
the Treasury In the Ministry of Finance. The report must include an audited 
balance sheet, income statement and other accounts. The specific date for each 
corporation's report is specified by its statutory act and as a result of the 
report the Minister of Finance requires the company to pay to the treasury if a 
profit was realized while the ministry may pay tho company for losses sufferred 
during the year. 
Methodology 
This study is based on data for seven out of the 29 profit making 
establishments i.e. approximately 25 percent.of the profit making statutory 
corporation for which data were available. Of these seven, three are banks, 
three are marketing boards and one is a manufacturing corporation. The data 
5. For example, in 1975 the Board of Directors consisted of five members. 
Of these top three positions on the Board namely the chairman, Deputy chairman and 
Managing Director were Libyans, See the Annual Report and Accounts, 1975. 
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collected on each organisation include annual profits and/or losses, issued 
capital, assets, investments, and dividend payments. The data vary considerably 
as we look at the various companies; However we have obtained annual profits 
and/or losses on all the companies in our sample. Although our purpose is 
to determine basic trends in the profitability of these companies in the 
1962-1980 period, data are not available for all these years. Conclusions 
about performance are therefore based on the data for the years for which 
information was available, 
We proceed with a case by case analysis and then integrate our 
results at the end into some generalisations which appear to have characterised 
profit performance of public enterprises in Uganda during the indicated period. 
All the seven state enterprises on which this study is based were 
either fully or partly-backed by 'i-capltal^ frpm1 £tibli"cv<Punds':V Therefore it "was 
stipulated that they would report to the public Treasury annually thus ensuring 
scrutiny of their accountability and contribution to the public. Their 
success in contributing to the development of Uganda may be determined from 
their reports to the Treasury and the public at large. 
Ideally, the success of a state enterprise is determined by the 
cost/benefit ratio. Where the ratio exceeds unity over the long term the 
corporation is a failure and vice versa. Such a judgement of course 
presumes a reliable calculation of all significant costs and benefits to 
(6) 
the public. As a practical matter meaningful cost-benefit analyses are 
so difficult to calculate that one must weigh the costs against the benefits (7) 
of preparing them. Representative indicators of the costs and benefits 
of state enterprises may provide a basis for judging their role in development 
and their success or failure in that process. Accordingly, the difference 
between revenues and expenses which the state enterprise shows in the annual 
income statement will be assumed here to represent the "net value - added" by 
that enterprise to the national product. Examination of the longterm trend in 
the difference between the annual total value of production and the costs of 
materials purchased from other firms provides a rough estimation of the firm's 
6' Roland N, McKeen, 'The Nature of Cost-Benefit Analysis' in Edwin 
Maufield (ed.) MicroEconomics, Selected Readings '3rd edition, W.W. Norton & 
Company, New York 1971. pp. 509-518. 
7. Ibid, p. 511. 
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contribution to Uganda's^economic development. Where the corporation is 
generally profitable this is equated with success in adding to the GDP while 
persistent loses imply failure to do so. 
CASE STUDIES 
1. The Uganda Development Corporation (UPC) 
This is one of Uganda's oldest and largest corporations. Table 1 
shows the profit and loss position of the UDC from 1971 to 1977. It is clear 
that this corporation operated at a loss throughout that period. By December 
31, 1977 the accumulated losses of the UDC amounted to 128 million Uganda 
shillings. Since the total share capital of this corporation was 159 
million shillings this means that Its accumulated losses at the time were 
approximately 80 percent of its share capital. The accumulated loss was 
also larger than its current assets of 116 million almost 90 percent of 
fixed assets in 1977. To the extent that profit - making state enterprises 
are supposed to be self-sustaining, the UDC was an abysmal failure during 
its third and latest decade of existence, 
Table 1; Profitability of the Uganda Development Corporation (UDC), 1971 - 1977 
Year Ended Profit Loss Issued Total 
31st December Uganda Shillings) Share Capital Assets 
(Millions of Shillings) 
1971 3,467,649 154 669 
1972 13,071,016 155 773 
1973 5,305,716 159 327.5 
1974 6,295,074 159 319 
1975 11,362,088 159 193 
1976 26,817,817 159 139 
1977 9,499,476 159 144 
Source; UDC, Annual Report, Various years 
It is also noteworthy that there was drastic decrease in the assets 
of the UDC as more and more of its subsidiaries broke away from the holding parent 
company to become independent organizations. Some officials of the UDC give this 
break away as the reason for the losses, However, we have not found any specific 
analysis by the UDC staff to support this argument. 
2. The Produce Marketing Board (PMB) • 
The Produce Marketing Board was formed under the Produce Marketing 
Board Act of 1968. Modelled after the Lint Marketing Board and Coffee 
Marketing Board it was intended to assist individual farmers as well as 
farmers' cooperatives to market their produce more efficiently. The act provided 
for the establishment of a Produce Price Assistance Fund to be accumulated from 
the profits of the Board and to be drawn on to supplement farm prices should they 
fall below acceptable levels . 
In 1968 the government purchased 125,500 shares at Ushs 20 each 
thus contributing capital of Ushs 2,510,000. The government increased 
capitalisation to Ushs 5 million in 1969 and to million by 1972. The 2§ 
million shillings appropriated by the government in 1971 and 1972 were specifically 
ear marked to purchase storage facilities. 
The profitability of the PMB from 1968 to 1976 is shown in Table 2. 
The Board obtained revenues from the sale of "controlled agricultural produce" 
a classification that covered virtually.all food crops-and tobacco. .They Only 
exception was onions, potatoes and fruits for which the Board lacked cold 
(8) 
storage facilities to prevent spoilage. It is evident from the figures in 
Table 2 that the PMB realized profits in 1968 and 1969, and from 1971 to 1975, 
while it suffered its first loss in 1976. However, the loss in 1976 was so 
large that it alone was equivalent to over 60 percent of the total profits earned 
by the PMB since its inception in 1968. Not withstanding this failure, it seems 
fair to say that the PMB operated successfully during its first decade of 
existence, 
3, Lint Marketing Board (LMB), 
The Lint Marketing Board was founded by the British colonial•admi-
nistration after World War II. Its major purpose appears to have been to provide 
an effective administration of the cotton industry in Uganda. By placing 
responsibility for the growth, expansion and marking under one organisation that 
was free to act as a quasi-private enterprise, it may have been hoped to achieve 
a more efficient cotton industry, Under the Lint Marketing Board Ordinance, 
No. 33 of 1949 all the lint and seed produced in Uganda had to be sold to the 
statutorily established Board at prices fixed by the government. 
8. Discussions were undertaken in 1970 between West Germany and Uganda 
to construct cold storage facilities. The negotiations followed recommendations 
made in a study by UN - FA0 experts. However, these plans appear not to have been 
implemented. 
— 
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Table 2: Profitability of the Produce Marketing Board, 1968 - 1976. 
Year Profit Loss Issued Share 
Capital 
1968 Shs 72,962 Shs Shs 2,510,000 
1969 758,306 5,000,000 
1970 NO Board of Directors5'4 
1971 2,097,540*" 7,000,000 
1972 2,171,091 7,750,000 
1973 6,339,707 
1974 3,197,190 
1975 904,962 
1976 10,584,219 
* By law no accounts could be issued without the signatures of at least two 
members of the Board of Directors, 
** Covers 18 month period. 
Source : Uganda Produce Marketing Board, Annual Accounts, various years. 
Following independence from Britain, the proposals of the Cotton 
Commission of Enquiry of 1962 were implemented as presented in Sessional 
Paper Number.5 of 1963 which was embodied as an act of Parliament in November 
1963. This legislation, while maintaining the basic functions and objectives 
of the LMB nevertheless gave more control of cotton matters to the Minister 
9 
of Agriculture and Cooperatives thereby weakening the LMB. It is not clear 
whether this change, which coincided with the replacement of all British Board 
members by Ugandans, was responsible for the losses which LMB suffered from 
1963 to 1966 (See Table 3). However, the Board complained of the problem of 
(having "to clear far more issues with Government before implementing them." 
In spite of persistent losses from 1963 to 1966, LMB operated 
profitably thereafter except for 1970 when it suffered a loss.10 The profit-
able performance of the LMB coincided with a "drastic" fall in production in 
the years after 1973. Cotton production declined to 74,422 bales in 1976. 
Between 1973/74 and 1979/80 fiscal years the area under cotton production 
by 55 percent while production fell by over 70 percent.11 In his budget speech 
of 1980 the minister of finance blamed the persistent decreases in cotton 
9. Lint Marketing Board, Annual Report, 1963/64, p. 3. 
10. Paradoxically enough, cotton production in 1970 was 467,000 bales 
the highest yield ever recorded in Uganda. Republic of Uganda, Budget Speech, 
1971. p.3. 
11. Republic of Uganda, Budget Speech 1980. pp. 5 - 6. 
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Table 3: Profitability of the Lint Marketing Board, 1963 - 1976 
Year (Uganda Shillings) 
Ended 31st December Profit Loss 
1963 62,962,320 
1964 20,064,140 
1965 49,336,780 
1966 81,181,080 
1967 1,143,846 
1968 1,188,578 
1969 489,568 
1970 6,836,706 
1971 16,078,994 
1972 36,843,474 
1973 48,602,937 
1974 86,876,562 
1*975 9,256,960 
1976 43,766,536 
Source: Uganda Produce Marketing Board, Annual Accounts, various years. 
production on "the failure to provide efficient marketing arrangements, the 
absence of the necessary inputs... and the relatively non-renumerative returns 
12 
of theicrop...." It is rather difficult to understand how the LMB operated 
at a loss during the 1960s when cotton production expanded rapidly, but came 
to operate at a profit in the 1970s when cotton production fell "drastically." 
The schedule of profits in the 1950 to 1962 period (Table 4) suggests 
a periodic fluctuation in the Board's performance. It operated profitably 
from 1950 to 1957 and then fell into a 'recession' from 1958 to 1962 and so on 
to 1966 as already indicated. This would tend to exenorate the Ugandanisation 
of the Board as the cause of losses since that trend started before independence. 
However, the general decline in cotton production during the 1970s is a severe 
setback for the Lint Marketing Board in spite of its apparent profitability. 
A final observation on the Lint Marketing Board's performance is the 
decline in the magnitudes of profit. It is noteworthy that the size of annual 
12. Ibid. 
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Table 4: Profitability of the Lint Marketing Board Before Independence: 
1950 - 1962„ 
Year Ended October 31 Profit 
. 19 50 Shs 82,998,958 
1951 216,673,977 
1952 . 176,459,570 
1953 258,120,215 
19 54 44,215,260 
1955 19,294,000 
1956 11,486,960 
1957 4,276,860 
1958 Shs 55,140,780 
1959 50,475,520 
1960 19,799,080 
1961 19,956,240 
1962 35,166,260 
Source Lint Marketing Board, Annual Accounts, various years. 
profits was considerably larger in the early years of the Board than in the 
1960s and 1970s. When this fact is combined with the decline in the value of 
the profits of later years (especially in the 1970s when inflation was 
astronomical) it becomes clear that LMB's profits have shrunk considerably in 
recent years compared to the early 19 50s. 
4. The Libyan Arab Uganda Bank 
The Libyan Arab Uganda Bank was incorporated on 4th January 1973. 
Its capital of 20 million shillings was subscribed by the Libyan Government 
(51 percent) and the Uganda Government (49 percent). Since its incorporation 
the bank has operated profitably even though its methods of generating income 
were largely based on purchases of government treasury bills and stocks. 
Table 
Year 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
Source: 
Profitability of the Libyan Arab Uganda Bank (LAUB) 1973 - 1977, 
Profit 
Shs 2,429,566 
2,482,477 
4,704,448 
6,649,753 
21,139,084 
Libyan Arab Uganda Bank, Annual Report, 1972-1977. 
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Although this organisation is titled 'bank for foreign trade and 
development,' its sources of income in 1977 consisted of interest on items 
whose developmental content is doubtful. These items were: 
(millions) 
i. Time Deposits with Local Banks Shs 116.00 
ii. Uganda Government Treasury Bills 300.17 
iii. Uganda Government Stocks 200.00 
iv. Loans to Customers, Bills Discounted and 
other accounts 204.00 
Total Shs 820.17 
Thus 75 percent of the bank's investments were in Uganda government 
securities. It seems strange that an organisation in which the government 
had a substantial interest would justify its role by buying government secu-
rities. It is doubtful that the government can promote development merely 
by funding institutions to buy securities from its central bank. Moreover 
this bank, declared dividends every year without fail, and 51 percent of the 
dividends were sent to Libya out of Uganda's foreign exchange holdings. Despite 
its profitable performance therefore, this bank's contribution to development 
could be challenged on these grounds. 
5, Uganda Development Bank (UDB) 
The Uganda Development Bank was founded by the government of Uganda 
on 10th November 1972. Its function was to mobilise and provide short, medium 
and long term development resources to large, medium as well as small enter-
prises. Its capital was entirely subscribed by government to the tune of 
UShs 47 million. This amount was raised to U Shs 77 million in December 1976 
following an appeal from the bank to the government to replenish the bank's 
losses which, it was claimed, resulted from the banks financing of governmental 
decrees that were unprofitable. Evidently the bank lost U Shs 13.5 million 
in loans to operators of commercial enterprises taken over from departed Asians, 
and U Shs 3.8 million was also lost when the government seized oil mills and 
ginneries and maize mills from private operators in 1976, These mills were 
placed under the Lint Marketing Board and the Produce Marketing Board respec-
tively . Following these actions the bank appealed for more share capital 
from government. This was given in 1976 to the tune of U Shs 30 million. By 
that time the bank's outstanding loss from previous years was 8.1 million 
shillings. Total assets in 1976 stood at 129 million, having risen from 54 
mill ion In 1973. The structure of the assets was as follows: 
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Deposits in Commercial Banks U Shs 7.4 
Investment in Treasury Bills 17.5 
Long term Loans 89.0 
Fixed Assets 2.2 
Losses 8.1 
Expenses 4.8 
UShs 128.9 million 
In November 1977 the capital of the UDB appears to have been raised 
by government through another 30 million shillings injection which raised its 
total capitalisation to 100 million shillings. The assets also rose to UShs 153 
million compared to UShs 53 in 1973. The profit position of the bank in the 
1973 - 1979. period is shown below. 
Table 5a: Profitability of the Uganda Development Bank, 1973 - 1979 
Year Profit Loss 
(million shillings) 
1973 5.5 
1974 0.8 
1975 
1976 1.4 
1977 1.9 
1978 9.1 
1979 7.6 
Source: Uganda Development Bank, Annual Accounts, 1973 - 1979. 
<4 The Uganda Development Bank participated actively in financing a 
wide range of development projects. The structure of its loans in 1973, 1974 
and 1975 is shown in Table 6. It is clear from these data that the bank 
promoted agricultural and industrial enterprise. By 1975 however, the bank 
had shifted from financing industry while maintaining its role in agricul-
ture, commerce, transport and construction. 
It is evident that this bank would have been out of business a 
long time ago if it were a private rather than a public enterprise. It could 
of course be argued that the bank is merely a means for channelling public 
funds into the hands of some lucky enterprises that are generally unable to 
pay back. This is probably an unfair charge. Nevertheless the problem of a 
state bank which actively finances private development projects but persistently 
fails to make a profit is in our judgement, a serious one. 
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Table 6: Development Financing by the Uganda Development Bank, 1973 - 1975. 
Sector 
Agriculture 
"Mafuta Mingi" 
Trade & Commerce 
Transport 
Tourism 
Industry 
Building 
Total 
1973 
4.3 
13.5 
15.6 
4.1 
12.3 
3.6 
Period 
1974 1975-
(millions of shillings) 
9.0 16.2 
13 .9 
2.5 
5.0 
5.0 
0.3 
10.2 
6.6 
1.2 
0.1 
12.4 
53.6 35.6 46.7 
'"'Estimate based on figures for the first six months of 1975. 
It is evident that this bank would have been out of business a 
Source: Uganda Development Bank, Annual Accounts, 1973 - 1976. 
6. The Dairy Corporation Industry (DC) 
Founded under the Dairy Industry Act of 1967, this corporation has 
plants nation wide to process milk, butter, cheese and ghee. The company's 
original charter authorised it to issue up to 1 million shares with a 20 
shilling par value. In 1967 one quarter of the authorised shares was issued 
worth 5 million shillings while a further 6.4 million was added by government 
in 1972. 
The results of the Dairy Corporation's activities in the 1967-1973 
period in relation to its profitability are indicated in Table 7. It is clear 
that the Dairy Corporation was generally unprofitable. The annual losses in 
1969, 1970 and 1971 were approximately equal to the company's original share 
capital of 5 million shillings and the accumulated losses in 1973 amounted 
to 16.9 million shillings. 
The company appears to have had serious management problems. For1 
example, a loan from Denmark of U Shs 9.5 million made to the corporation in 
1969 required annual payment of interest at 5 percent p.a.; no interest was 
paid between January- 1971 and July 1978. It is not clear whether the 
interest was overlooked or if the corporation was unable to pay. Another 
instance of mismanagement was that employees remained on the payroll of the 
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Table 7: Profitability of the Dairy Corporation Industry 1967 - 1973 
Year Profit Loss 
1967 Shs 331,034 
1968 1,953,559 
1969 5,061,304 
1970 4,740,516 
1971 4,162,358 
1972 216,587 
1973 Shs 207,508 -
Source: Dairy Corporation Industry, Annual Accounts 1967 - 1973. 
company long after they were dismissed. There were also instances of dupli-
cated payments and payments to dummy employees. In some of the accounts 
accumulated depreciation charges on assets exceed the costs of those assets 
so that the auditor general found the company's accounts to be improperly 
kept. Moreover the company was in one instance more than 5 years in arrears 
in submitting its accounts to the authorities as required by law. It is 
perhaps not surprising therefore that the company suffered a perpetual loss in 
its first five years of service. 
7. The Uganda Commercial Bank 
The Uganda Commercial Bank came into existence when the Uganda Credit 
and Savings Bank was transformed into the Commercial Bank in 1965. The former 
had been in existence since 1950. Today the Uganda Commercial Bank is the 
largest commercial bank in Uganda with more than 45 branches throughout the 
country. 
The bank enjoyed a highly profitable record in the period 1967 to 
1977 (Table 8). The increase in profits since 1973 may have been due to the 
increase in the volume of operations in the bank's business following the 
closure of up country branches of Barclay's, Grindlays and Standard Banks. 
Most of those branches were assumed by the Uganda Commercial Bank. Additionally 
all government institutions have been required to bank with UGB since 1972 so 
that .it enjoys a large guaranteed customer. In all the Uganda Commercial Bank-
enjoys a good reputation in most parts of the country as well as the general 
confidence of government and the public. 
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Table 8: Profitability of the Uganda Commercial Bank (UGB), 1967 - 1977 
Year Profit Issued Share Capital 
(millions) (millions) 
1967 Shs 1.0 Shs 
1968 2.2 -
1969 3.2 30,0 
19 70 2.4 30.0 
1971 0.6 30.0 
1972 2.2 30.0 
1973 24.4 30.0 
1974 10.1 30.0 
1975 11.1 30.0 
1976 11.0 40.0 
1977 36.2 -
Source: Uganda Commercial Bank, Annual Report3 various years. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Table 9 below gives a summary of the profitability of all the enter-
prises in the sample. Four enterprises were generally profitable while the 
remaining three were generally unprofitable. It is therefore difficult to 
say definitively that state enterprises have been either profitable or un-
profitable. Their success was clearly mixed. 
Table 9: Summary of the Profit Experience of Sample State Enterprises? 1962-
1980. 
Enterprise 
1. Uganda Development Corporation 
2. Produce Marketing Board 
3. Lint Marketing Board 
4. The Libyan Arab Uganda Bank 
5. Uganda Development Bank 
6. The Dairy Corporation Industry 
7. Uganda Commercial Bank 
Actual years Record 
Profitable Unprofitable 
1971 
1968 
1963 
1973 
1973 
1977 
1976 
1976 
1977 
1979 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
1967 - 1977 
Source: Own compilation. 
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However, it is noteworthy that the categories under which any of 
the institutions fall were distinct. With the exception of the Lint Marketing 
Board which experienced long periods of profitability followed by equally 
long periods of losses, the other enterprises tended to be either persistent 
losers or consistent profit makers. So it would be clear on the profitability 
basis which ones should continue to exist. 
Secondly, it is relevant to bear in mind that all enterprises 
operated under extra ordinary circumstances in the 1970s. There were frequent 
changes in regulations and relations with other institutions - both domestic 
and international - which created extreme uncertainty. Uncertainty in the 
availability of inputs, particularly personnel, made operations unplannable 
and unpredictable. Many of these difficulties were in large part due to 
political uncertainty and instability, 
Thirdly9 operations in the 1970s coincided with recessionary 
conditions at home and abroad. This generally contracted their output resulting 
in severe shortages In the whole country. It is still unclear whether or not 
Uganda's enterprises can infact be fully rehabilitated. 
The fundamental decision for the country now is whether reliance 
on state enterprises which are directly responsible to government creates an 
inherently unstable economy. For as the government changes so will the state 
enterprises also tend to change. For example a generally corrupt administra-
tion would tend to use the state enterprises as a means for the enrichment of 
government officials. This is in fact what appears to have happened in 
Uganda. In contrast one might argue that private enterprises would tend to be 
more stable because their private owners would have a far greater interest in 
protecting their properties and livelihood. 
However, resolution of the balance between the resources to be 
controlled by public versus private enterprise will rest not only upon the 
relative expected efficiency of either form of organisation but also upon the 
capacity of either sector to actually undertake economic activity. Whereas 
government initiative in creating enterprises may have been essential to fill 
a vacuum in economic activity, the abuses and failures of some of the enter-
prises so created constitutes evidence for more careful choices. There is an 
agonising recognition in Uganda todays to balance complex activities so that 
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none of the essential, social goals of economic stability, equitable income 
distribution and economic development are sacrificed. The future role of 
the state enterprise in Uganda will critically depend on how this device 
can promote a balance among1at least these three crucial social goals. 
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THE INTERNAL STRUCTURE AND PERFORMANCE OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISES 
SUMMARY OF A SURVEY 
By 
Dietrich C. Bruening 
INTRODUCTION 
The problems of the internal structure and performance of African 
enterprises discussed in this paper are based on the results of a short 
term research project performed during March and June 1979 in three East 
African States. 
Our aim was to visit two public enterprises in each of these 
Countries: Sulian, Tanzania and Zambia (in Tanzania we could visit only one 
public and one private enterprise). Managers of the main departments were 
interviewed as shown in the attached questionnaire. Out of these interviews 
we decided to focus on these problem areas: 
Warehouse Administration 
Purchasing Department 
Production Department 
Personnel Department 
Sales 
Finance 
Management 
1. WAREHOUSE 
1.1 Raw and Auxiliary Materials 
The administrational situation of raw and auxiliary material 
management varies greatly between the enterprises visited depending on the 
nature of the enterprises and their production. 
In enterprises like sugar, plants no raw material administration 
exists because no raw material is taken on stock. The raw material is 
brought to the production plant on a daily basis according to the harvesting 
plant. Other enterprises, because of the nature of their final product, need 
more sophisticated warehouse management. 
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As long as the amount of raw or auxiliary material items are few, one 
could .speak of an adequate administrational set up for these goods especially 
when the materials consisted of local production. 
The situation changed drastically if the production is baseda on 
hundreds of different raw and auxiliary materials. In general, even in 
spite of a greater number of employees working in warehouse administration 
and the usage of Bin Cards, Stock Ledger Cards and Stock Movement Reports 
the information value of these means of registration was found to be 
very small. The cards showed figures of defined minimum and maximum stock 
but these figures often made no sense. To give an outstanding example, On 
one Stock Ledger Card we found a maximum stock of 10,000 Kg., a minimum 
stock of 24,000 Kg., and a re-ordering level of 50,000 Kg. Other examples 
like this one can be found but not as outstanding as the one given. A 
special problem was found in the field of the definition of the minimum 
stock and the re-ordering level. 
which represent a large number of items of the needed raw and auxiliary 
materials. But because in turn the replacement time depends on the amount 
of foreign currency and the time of Its allocation through the National 
Bank, the replacement time, and thus the stock card figures are indirectly 
dependent on the changes of the general economic situation of the respective 
countries and can hardly be predicted by the warehouse personnel. On the 
other hand, as we will show later, there is no direct information flow 
between the Purchasing Department and the Warehouse Administration to inform 
them about the expanding or lessening re-ordering time. Beside that the 
Warehouse would be over-burdened recalculating all the minimum stocks and 
re-ordering level to keep apace with the continuous changes. These problems 
and others like not having the required material on hand at time of need 
because of ordering too late or too few causes production halts, com l <'' ii 
1.2. Spare parts 
The problem of the administration of the spare parts warehouse 
is much more complicated because of the large amount of items which sometimes 
mounted up to 19,000. Because most of the spare parts are Imported this 
increases the importance of their proper administration because as we 
shall see later of the problems foreign exchange. 
These figures depend on the replacement time, specially on imports 9 
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The internal administration systems were similar to the raw and 
auxiliary material administration with use of Bin Cards, and Stock Ledger 
Cards. Our random checks showed often deviations between actual physical 
stock and registered-stock. But beside that, here we could not get a clear 
idea of what kind of spare parts were needed and how many should be kept in 
stock. 
The generalized finding was that in spite of the defined minimum or 
maximum stock figures the actual differed in excess or lower. On the one 
hand we often found no movement of spare-parts items for 4 years on items 
which had exceeded the maximum stock, on the other we found spare-part 
stock with a high turn-over which were less than the required minimum stock 
and in spite of that no replacement order had been issued. Also here we 
could not find any relation between the minimum stock and the replacement 
time. 
The fact that spare parts are often not available when needed 
(their replacement time is sometimes up to 18 months) we were told often 
led to production halts. 
2. PURCHASING DEPARTMENT 
In general we found very little of authority within the purchasing 
departments meaning that they were rather executing other departments orders 
than developing actions on their own responsibility. Two factors may have 
contributed to this role of the purchasing department: 
1. In general we found the purchasing departments cut off from 
the information flow within the enterprises, Most of the 
purchasing managers claimed that they were not sufficiently 
involved in the decision making process. Neither were they 
informed for example of production plans, management decisions 
or of world market trends 
nor did they receive e.g. sufficient prospective informations 
of the spare parts requirements of their enterprises . 
2. The possibilities of action of the purchasing departments 
were directly depending £?>om their National Bank's allocation 
of the required amount of foreign currence. 
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The latter needs some more explanation. Indeed, the purchasing 
departments in general were involved during the phase of budget preparations 
by giving cost estimates on the requirements of the different departments. 
After the budget has been prepared it has to be approved together with the 
enterprises plan of action by a government committee consisting in general 
of representatives of different ministers and a member of the respective 
National Bank. But even after approval of these authorities the enterprises 
or even the purchasing departments are often not free to dispose of the 
approved amount of foreign exchange but have to submit requests for 
each import order. Sometimes these requests are reduced or even rejected. 
Thus "the purchasing department, being unable to provide the enterprise 
with the needed goods looses it reputation and becomes an administrational 
unit used by those who have authority. 
3. PRODUCTION DEPARTMENT 
The production plants in general we found well organized as far 
as the placement of stpres, material flow, production flow etc. were concerned,. 
Some of the enterprise we found, have plants with machines of an age of 
10-30 years, No where could we find an inventory' list showing'the history of 
each machine and each part of the plant. This means that the number of 
repair hours spent on a production breakdowns caused by each machine or 
part of the plant per week or year cannot be shown; therefore, it is difficult 
to estimate which of these machines or part of the plant have to be placed 
on a priority replacement list. 
The same applies to the maintenance plans. In none of the enter-
prises visited, could we find a scheduled maintenance plan in which periodic 
changes of parts would have -been scheduled and their need thereby defined 
and projected. Repairs were performed after breakdowns of plant units or 
at weekends, if they could last out . till then. This general feature, 
meaning the age of the plants, the lack of priority replacement list of 
special machines or parts of machines, the non-existence of maintenance plans 
and the difficulties within the spare part administration and purchasing 
department to have the needed spare part on hand at the right time, is 
liable to cause breakdowns of machinery, rapid wear and tear and together 
with this a shortening of the life span, which means new costs. 
The same lack of maintenance discipline we found with transport 
officers and drivers. As transport is one of the most crucial problems 
in all developing countries one would expect a special control of all transport 
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facilities. The opposite is the rule. The maintenance workshops which we 
saw are in general very poorly equiped with old unsatisfactory tools. Many 
of the vehicles were out of order. 
In most of the enterprises visited we found an adequately 
organized production control unit. This unit controlled the quality and 
quantity of the production on different points of the production line. 
Also the production report system to the management and the marketing 
department in general was found to be well organized. 
PERSONNEL DEPARTMENT 
In general the management of the enterprises studied stated that 
their factories were overstaffed. This fits in with the general idea of 
public enterprises which aims to fulfil beside their function as a production 
unit, a social role in reducing unemployment figures. The overstaffing 
appeared generally in a latent form which means for want of clear job 
description with defined work loads it is nearly impossible to say where 
exactly over employment takes place. Where attempts were made in this 
direction they failed because of lack of knowledge of how to define the 
real working load, which should be done by definition of the: 
(a) List of repeated general duties 
(b) Time spent for each of the above mentioned duties 
(c) Organizational duties 
(d) Planning duties 
(e) Control duties 
( f) Personnel duties 
Because of the non-existence of precise job descriptions it was 
also impossible to create a workable system of job evaluation which in turn 
could be used to establish a system to provide various incentives for better 
performance. The described situation is worsened by the fact that dismissals 
are nearly impossible. This above mentioned lack of the fundamental tools 
for personnel management cost the enterprises a great deal of their eventual 
profit which could be used to create new jobs. Beside that, it stabilizes 
the problem of overstaffing and forces the governments to keep the general 
salary scale low to avoid higher costs of production. 
Beside the official salary system, there exists a fringe benefits 
system for the General Managers and the Division Chiefs. These fringe 
benefits provide free housing, free cars with drivers, free servants, etc. 
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Another characteristic of employment was found in two countries. 
Often upper management positions like chief accounts or production chiefs 
are held by expatriates. They are employed according to the national pay 
scale with a topping-up of the salaries which sometimes surpasses the salaries 
of nationals by as much as 100%. 
The topping-up of salaries for foreigners of course is the 
consequence of the lack of manpower for certain jobs, but there should be 
a system of continous training for nationals to replace expatriates after 
a certain time. 
5. SALES —r— 
The public enterprises studied in general operation as sellers' market 
in the sense that what-ever has been produced is sold. Stocks of finished 
goods were hardly available, and if so, this is due to transport and distribution 
problems. 
Therefore, a market development policy for the public enterprises 
visited in genral did not exist. We found very little competition because in 
general there is only one producer on the market. This situation could have given 
a public enterprise a strong position on the market by which it could increase 
its prices to have higher return. But price increases are subject to government 
approval to stop inflationary tendencies caused by such a market situation. 
Unfortunately this price control is often not reflecting the real production costs. 
In one case it happened for example that the government raised 
the prices for raw materials by 28% but kept the prices for the final product 
constant. 
Export prices as far as export exists, are based on world market 
prices even if they do not cover production costs. They are simply to earn 
foreign currency which is needed to import raw materials and other products. 
Another problem which some enterprises have to deal with is 
distribution. Often the products reach only the consumers in the area of 
the production unit, the rest of the country is uncovered. In our opinion, this 
is due to the transport deficiencies, limited capacity in responding to 
increased demand and to a lack of incentives for higher sales. Sometimes 
even the distributing organization is an independent government organization 
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with no links to the producer meaning that the public enterprise are only to 
produce - the marketing is done by another organization. The marketing 
organization distributes what is given to it. The countervalue of the 
sales is transferred to the Minister of Finance which in turn pays the 
producing company according to the approved budget, This pattern ofcourse 
fails to give the producer the feedback on consumers' demand. The above mentioned 
marketing situation of most of the public enterprises inhibits their interest 
in either developing its market or performing marketing studies leading to 
sales extension plans. 
6. FINANCE 
The performance of the systems of accounting vary greatly from 
country to country. In most of the enterprises we found a sufficient system 
of financial accounting to provide the superior authorities with balance-
sheets and a profit and loss account. But no where could we find a proper 
cost accounting system. This we feel strongly weakens the managerial possibi-
lities of the general managers. If analytical cost accounts were made available, 
managers would be able to see exactly where losses or weaknesses in each 
enterprises exist. With such information conscious decisions could have been 
taken by management to control weak points and to expand those activities which 
contribute to greater efficiency. Furthermore, had such information been 
available, policy making at the highest levels would be considerably facilitated. 
In fact it should then be possible to convince the higher authorities of the 
directions in which decisions ought to be taken so as to avoid serious consequences. 
The exercise of the budgetary control function which is an essential 
tool of management does not always exist in the form that one would desire for 
effective control. The weaknesses in this area are that the budgets are often 
based on rough projections of previous years figures with a percentage added 
thereto; budgets are not cost/related so that the budgets do not represent 
lit 
Vva\t the costs ought to be for given activities according to the plan of action. 
By way of example the case can be cited of one enterprise where budgetary control 
did not exist at all on the supposition that if actual expenditures exceeded the 
budgeted figures it was considered not to be a problem because a new supple-
mentary budget could easily be prepared to ask for the additional funds. 
The above mentioned weaknesses gave us the impression that special 
measures need to be taken to install, where necessary, cost accounting systems 
and by this to help improve managerial performance. 
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7. MANAGEMENT 
At the end of our visits to the different public enterprises we 
discussed our finding with the general Managers of the respective enterprises 
or corporations. At the same time we interviewed them about their own 
management problems. The following may give a generalized picture of the 
problems all general managers have to face. In nearly all of the enterprises 
we found a continous conflict between the supervisory authorities, and 
the management. Even when the managers stated that they have full 
responsibility they had later on during the interview to admit, that 
management decisions have occasionally been altered by tutelary authorities. 
Especially in the field of employment, pricing and finances as well as 
investment the management had to follow the different directions of differe-
nt authorities as there are the national Ministry of Labour, Government 
Price Controllers, National Banks and the Ministry of Industry. Most of 
the managers stated that they ipnly try to minimize government intereference. 
This system of allocating objectives to the enterprises through 
government authorities in general limits the freedom of management's 
decision-making and transfers responsibility for the main decisions to a 
more complete and anonymous body. 
As far as the internal organization is concerned we got the 
impression that instead of delegating certain managerial power to the 
division chiefs in many of the enterprises all decision-making power is 
concentrated in the person of the General Manager. The organizational charts 
we found were very often more theoretical outlines of how an enterprise 
should be organized than that they reflected real powers, responsibilities 
and functions of the different owners of the positions. Specially they 
did not satisfy the requirements 'for a clear organizational set up. An 
effective organizational set up should be a tool for management and not 
only a list of functions and positions of employers. It should include 
in a well described form the activities, functions and responsibilities 
of each position, the channels decision making and the system of information 
and co-operation between the different departments of the organization. 
Once these rough outlines have been developed, it will be possible to give 
more details on job descriptions and to develop criteria for a job evaluation 
/ system as mentioned above. 
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In the enterprises interviewed we could not find the above mentioned 
organigrams. The question might be raised, whether this is not too 
sophisticated for the enterprises visited. We think that this should be 
considered in relation of the size of the enterprise. The bigger the enterprise, 
the more management and control methods become necessary. Public enterprises 
in general are big enterprises without the traditional personal relationship 
between managment and employees. Each of these organizations are divided 
into hundreds of functions, which cannot be supervised without a recourse to 
modern organizational skills in public enterprises is unavoidable if one hopes 
to run them on an efficient and effective basis. 
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INDEPENDENCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN 
STATE ENTERPRISES IN UGANDA i 
By 
Thomas B. Byatike 
Ministry of Finance, Kampalas Uganda 
INTRODUCTION 
Part I 
As early as 1971 it was clear that the exchequer in Uganda was 
increasingly being called upon to provide funds as short term advances or 
as outright grants in what could only be described as bail out exercises 
of certainly non viable statutory corporations. Such releases of funds often 
took place in cases where the Secretary to the Treasury and the Auditor 
General knew fully well that the corporations would not be able to repay even 
the interest, let alone the principal. In the case of grants it took plaice 
as a means of providing additional capital for apparently self financing 
entities in the full knowledge that the entities in question would never be 
self financing. These financial transfers coincided with the availability of 
many audit inspection reports indicating poor management, inadequate accounts 
records essential to management, inadequate account records essential to 
management for effective policy decisions and exceedingly high overheads mostly 
associated with a surfeit of staff, prestige offices and staff houses. Many 
of these corporations would have been forced into liquidation but for the 
underwriting provided by the tax payer- This general state of affairs is 
indeed well known but has never been the subject of systematic enquiry. 
An examination of major state owned corporations to determine their 
profitability has been undertaken by Dr. Ezra Suruma as part of a study of 
the financial and management problems of the parastatal sector (1) The effort 
should help reveal the existence of unprofitable public corporations whose 
continued operation largely amounts to exercises in income redistribution 
from transactors in the economy who constitute the major sources of tax 
revenues to employees, direct and indirect suppliers and consumers of the 
particular corporations' activities. The exercise may also contribute to 
an understanding of the lack of bouyancy in Central Government revenue which 
has been a major factor in the emergence of a tradition of deficity financing 
and the virtual institutionalisation of very high inflation rates . The use-
fulness of the exercise may be enhanced by an examination outlined in this 
paper of the set up for control and public accountability of parastatal 
organisations. This may reveal modifications in the system of control and 
public accountability which could result in profitable operations in a number 
of previously unprofitable public corporations. 
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Part II 
A government's relations with any of its corporate or autonomous 
entities are always faced with the question of how operating flexibility and 
independence required for successful operation of an enterprise can be recon-
ciled with the need for controls to ensure public accountability in the use of 
public resources and consistency with public policy. Control and the level 
of accountability in autonomous public organisations is likely to be influenced 
by the degree of control and the extent of public accountability in the central 
bureaucracy itself. Given proper financial control and accountability in the 
central bureaucracy, the problem of conflict between independence and account-
ability in autonomous state enterprises may be expected to be minimised. In 
the contrary setting of lax financial practices and control in the central 
bureaucracy, rather more conflict between independence and accountability may 
be expected. The extent of the problem may further be expected to be even 
greater given a situation of extensive inability on part of many autonomous 
state organisations to pay their way. Then a virtual merger of their budgets 
and the central government budget may take place through continuing subsidies, 
grants in aid, loans and advances, loan guarantees that more often than not 
end up as actual rather than contigent liabilities or through repreated re-
Structuring of capital set up involving the injection of new resources from 
tax revenues. In a setting of this nature, an examination of the state of 
control and public accountability in the central bureaucracy itself is a useful 
point of departure for an inquiry into the set up for the control and public 
accountability of autonomous state enterprises . 
Part III 
It is possible to trace increasing deviation from the principles and 
practices of proper financial control and accountability in the central 
bureaucracy in Uganda as far back as the early Independence days. Divergence 
between the ideal and realised practice widened during the period of the military 
regime (1971-1979) but did not originate in that period. Present day general 
explanation of the continuing and possibly deepening system of lax central 
accounting practices and deficient financial control asserts that the period of 
military rule so corrupted society that proper financial management and control 
is impracticable but may very well represent pre-occupation with other concerns. 
There is perhaps no one set of documents which chronicles the steady 
decline in accounting and financial management standards in the Uganda central 
bureaucracy than the Auditor General's annual reports on the public accounts of 
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the country. Accounting and audit staff shortages in the face of a steady 
rise in the number and variety of accounting transactions appear to have 
been major factors in the emergence of the trend. 
Coinciding with the advent of independence, in 1961/62 there was an 
expansion and decentralisation of accounting work and a departure of experienced 
accounting and audit staff. In 1962/63 the work undertaken continued to 
leave the country. Only minimum audit of the main government accounts was 
possible. Nevertheless the general standards of accounting was judged satis-
factory and unauthorised expenditure, most of it the result of cost overruns 
in construction works, amounted to just over some three million shillings. 
Staffing difficulties figured prominently in the Auditor General's reports 
each year throughout the 1960s and for the first time in 1965 his report was 
a qualified one in that there was reference to a large number of unfinished 
matters and expected replies to querries in that report. In the following 
year, 1966 there was specific reference to a decline in accounting standards 
for the first time. A general decrease in the efficiency of accounting units 
was referred to in the opening pages of the Auditor General's report for 1969. 
A considerable number of accounts were in arrears, essential records were not 
in all cases maintained, accounting instructions were violated, the magnitude 
of loses of cash and stores were reaching alarming proportions and inadequate 
supervision of accounts staff was noted. The report made reference to a 
disturbing increase in the number of instances of abuse of public funds such 
as the payment of private bills in the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs 
and in the National Assembly and the Police. Private and social journeys and 
passages for children in excess of entitlement, unauthorised passages for 
officials' wives and unauthorised allocations of houses additional to an 
official residence and mileage claims in addition to the provision of hired 
transport were all apparently general in many branches of the civil service. 
Adverse criticism of accounting standards had become perennial. Reference to 
the dearth of experienced staff had become equally perennial while remedial 
action, despite deterioration of an already serious situation was imperceptible. 
Indeed by 1968 the latest Treasury Memorandum which should set out each year, 
(and which should be tabled in the legislature each year) the Secretary to the 
Treasury's reaction to the various recommendations, criticisms and comments 
following upon legislative examination of the Auditor General's report, was 
that for 1962. Treasury Memoranda in respect of 1963/64 and 1964/65 were 
submitted only at the time of preparation of the Auditor General's report for 
1970 (2). An essential link in the annual cycle of appropriation'of funds by 
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the legislature, the disbursement of funds by accounting officers, the audit 
reports, the tabling of those reports in the legislature, the examination of 
accounting officers by the legislature, and the Treasury Memorandum on the 
legislature's report, had been severed and had been converted into a historical 
exercise carried out more or less for record purposes after the recommendations, 
criticisms and comments it addressed itself to were no longer of current 
pressing concern. 
With the advent of the military regime, the legislature at the end 
of the chain of reporting in the system of financial control was suspended. 
The Public Accounts Committee of that body before which accounting officers 
were liable to be called for cross-examination of the management of their 
votes was not replaced or reconstituted in any form. A number of accounts 
statements that the Treasury should have compiled for the Auditor General's 
annual examination such as the statement of receipts into and issues from the 
consolidated fund, the balance sheet of the same fund, the summary statement 
of revenue and many other ceased to be available on a regular basis. The 
Auditor General's examination covering the last year of the military regime 
1978/79 reported no change in the persistent deterioration in standards of 
accounting, in effectiveness of accounting controls, in the proper discharge 
of accountability and went on to reveal that most accounting units had, for 
the last five years, failed to compile end of year financial statements and 
that the Treasury itself appears not to be taking action to arrest the situation. 
Public accountability of resource use in the central bureaucracy itself appears 
to have been completely jeopardised (3). 
Indication of the decline in accounting and financial management 
Standards in the central bureaucracy Is also provided by the evolution of the 
budget making process. A realistic appreciation of the relationship between 
government revenue from all sources and government expenditure for whatever 
purposes is an essential element in the control and public accountability 
of government financial resources consistent with the avoidance of inflation 
and the maintenance of stable purchasing power of money. However, indicative 
of declining financial control and public accountability in Uganda, from 
around the beginning of the decade of the seventies, there appears to have 
developed increasingly limited appreciation of the relationship between 
revenue and expenditure. Government expenditure cessed to be guided by 
an assessment of revenue likely to be available to the Treasury from all 
sources whether domestic or foreign, through grants, taxation, government 
commercial operations or borrowing. The result was an unprecedented 
accumulation of ways and means advances from the central bank and the virifaual 
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institutionalisation of very high rates of inflation. Beginning with 1974/76 
ways and means advances have consistently exceeded the legal maximum of 18 
per cent of expected recurrent revenue each year. During the period of the 
military regime, the excess over the permissible legal limit reached a peak 
in 1976/77 when this stood at over 2.52 billion shillings as of the 30th of 
June of 1976. There was a slight decline to an excess level of around 2.51 
billion shillings as of the 30th June 1978 the last full year of the military 
regime. Since then a remarkable acceleration has taken place with the extent 
of extra legal automatic government borrowing from the (Central \Bank reaching 
over 7.2 billion shillings as of the 30th of June 1980. At that date out-
standing ways and means advances exceeded forecast recurrent revenue by a 
factor of nearly one to one and a half (4). The situation is as if the 
authorities have accepted the idea of government expenditure for all purposes 
must equal the total financing from all sources including printing money, 
and had consciously selected to determine to a very high degree the path of 
public sector purchases of goods and services and to forego completely any 
possibility of influencing the price level (5). Significantly the need 
to relate expenditure to likely revenue resources in the annual budget state-
ment for 1980/81 was excised from the statement after specific inclusion at 
the drafting stage. The budget department continues to carry out the annual 
compilation and of what limits and purposes the spending ministries and other 
units will be permitted to plan for without obtaining any guidelines whatso-
ever from the taxation, aid coordination and economic affairs departments as 
to likely revenue resources from taxes, loans and grants and from government's 
commercial operations. The budget department too does not indicate limites of 
permissible expenditure to spending units before calling for submission of 
their bids. Indeed the effort to include autonomous enterprises' requirements 
in the development budget is a much more prominent exercise than that of 
determination of their contribution to government revenue. The exercise has 
now evolved such that the development budget is laid out by the Ministry of 
Planning with the determination of the ranking of priorities alone as sufficient 
criteria for inclusion in the annual budget. 
The apparent concentration of interest on the spending side of financial 
control and management in the central bureaucracy seems to have come about 
along with other novel features. Missing records misplaced vouchers, over 
crowded and disorderly working conditions, understaffing, long standing neglect 
of training needs, low morale engendered by the extremely high and rising cost 
of living and poor transportation and security situation are some of the mundane 
factors constituting obstacles to the reintroduction of public accountability 
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in the post military period. Systematic attack on many of these factors is 
possible as is evidenced by working level proposals for regular contacts 
between the Treasury and Heads of Accounts in various Ministries, regular use 
of Treasury Inspectorate Teams, posting knowledgeable personnel as Heads of 
Accounts, refresher courses for staff, enlargement of accounts establishments 
and insistence on monthly returns, within two weeks of the end of the month, 
covering monthly expenditure and revenue receipts, trial balances and bank 
reconciliations (6). However, there seems to be considerable remoteness 
between Accounting Officers who are the Permanent Secretaries and working 
level accounts staff. The Accounting Officers are extremely busy officers 
closely associated with the management of the new distribution system of a 
world of controlled prices, free market prices, primary access through admini-
strative decision and unsegregated markets for officially and unofficially 
obtained commodities. Closer attention and interest in public accountability 
on part of Accounting Officers is likely to develop further only after the 
reintroduction of the system of public, examination of these officers before the 
Public Accounts Committee of the legislature and extensive dismantling of the 
new distribution system of allocation committees topped by the Ministry of 
Supplies. 
Part IV 
Accounting Officers presiding over the central bureaucracy that has 
experienced changes in the level of public accountability reviewed above are 
the principal officers responsible for overseeing accountability in state 
enterprises and conformity with public policy. The independent and flexible 
powers of the public, corporations are in law vested in boards of directors. 
The accommodation between flexibility and independence on the one hand and 
public accountability and conformity with public policy on the other is 
however not just a product of legislation alone but is also the outcome of 
customs and traditions and perhaps even simply folkways in the country among 
the elite controlling group as a whole. 
At first sight it would appear that a series of interlocking checks 
and balances should certainly ensure a required equilibrium between independence 
and public accountability and control. In every public corporation a chief 
gxecutive -exercises day to day management and control but by the law establishing 
the corporation, for example, that establishing the Uganda Development Corporation 
it is the board of directors that is entrusted with the responsibility to manage 
and control the operations of the corporation. Indeed, any powers not specifi-
cally reserved and required to be exercised by the shareholders either by the 
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provisions of the specific public corporation law or by the companies act 
which governs all companies in general, are exercised formally by boards of 
directors. Since boards of directors are supposed to be teams of public 
minded men of proven experience in business and public administration, their 
effective control and supervision of the chief executive could confidently be 
expected to contribute to required balance between independence and public 
accountability. Additional balancing mechanisms is to be found in Ministerial 
control over the activities of any public corporation. All public corporations 
fall under one Ministry or another for purposes of policy guidance and super-t 
vision. Establishing legislation most often specifically provides for the 
possibility of Ministerial directives and no corporation operates in an 
environment in which it is free to disregard entirely the direction of govern-
ment policy. Audit reports too provide yet another mechanism for balancing 
between statutory corporation independence and control. The reporting to the 
Minister of Finance required of the Auditor General or of any competent person 
the Auditor General may appoint is in very specific terms and by stated dates. 
The reports have to express an opinion on whether proper books of accounts have 
been kept and on whether the financial statement of the particular corporation 
was prepared on a basis consistent with that of the previous year and in agree-
ment with the books of account. The reports further must come out on whether 
the balance sheet of any corporation gives a true and fair view of the 
corporation's affairs at the end of the financial year in question, and on whether 
the income and expenditure statement gives a true and fair view of the corpor-
ation's affairs. Audit reports must further contain any other matter falling 
in the scope of the auditor's examination which in his opinion should be brought 
to the attention of the legislature. Audit reports involve test checks on say 
day to day operations of the business on the verification of assets and liabili-
ties. Any material weakness in the corporation's internal control is also 
reported to management (7). Clearly this is a powerful element in the system 
checks and balances especially because the reports go to the Ministry from 
which public corporations obtain initial capital, additions to capital, loans 
and advances and loan guarantees. In a system of Ministerial responsibility 
and control by the legislative, audit reports become all the more important 
since the annual reports and accounts have to be tabled and debated and 
presumably jobs may be lost given poor performance. 
Operating reality seems to be totally different from the spirit of 
constitutional and legal provisions. On the whole operating reality gives 
primacy of place to the chief executive. He is nine times out of ten a member 
of the board of directors and chairman of that board. The top management team 
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strengthen the chief executives' dominating position. On appointment members 
of .the board seldom have their responsibility enumerated. They are never told 
they are to develop querries regarding plans of management. They are never 
told to raise objections, to call for regular reports covering both technical 
and financial aspects of agreed to projects. Their terms of appointment are 
fixed and on their installation in office emphasis is on remuneration they are 
to receive. 
Removed from three foregoing groups is the Ministry of Finance whose 
central concern is with proper care and custody of the assets and finance of 
the co-operations, maintenance of proper and timely written books of accounts, 
timely preparation of annual reports and audited accounts, development of 
effective corrective action for any defects identified by auditors, and 
conformity with the law especially as regards payment of taxes and dividends 
and timely transmission of all taxes collected. Very often, however, the 
Ministry is being pressed for funds even for corporations whose accounts are 
in arrears or show serious accounting shortcomings. Quarries from the Ministry 
are often simply ignored. Taxes are sometimes not paid or if collected from 
employees or otherwise in the course of business are often not transmitted to 
the Treasury. Dividends due are often retained. Guarantees for borrowing are 
almost equally often extracted from the Ministry. 
Part V 
Clearly apart from the absence of the final link in the chain of 
reporting of open cross-examination of Accounting Officers before the Public 
Accounts Committee of the legislature, there are considerable gaps and 
deficiencies in the system of interlooking checks and balances designed to 
relate independence and flexibility of autonomous state enterprises with their 
public accountability and conformity with public policy. The advertent wide-
spread emergence of a dual pricing system for many commodities (ranging from 
foreign exchange, imported vehicles of all types, durable household items to 
locally manufactured soap, sugar, cement, textiles and what have you) with 
access at lower officially sanctioned prices determined through administrative 
decision making, diverts considerable attention of power holders from public 
responsibilities into efforts to acquire such commodities at controlled prices 
for resale at free market prices. It would appear that further strengthening 
of the powers of the board of directors to counteract the likelihood of the 
chief executive of any corporation joining hands with the Minister of direct 
functional responsibility to run the corporation as a private preserve deserves 
exploration. The almost total concentration on remuneration and benefits of 
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directors at the time of their appointment should perhaps partly give way to 
an outline of their duties and responsibilities including indication of the 
type of offences of directors as well in law. Then again a look at the idea 
of making directors' terms of office partly dependent on periodic reviews of 
the corporations' performance as an indication of directors' performance apart 
from being fixed for specified periods could also be considered. Finally, 
perhaps tightening up legally permissible areas of activity for any corporation 
deserves further study so that corporations intended to develop mining 
resources, to engage in import and export trade, to promote manufacturing, to 
develop agricultural enterprises or what have you do not diversify into easy 
real estate and prestige office development beyond immediate staff requirements. 
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MANAGERIAL PROBLEMS AND STATEGIES OF PARASTATALS IN 
THE KENYAN HORTICULTURAL INDUSTRY 
By 
Dr„ Hans Klaus 
Institute for Development Studies 
University of Nairobi 
A. THE HORTICULTURAL INDUSTRY IN KENYA 
The Horticultural Industry in Kenya is part of the Agricultural 
Sector which is of great importance for the whole population and which 
provides more than 1./3 of the national income. Although the horticultural 
industry by itself is not yet important in terms of turnover, it has a high 
potential for further development. Not only can investments in the horti-
cultural industry increase earnings of foreign exchange through export, it 
can also with expansion of cultivation of produce create additional income 
for the population; it can also improve their health through the variety 
produced and the vitamins and other nutrients contained and can decrease the 
country's dependency on the very few basic commodities. Whereas exports of 
horticultural produce may stabilize in future because of various constraints 
In industrialized countries there can be expected an expansion of the local 
market with regard to turnover, urbanization and growth of population. 
The Kenya National Development Plan of 1979 to 1983 has this to say 
about the importance of the horticultural industry: 
'4 Horticultural Development which will also receive high priority 
during the Plan, aims to increase production and improve the 
quality of horticultural produce in Kenya. Specific programmes 
on how to improve and maintain, competitiveness in export markets 
to earn needed foreign exchange will be undertaken. This will 
include services to improve the flow of market information, and 
improved extension services designed to help the users to respond 
rapidly to market opportunities. To improve institutional standards 
in terms of minerals and vitamins a sectoral programme of diver-, 
sified products based on the 1978 Horticultural Development Study 
will be implemented. 
The Horticultural. Sector in Kenya grows more than 30 different kinds of 
products of which some are mainly grown for export (french beans, aubergines, 
ochra, bitter gourds, courgettes) and others for local consumption (onions, 
potatoes', etc „). The. main countries which import Kenyan horticultural products 
are: United Kingdom,, France3 West German, Holland, Sweden, Djibouti, Saudi 
Arabia. Whereas the total export in 1967 of horticultural produce in Kenya 
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was only 1,500 tons, it had increased to 21,000 tons by 19 78 with a value of 
KShs. 160,000,000. Except for tropical fruits which are mainly grown by large 
scale farmers suppliers for the horticultural produce in Kenya are mainly 
small scale farmers. The horticultural produce can be sub-divided into 
tropical fruits, off-season vegetables and asian-vegetables. The.''handling 
of the produce and the whole procurement and marketing activities are affected 
by the highly perishable nature of the produce especially the vegetables. 
2. Legal and Organisational Framework 
According to the Agriculture Act the Minister of Agriculture can 
declare any particular crop which is grown in Kenya for the purpose generally 
of sale to be a special crop. Whenever a crop or a group of crops are 
declared special the Minister shall establish an Authority for promoting and 
fostering the development of that crop. (Agriculture Act, Section 190-192) 
In 1967 horticultural crops were declared as such and the Horticultural Crops 
Development Authority was established. The Agriculture Act indicates the 
structure and power of boards and authorities for those special crops which 
then are specified in an Act of Parliament for each institution. 
At present there are two parastatal organisations sharing the 
horticultural market with many private companies. One is the Horticultural 
Crop Development Authority, which was established under the Agricultural Act, 
Chapter 318 by promalgamation of legal notice Nr. 229 of 1967 and the amend-
ment by legal notice Nr. 44 of 1976. The other one is the Horticultural 
Co-operative Union, established as a country^wide Co-operative, and was founded 
in 1953 under the Co-operative Society's Act (Register Nr. 263), but with 
special by-laws regulating its objectives, purposes of funds membership, share-
capital and liability, funds, general meeting, management committee, borrowing, 
powers, general provisions, binding rule, distribution of supplies, disputes 
and liquidation. It is one of the country wide co-operatives in Kenya for which 
the Ministry of Co-operative Development is the parent Ministry. 
B. THE ROLE OF THE HORTICULTURAL CO-OPERATIVE UNION 
1. Historical Background and Development: 
The HCU originally formed in 1952 with the purpose of importing 
sufficient quantities of foods which were not available in Kenya, has quite 
a long tradition. As part of the co-operative movement it had to serve 
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particularly the small scale farmers. Later on in 195'79 the HCU started 
marketing r of locally grown produce. Up untill 1965, the HCU had a monopoly 
in all export business and it received most of the high quality produce from 
growers, although the export sales were only possible In small quantities 
and only a few exporters were operating in Kenya. During this time, that is 
before 196 7, the HCU was marketing its produce procured from local co-operative 
members by an experienced staff but these, conditions have however changed and 
HCU continues to experience trouble in the form of lack of marketing and procure-
ment knowhow and financial problems. 
In the past the Ministry of Co-operative Development, the parent 
Ministry for HCU, made a lot of efforts to put HCU again on an economically 
health basis. Several times the top management, including the management 
committee were replaced and a foreign donor- - the Dutch Government - was 
involved to give financial support and technical aid. In 1976, the government 
of the Netherlands provided the Chief-Executive and a Marketing Manager for 
the Union in addition to the loan. Besides this support investigations were 
carried out through a working party established by the Ministry in 1975, and 
there was also a report of a Dutch Evaluation Commission in 1978. In 1979 
another study team was appointed by the Ministry of Co-operative Development. 
All these study-teams made several investigations into the performance of the 
HCU. But inspite of all these efforts and the recommendations, the overall 
functioning of the Union has deteriorated. 
2. HCU's role as part of the Co-operative Movement 
Particularly from the view-point of the Co-operative Movement a 
solution for an Improved performance of the Union has to be found. According 
to its objectives as mentioned above, the HCU was established to support its 
members in the marketing of their produce and serve as such the small scale 
farmers in Kenya. 
i 
But it must be admitted that because the Union has been exempted 
from various sections of the Co-operative Society's Act (Sections 2, 40, 41, 
42,) it has widely failed to contribute to the Co-operative Movement and has 
so far been unable to meet its objectives. According to these exemptions 
the Union is allowed to register not only primary societies but. companies and 
individual growers as their members, Moreover, the Union has power to give 
loans and to buy produce from ncn-members. 
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In fact, more than 50% of the turn-over of the Union in 1978/79 
was contributed by non-members, HCU has also not achieved the objectives 
2, 4a 5, 6S 9 out of nine objectives mentioned in the by-laws. This means 
that, there have been no activities of the Union in the past to supply members 
with seeds and other farm requirementss, it does not own and operate canneries, 
it does not promote the development of the horticultural industry and 
organise further Co-operative Societies, and there were no important efforts 
to strengthen the idea of the Co-operative Movement, 
Taking into account the actual poor performance of the HCU and its 
contribution to the Co-operative Movement«, its further existence has to be 
questioned as the Union has made heavy losses particularly In recent years. 
3. Actual Performance and Prospects of HCU 
The management of the HCU consists of the Management Committee, the 
General. Manager and the Managers for Procurement, Marketing and Accounts. 
Other major functions within the Union are Storekeeping and Transport. During 
the financial year of 1978/79 HCU had a turnover of KSh 10.8 million and 
employs at present a staff of about 100 people. The power of the Management 
Committee is described in the by-laws. It is more a supervisory than a 
Management Committee as it has to function mainly as a linking pin between 
the members and the Union, supervising and providing accurate accounts. Out 
of 21 functions of the Committee9 only four are marketing oriented. One 
important power of the Management Committee is to appoint, discuss, suspend 
or punish employees and to fix their terms of service, The Management Committee 
is supported by a Planning Committee composed of the Chairman, Vice Chairman of 
the MC and the General Manager and Chief Accountant of HCU, 
"The Committee may delegateby resolution in Committee, to the 
General Manager of the Union those of its powers which relate to business 
transactions" The General Manager may be present (at the meetings of the 
Committee) to advise the Committee if necessary but shall not vote. (By-law 
of HCU). The General Manager is expected to implement the decisions of the 
Management Committee and to act on behalf of the Committee concerning the day 
to day business of the Union. There is no job description available although 
it is a key post. 
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The Marketing Manager of HCU is Responsible to market its produce 
and carry out other marketing functions, both exports and local sales. In 
most cases the produce is sold and commission is given to members or non-
members. When this happens, the supplier does not know in advance what 
price he will get. HCU gets a certain percentage (10% from member, 15% 
from non-members) from the turn-over achieved at the market as its income. 
HCU is also involved in direct purchase. There are standing orders or tenders 
from Hotels and governmental institutions, but most of the produce is 
marketed on a whole-sale basis. 
The produce on the local market is sold either from a godown at 
the headquarter of HCU in the Industrial Area of Nairobi or at two Branches 
at Mombasa and Kisumu. There is in addition marketing by the HCU on a retail 
basis at the headquarter, through a sales van, and at a City stall at the 
City Market. The problems the Union has to face in this connection are price 
fluctuations which require a functioning marketing information system. 
The Union is lacking this kind of information which requires experience and 
knowledge of the horticultural market. It has been proved that private 
competitors are more flexible in their price calculations. This lack of 
knowledge of how to fix prices, affects also the procurement department, 
which is without guidance from the marketing department. As a result of this, 
it happens that procured produce can afterwards not be sold at prices formerly 
agreed upon which may lead to high wastage or to sales below cost-prices. 
The procurement from the producers is also affected by lack of 
transport, low prices and delayed payment on the part of the Union. But 
there are also societies or individual suppliers who cause problems by 
delivering low quality products or by shifting to private competitors against 
the provisions of the Co-operatives Society's Act. 
In summary, the main problems of the Union concerning marketing 
and procurement of their produce are: 
lack of cost and price information, 
lack of transport facilities 
lack of co-ordination between procurement and marketing department 
an unreliable Union 
lack of experienced and dedicated staff 
poor external relationship 
It has to be pointed out that HCU apart from solutions for its internal 
management problems, can only survive within the horticultural market if a much clos 
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cooperation and coordination with HCDA can be achieved, promoted by the two 
parent ministries. Moreover, HCU has to be put on a viable financial basis 
which really strengthens the market position of small scale farmers. 
Its success will depend on its ability to provide reasonable 
prices for the farmers and to invest part of HCU's income not only in 
administrative expenses but for improved services for the farmers. 
C. THE ROLE OF THE HORTICULTURAL CROPS DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (HCDA). 
1. Background and Development. 
The HCDA was established in 1967 as a Statutory Board under the 
Agricultural Act. According to these legal provisions the HCDA is an extremely 
powerful organization which could dominate and control the whole horticultural 
industry in Kenya. Its control and regulatory functions concern the cultiv-
ation of horticultural crops, the purchase and sale of planting material, the 
growing, harvesting, purchase, transportation, sale and marketing of produce. 
The HCDA can take all actions it considers necessary to promote the develop-
ment of the horticultural industry. It also fixes prices for the horticul-
tural produce and for all these functions, HCDA can either appoint agents or 
directly involve itself in marketing. In order to finance its activities 
HCDA can propose levies on growers of horticultural produce and has got 
considerable financial support from the Government. 
In carrying out its various functions HCDA has issued licenses to 
exporters and is in control of the air space allocation for horticultural 
produce at Jomo Kenyatta Airport. HCDA has also set up a market information 
centre in Europe to provide Kenya with the necessary trade links and has 
participated in exhibitions abroad. It also provides market information for 
traders in Kenya. In general HCDA in that role has given priority to the 
development of export marketing, but has provided the local market with a 
number of packing stations. 
2. Performance and Prospects o£ HCDA 
HCDA employs a staf-f of about 70 people and had an estimated revenue 
of KSh 2.3 mil. in 1979 The parent ministry for HCDA is the Ministry of 
Agricultures, Thi;= Ministry is therefore represented in the Board of the 
Authority togp-ner with representatives of the Ministry of Economic Planning 
and Deve"' ^ pment, Ministry of Commerce and the Commissioner of Co-operatives. 
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In addition representatives of the producers and of the canning industry 
are members of the Board which can therefore be seen as a coordinating and 
policy making body. The Board is assisted by several committees for manage-
ment s marketing and development. Besides the General Manager9 there are 
the following divisions established: Marketing Divisions, Production and 
Planning Division, Accounts Division and Administrative Division, 
In the Marketing division, there are separate sections for export 
and local marketings. HCDA operates through the Nairobi Godown, a Packing 
Station in Karatlna and a branch in Mombasa, The produce which is handled 
by HCDA locally in onions, tomatoes and pineapples only, HCDA Is one of the 
many Boards and Authorities In Kenya which has taken over increasing marketing 
activities apart from its regulatory functions and inquitably in this 
connectionp the problem of conflicts between the regulatory and the commercial 
functions comes up. It means that HCDA is using: its regulatory power in 
favour of its own commercial activities. This situation will probably 
jeopaidise a fair competition in the horticultural market which should lead 
to fair prices for the small scale farmers and to an increasing supply for 
the customers. 
HCDA seems to be a well established institution although it still 
fa ces alot of management problems which are similar to those of the HCU. 
But because of a direct concern of the Ministry of Agriculture and its more 
reliable basis for its revenues it is operating now on a profit basis. It 
should be worth discussing to confine HCDAs activities to regulatory, coordi-
nating and service functions, which can be utilised by all suppliers and 
customers within the horticultural industry. In order to carry out these 
functions independently HCDA may have to rate increased levies or cesses from 
the traders in the horticultural market. 
D. MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS AND STRATEGIES 
1. Personnel Management 
One of the major problems within the Parastatals of the horticul-
tural industry has always been a lack of qualified staff and it is obvious 
that these problems have created a lot of financial and organisational in-
adequacies. The reason fcr this under-qualification can partly be seen in 
poor appointment procedures but are also due to the fact that within Kenya 
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it is difficult to recruit staff which has administrative experience and 
horticultural experience at the same time. Moreover, the level of salaries 
is not that high that it could attract really qualified staff, in fact it 
is about 30-50% lower than in the private sector. 
Poor management within these Parastatals is found on .each manage-
ment level, that means, within the Board or Management Committee, on the 
level of the General Manager and also amongst the senior management staff, 
which Is mainly responsible for procurement, marketing and administration. 
During the last years there was an extremely high turn-over of personnel 
especially at the level of the General Manager and the senior management 
staff. Some key positions were unfilled for several months. The lack of 
continuity of leadership of course has affected the internal performance of 
these Parastatals, their long term management strategy, and a lack of co-or-
dination and knowledge of the horticultural business. 
In this connection a good documented report, statistic and accounting 
system could help a lot to facilitate the introduction of new staff and could 
support the decisions and actions if there is a well organised organisational 
and communication framework. But because of the high turnover of personnel, 
there was no time to create such a documentation system.inlnomdist cases each 
manager who started his job tried to introduce his own personal system but could 
not complete it because of lack of tenure on his job. Despite all this there 
are a lot of useful information sheets prepared and the organisational system 
forms and the registry systems are much better than could be expected. The 
problem is that this information which is prepared is not up-to-date or the 
actual management does not even know that this kind of information has been 
prepared formerly. 
Solutions for such a situation can be found of course, in reducing 
the high turnover, introducing proper appointment procedures and by training 
the available staff in order to improve their qualification. But it was found 
during our investigations that this is not the only solution and possibly will 
not lead to any important improvements. 
While one has to acknowledge that the horticultural business is a 
complex one with high time-pressure, perishable products to handle, diversified 
products and a complex market structure it is assumed that these problems 
cannot be overcome unless the motivation of the management and the staff as a 
whole can be influenced. It has been observed that a manager in these 
._ 15 g _ IDS/OP 39 
Parastatals, and this may apply not only to the horticultural sector, is more 
concerned with this family and tribal background than with the institution for 
which he has been appointed. In an environment where the family and tribal 
traditions are very strong and the artificial institution of an enterprise is 
quite new, the manager in general does not identify himself with this 
organisation, at least he is more dedicated to his natural environment. 
Therefore, all decisions he makes, concerning the activities of the enterprise 
consider to a high degree his personal interests. That means, he has mainly 
in mind the improvement of his own financial situation or for instance'the 
recruitment of his own family or tribe without necessary qualification. The 
impression is that because of a considerable gap between rich and poor in 
developing countries there is very little delegation of decisions but the desire 
of the management is to secure its own influence in order to control the 
benefit of decisions. 
For the same reason we found a lot of secrecy within the Parastatals 
which is maintained because it is intended to keep the decisions process 
intransparent in order to hide possible underqualification or weak decision 
making. A possible solution in this context could be a higher publicity of 
Parastatal's activities which should be provided by law. 
Studying the past performance of Parastatals we very often found 
within the horticultural sector the recruitment for top-management politically 
motivated and not according to professional qualifications. This also has 
contributed to lack of continuity in leadership. Since the lower management 
level had been occupied in the meantine with quite a well trained personnel of 
a new generation, there is lack of communication and mutual understanding 
between these two management levels. On one hand top-level management fears 
to delegate responsibilities to these professional people and is therefore 
often overloaded and not efficient, and on the other, the lower level is not 
motivated enough because it has no discretion according to its qualification . 
But there is a communication gap between the senior staff management, the 
middle management and the operational staff as well. The educated management 
staff does not feel any obligation to communicate and explain company's objectives 
to this lower qualified group. The impression is, that the Harambee and Nyayo 
idea which has strengthened the economic development in Kenya, has not yet 
been introduced or applied to the activities or members of parastatal organi-
sations in this case. 
Another very common problem in the horticultural sector is that a lot 
of recommendations made by various study teams and commissions either appointed 
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by the Ministries concerned or by the Parastatal itself, have never been 
implemented. The impression in this connection is, that these appointments 
are very often something like an alibi for the management, to hide problems 
which are obvious but where no implementation or follow-up of these results 
has been done. . It was also observed that there is alot of valuable 
recommendations from various advisers which do also a very good job in 
analysing the problems and the situation but there are only a few indic-
ations on how to change the situation and how to transform the recommendations 
into an action programme. At this stage the management is often left alone 
until the next study-term appears to evaluate what has been achieved. As there 
is supposed to be something wrong with this procedure, it is suggested that 
advisers should be integrated into the implementation process. This should 
be part of their advice. On the other hand the management should participate 
during the whole process of investigation and finding of solutions for only 
through that, will they identify themselves with the results. In many cases 
this will not be sufficient to motivate the management, as they will not 
really act as a team to find a solution for the improvement of its own situation. 
Preferably, it could be an improvement if study teams or advisers are not only 
carrying out or delivering a report, but instead try to assist the management 
team of the Parastatal to find its own solutions and to enable them in the 
skills of problem analysis, decision making and design of solutions, structures 
and strategies for their.own organisation. 
In the case of the horticultural industry it seems that the counter-
part principle could not be successfully applied. There were several attempts 
to assist the management of the organisation of the Parastatals by providing a 
General Manager or Marketing Manager from abroad for a certain period. It seems 
however, that there was no clear concept for an introduction and the training 
of a Kenyan Manager, either due to lack of time or since the aspect of continuity 
of leadership was not given high priority. 
Summarising the managerial problems in Parastatals in the horticultural 
sector, and possible solutions for appropriate strategies, one can say that:-
1. There is a lack of cie&i? "ob.jjeot if#s <-' explained -tg> the management landl the J. • 
staffs because .thfey rely, more Lop oontrol-techniquesofor. supervising than :, 
oh motivation by objectives; 
2. There is a lack of qualified, staff due to policy interference, low levels 
of salaries, weak appointment procedures and lack of training and profes-
sionalism; 
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3. There Is a lack of co-operation between various management levels 
and therefore a lack of delegation in decision making, storage of 
information? and a .lack of team-work; 
4. There is a lack of knowledge on how to implement organisational 
changes and how to design and Implement long term plans; 
5. There is too much confidence In job-descriptions and organisational, 
structures concerning lower level posts, but for the very post of the 
General Manager, a job description Is missing. 
Strategies to overcome the managerial problems should consist 
mainly in Improvement of the motivation of management and operational staff. 
Although there Is also a lack of working capital with regard to the objectives 
and activities of the Parastatals, lack of technical facilities and proper 
selection and introducing job descriptions for key personnel like the General 
Manager together an annual plan of action for- the G.M.£ designed by him and 
approved and controlled by the Management Committee of location, an improve-
ment could be achieved by 
introducing the Harambee Idea within the Parastatal. organisation, 
- establishing financial incentives for the staff, correlating with 
profits made or services provided 
Improving working conditions 
promoting goal setting and explaining and participation 
establishing permanent implementation and brain-storming teams of 
the management 
promotions of "self-made" organisational development 
supplementing control and supervisory techniques through 
departmental and organisational planning and budgeting, 
Apart frcm these strategies an intensive and varied training prog-
ramme for the ^management at all levels seems to be very necessary. Training 
should start with the members of the Board In order to provide them with 
professional knowledge on management functions. They should particularly 
know how to request key informations enabling them to evaluate the actual 
performance and future prospects of the public enterprise, In this case 
training should be provided as a kind of workshop including Board members of 
various public enterprises. Better trained Board members will be in a better 
position to evaluate more critically the performance of the General Manager 
and to become more independent from his Information policy. 
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A better trained General Manager will provide essential inform-
ation to the Board and will give much more assistance in policy-decision 
making, But at the same time he should be under the above mentioned 
professional control of the Board. 
Training in motivation and implementation techniques and decision 
making will improve the managers ability to convince his staff to be more 
dedicated and to improve their skills as well. 
All management levels, including the heads of department should 
accept an attitude where training is recognized as a permanent need and as 
a necessary part of the working time of each member of the organisation in 
order to meet the challenges of a changing society, technology and environ-
ment in general. 
2. Marketing problems and strategies 
Concerning the marketing of the horticultural produce we have to 
keep in mind, that there is the Horticultural Development Authority with its 
regulatory functions and secondly the Horticultural Co-operative Union as 
part of the Cooperative movement with its objective to serve the small scale 
farmers through its primary society members. Furthermore, there is a majority 
of private competitors in this market. There is a great variety of horticul-
tural produce to be sold on the local market and for exporting as well. HCDA 
is the more powerful Parastatal organisation because of its regulatory functions. 
All other companies, including HCU have to apply at HCDA for import or export 
licences. Originally, HCU was acting as the sole agent for the selling of 
onions for ihei:H6DA, but in 1972 HCDA took over herself 50% of the marketing 
of onions and left only 50% to HCU. Originally, HCU was the importer for 
delicious fruit from abroad, but in 19.70/71 HCU lost this privilege mainly 
because of import restrictions from the Government. Originally, HCU was the 
one exporting untill the last few years when HCDA started operating in this 
field. 
Consequently, not only is there stiff competition in general in this 
horticultural market but there is also a competition between these two govern-
mental institutions which should exibit coordination and complementary action. 
As can be seen, the HCU as a result has no regulatory competence and is mostly 
treated like other private competitors. HCDA as a regulatory body started 
trading activities after a Ministerial Cabinet directive, :which decided that 
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Parastatals should operate on their own budget so that their expenses could 
be covered by their own income„ In the following years HCDA could manage to 
make a profit whereas HCU was always In the red. During recent years, the 
number of exporters highly increased which affected the available airspace for 
transportation which made the handling of Its produce much more difficult 
than in the past. Whereas HCDA could overcome these problems better9 partly 
because of its more active roles and because of its regulatory functions, 
HCU had to suffer from the lack of organised outside contacts and aggressive 
marketing activities. Instead of approaching new suppliers and new customers, 
there was merely await and see policy implemented. Personal contacts, visits 
and "barazas" with suppliers and also visits to customers were neglected. 
i 
Looking at the organisational structure of HCU it can be seen, that 
the function of a liaison officer for Co-operative Societies is established 
on a very low management level and moreover this function is reported as vacant. 
Problems are also created by the wide variety of produce which is sold by the 
HCU, although it is only four or five products which contribute more than 50% 
to the turnover. There is also a lack of service for the suppliers. Farmers 
are complaining because of non-payment or delay in payment by the Union and 
there is almost no advice for the suppliers on how they should cultivate their 
produce and which prices they can expect. No loans are provided for the growers 
and produce is just taken and marketed as It is. It is because of this kind of 
poor service of the Parastatals that farmers are more open to private competitors 
who offer them lower prices but prompt payment in cash and provide them also 
with loans which the farmers badly need for investment. 
It is surprising that the stiff competition within the horticultural 
market has not contributed towards an Improved efficiency of the Parastatal 
organisations as one might have- expected. The problem here is, that one 
Parastatal is relying mainly on its privileges as a Statutory Body whereas the 
other one (HCU) is just asking for the same privileges or is relying on the 
Government which eventually is expected to take over the losses. 
In order to overcome these problems described above, first of all 
both of the Parastatals should coordinate their activities and strategies. 
This has been made difficult because they are assigned to different ministries. 
Some basic strategies have therefore to be coordinated between these two 
ministrieso There should be.at least a division of labour concerning 
the marketing of onions 
the importing of fruits 
the export activities. 
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Maybe there is also the possibility of dividing the local market 
along various districts for which each Parastatal feels responsible for the 
marketing functions. In order to coordinate the activities and strategies, 
the day to day business as well as the long term planning, there should be 
mutual representation in the Boards of the two Parastatals and there should 
also be regular meetings of the senior management staff. Such meetings and 
discussions could contribute to a development whereby HCU will no longer 
justify its weak performance because of the privileges of HCDA and HCDA will 
no longer consider HCU as an unnecessary organisation which could be wound 
up. This mutual agreement on the organisation of the horticultural market 
should also consider and allow the trading activities of private competitors, 
for instance through organising the export traders as one Co-operative or 
Agency which could strengthen the Kenyan position with regard to the importing 
countries. Concerning the local market the Parastatal bodies should establish 
buying centres in the growing areas of horticultural products, which could in 
some cases be upgraded in packing or grading stations. This would help the 
farmers to deliver the produce and could strengthen the Parastatal supplying 
functions for the horticultural market. Another strategy should be to 
establish improved payment conditions for the farmers. The Parastatals very 
often do not get the produce from the farmers by direct purchase but are taking 
the produce on the market. There could, however, be an improvement in such 
a way that 50% of the assumed value of the produce is paid immediately after 
delivery and the rest after the produce has been sold. 
Furthermore, each of these horticultural Parastatals could specialise 
on a range of horticultural products which they mainly market and where the 
other Parastatal body has only a supplementary function. 
Altogether it means that both Parastatal bodies would justify their 
existence through improved performance by coordinating and sharing their 
facilities especially storing and transport facilities, which are•extremely 
important within the horticultural business, and making agreements on which 
suppliers, customers (export, local, wholesale, retail) should (be served in 
which regions and with which products). At present there is a lack of such a 
coordination which should be accompanied by a cooperation between these 
Parastatals concerning price information, research, training advisory and 
developmental activities on horticultural products. But as long as HCDA as a 
regulatory body is also involved in trading activities, there will always be 
the problem of mal-practice of this regulatory function in favour of its own 
activities. 
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An alternative thereforea would be to confine HCDA on its regulatory 
functions and have the HCU take over all the marketing of produce concerning 
the smallGscale, growers and the local market„ Furthermore, there will still 
be room for activities of private traders which could organise into an export 
Co-operative under the control of the HCDA. It is quite obvious that this 
solution is not the only possible one, but it promises to bring an improvement 
as compared to the present situation. This state of affairs will neither 
support the Cooperative Movement nor strengthen the development of the 
horticultural sector as part of the economy, 
3. Service to Small scale Farmers 
The Parastatals in the horticultural sector should help under-
priviledged groups through promotion so .that the role of Parastatals in the 
horticultural sector could be justified. One ^Parastatal could provides the 
necessary control to achieve the objectives and the other provides the services 
which would not be secured by private enterprises. But these services should 
have the effect of increasing the number of viable small scale farmers 
growing horticultural products, Improve their know-how and financial basis 
and income situation and supply horticultural produce to remote areas of the 
local market. 
Other objectives like export activities, quality control and improve-
ment, up-grading and processing of produce should only be considered by Paras-
tatals in so far, as they are In line with the above mentioned service functions. 
This strategy could also apply as a decision criteria for how far private 
enterprises activities and competition should be tolerated or even promoted. 
In any case this aspect should have its role in the decision making and 
policy making process of Parastatals In this sector. 
It is particularly doubtful if the Parastatals in the horticultural 
sector have achieved or have even in mind an implementation of this kind of 
strategy. There is almost no service of the Parastatals in terms of loans, 
advice, training of smallscale farmers, and on top of that there are; low 
prices, poor payment conditions and a lack of transport facilities, and 
storage. The Parastatals should therefore give the handling of these problems 
a much higher priority within their plans and budgets. A high ranking officer 
should be made responsible for relations with small scale farmers including 
membership aspects for Co-operative Societies. .The Parastatals should set 
up an organisational structure where this function is ranging just under the 
General Manager and carried out by a dedicated officer with support of a qualifed 
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staff. He should organise the services of the Parastatals within the limits 
of a given budget. One of his functions should be a permanent evaluation of 
the objectives, activities and achievements of the Parastatals according to 
these service functions for the smallscale farmers. Personal contacts new 
letters, of the Parastatal to its supplier informing them on prices, problems 
and prospects of the horticultural sector and the Parastatal's activities 
and the establishment of buying centres could be a start In the right direction. 
It could help to evaluate the activities not only in the light of profit and 
loss, but with regard to the Parastatal's developmental functions. 
E, CONCLUSION 
From our studies in the horticultural industry we can confirm many 
of the findings of the Ndegwa Commissions, particularly concerning financial 
mismanagement, qualified lack of management reports, lack of accountability, 
weak role of the Board, staff and poor budgeting. Apart from that, coordin-
ation and cooperation between different management levels, between different 
departments and among Parastatals is very weak. But even if information and 
knowledge about techniques were there, lack of motivation as a major problem 
remains preventing the mobilization of information and knowledge and the 
allocation of the resources which are available. 
Some strategies have been mentioned which could overcome these 
problems. But there is a considerable need for further research and for a 
broader discussion of this issue. The Institute for Development Studies is 
going to contribute to a further analysis of the performance of public enter-
prises through other case studies in various sectors of industry and by a 
survey of the problems and having needs of the top management. 
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THE ROLE OF PUBLIC AGRICULTURAL ENTERPRISES IN 
TANZANIA WITH REFERENCE TO STATE FARMS 
By 
Dr. LoA. Msambichaka 
Econonmic Research Bureau 
Tanzania 
1. INTRODUCTION 
At the time of independence in 1961, Tanzania had inherited an 
agricultural structure, which was relevant to the metropolitan states. 
Agricultural production was principally ^ eaVed at serving the colonial master's 
industries. Such a development led to persistent deformation of the Tanzanian 
economy and to economic underdevelopment. 
The abolition of agricultural backwardness, and the establishment 
of an efficient agricultural system, was one of the major issues of consider-
ation in the agricultural policy, which followed soon after independence. 
Various agricultural programmes and institutions were recommended, as an 
alternative to rapid social and economic development in the rural areas. 
Among them were, public agricultural enterprises, which, though not vocally 
advocated, have managed to survive the abolition, basic changes, or being 
scrapped in the annual budget for the past two decades. 'It looks as if, they 
are now going to survive for many other decades to come. The largest single 
group in the list of public agricultural enterprises are state farms/plant-
ations, which are basically production units. 
This paper will not give a detailed account of the role of public 
agricultural enterprises in Tanzania. The paper tries to throw some light on 
the nature of agriculture in Tanzania in Section 2, before looking at the 
composition and role of public enterprises in Section 3. Section 4- briefly 
describes the trend and contribution of state farms to the economy, before 
winding up with the main issues of concern on Section 5. 
2. THE STATE OF AGRICULTURE IN TANZANIA 
After independence, Tanzania was faced with the task of eliminating 
economy backwardness, which was a colonial remnant. This backward nature, 
reflected itself in the low level of development of the people (education, 
health, housing) and in a lopsided economic structure. The methods and 
techniques of production were archaic, poverty and illiteracy were spread 
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all over the country. As a consequence of neo-colonial influence particu-
larly in the foreign trade9 the situation has not radically changed. 
The Tanzanian agricultural policy considers, that the present 
agricultural backwardness can be eliminated through, socio-economic trans-
formation (ujamaa policies) and the implementation of economic developmental 
measures such as the improvement of instruments production. The ultimate goal 
is to produce enough for food, for Industrial raw materials and enough for 
exports. In view of this, state farms' development is taken as one of the 
rural developmental production forms which can assist in solving some of the 
mentioned problems. 
2.1 Agricultural resources and their utilization: Land resources: 
Tanzania occupies an area of 93,970 sq. km. and has a population of 
approximately 18.0 million (1980) (World Bank (WB) 1980, Markie 1976). 
Almost two decades have elapsed since independence. Nevertheless, 
the agricultural resources, such as land, water, animals, and the available 
labour power, are insufficiently used. There is enough land, which could 
effectively be used (See Table 1). 
Table 1. The development of land utilization in Tanzania (in 1000 ha) 
.1961/65 1970 19 75 1976 
Total area 94,509 949509 94,509 94,509 
Land area 88,604 88,604 88,604 88,604 
Area under crops 3,349 5,130 6,070 6,290 
Arable land 2,613 4,180 5,000 5,200 
Permanent crops 736 950 1,070 1,090 
Meadows 45,240 44,960 44,760 44,720 
Forest 33,942 31,074 31,074 31,074 
Others 6,073 7,440 6,700 6,520 
Source: FA0: Production Year Book 1976, Vol. 30, Rome 1977. 
Table 1 indicates, that in 1976 only 7% of the land area was under crops. This 
implies, that there is still more land, which could be used for the expansion 
of both crop and livestock production. Large scale farming, which comprises 
mainly of sisal plantations and other crop farms, occupies almost 1% of the land 
area (Chai 1979 edits and others (a.o. ). 
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Livestock: Another distinctive feature to the Tanzania agriculture, 
is the large size of cattle herd about 12 mil. in 1979 (TFNC 1980). These 
animals are scarcely used for labour purposes, and insufficiently slaughtered 
for the supply of meat (See Table 2). 
Table 2. Estimates of per capital consumption of animal products in Tanzania, 
1972 and 1981 in kg. 
Source of meat products 1972 1981"^ 
Cattle 7.70 10.5 30 
Goats 1.10 2.400 
Sheep 0.43 
Pig 0.08 0.125 
Poultry 0.80 1.400 
Milk (litre) 2.80 3.000 
Per-capita figure for 1981 is based on the population estimate of 
17.9 mil. in 1981. 
Source: Govt, of Tanzania: Third Five Year Plan for Economic and Social 
Development 1976t1981, Vol. I, Dar es Salaam, 
19 78. 
In 19 73, rural beef consumption stood at 7.5 kg. Cap/year. The 
national per capita beef consumption was 23.5 kg./year (Mackenzie, 73.5). 
This gives a ratio of 3:1, between the urban and rural dwellers. However, 
recent research findings indicate, that the difference in beef consumption 
between the two groups is narrowing for worse (See Table 3). 
Table 3: The supply of beef per capital in Tanzania 1971-1977. 
Year Urban Rural National 
Supply Supply Supply 
1971 32.9 7.4 9.3 
1972 25.4 7.1 8.5 
1973 21.7 8.0 9.1 
1974 20.5 4.9 6.3 
1975 20.4 4.9 6.5 
1976 19.4 6.4 7.9 
1977 11.5 7.2 ' 7.7 
Source: TFNC: Data Report on the Food and Nutrition situation in Tanzania 
1973/74 - 1977/78. 
Department of Planning, April 1980 Table 13.8. 
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The trend shown on Table 3 is partly due to the impact of high meat 
prices and other consumer goods, on which the consumers have to spread their 
thin income. Consumers have to look for other less costly alternatives of 
protein sour'ce, if th^y are to escape malnutrition. At a national level, the 
alternative is that of opening more state ranches, in order to supplement to 
the existing supply and finally set prices, which are favourable for both the 
livestock-keeper and the consumer. In addition, the animals are small, 
weighing about 113 kg. when slaughtered (Mackenzie 1973). Related to this 
problem is the low yield of milk per cow. Most of the Tanzania short-horn-Zebus, 
about 10 mil. cattle, produce on the average between 250 - 500 litres. 
The 3000 graded cattle produce almost 3000 lit.es i.e. 1000 litres per cow/per 
year. Milk consumption in 19 77 showed that 22.2 and 36.6 litres, per capita 
are consumed in the rural and urban areas respectively. With the establishment 
of more dairy farms, and if the dairy processing plants operate more 
efficiently, more milk should be available to the public. 
Human Resources: Furthermore, there is an extreme disproportion in 
the economy. Most unfavourable, is the high percentage of agricultural labour 
force, which has been declining very slowly in more than a decade (compare 
with Table 4). 
Table 4: Population growth in Tanzania 1965-1978 (in thousands) 
Economically 
active 
population 
Economically 
active population 
in agric. in % 
5 ,121 
5 ,850 
6,488 
6,975 
87 .7 
86 .0 
83.6 
82.1 
Year Total 
population 
Rural Popul-
ation in % 
1965 
1970 
19 75 
1978 
11,616 
13,273 
15,388 
16,886 
87 .6 
86 .0 
83.6 
Source: World Bank, World Development Report, 1980, Washington, D.C., 
August 1980, p. 146. 
FA0, Production Year Book Vol. 32, Rome 1978. 
The slow decline as shown in Table 4 indirectly indicates, that industrializ-
ation and service sectors, which would otherwise absorb more people are 
expanding and growing slowly. In a country like Tanzania, where unorganised 
peasant production is predominant state farms seem to be the possibility of 
having targeted and specialized production implemented (at least in the near 
future). 
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Another distinctive feature of Tanzanian agriculture, is the under-
employment of the farmers. This is necessitated by the low development of the 
productive forces, and the heavy dependence on the natural conditions. As a 
result, most of the farmers are productively engaged for about 700 hours with 
a maximum of 1500 hours (Sharma 1973, TFNC data 1980). The labour productivity 
in agriculture as well as in the national economy is still very low. Compared 
to USA, the labour productivity in Tanzania stands at 1% (USA 1973 = 100) 
(Griening, 1977). 
Paralelled to these problems, the Tanzania agriculture is identified 
by the reasonable percentage of illiteracy. The national record (1975) show, 
that the adult litejca-^ y r a t e is 66% (WB 1980, p. 154). Whereas in 1960 only 25% 
of the school going age could enter primary school, in 1977 about 70% enrolled 
themselves in primary school. Since November 1977, about 97% of all school 
going age children enter primary school. Most immediate problems are in 
connection with the teaching staff, classrooms and in the long run, the pre-
paration of employment opportunities for school leavers, for since school is 
for all, jobs must also be for all. The problem of education is crucial, 
because the efficiency in the labour process is directly linked with the 
qualification of the individual at work. This means, increase of productivity 
and education (qualification) are interrelated factors (Schmidt 1972). Research 
on educational status of workers in state farms indicate that eradication of 
illeteracy, through adult education programmes is carried out successfully. In 
addition, farms with a high percentage of literacy and qualified management 
show a better farm performance. 
The average life expectancy at birth in 1964 was between 35 and 40 
years, it ranged between 40 and 41 in 1967 and reached 45 in 1975. In 1978 it 
recorded 51 years (WB 1980; Govt, of Tanzania 1978). 
Technology of Production: The low level of the means of production 
used, and the degree of intensification, is particularly noticeable, in the 
use of a hoe, as a major farm implement of a farmer. Ox-ploughs, and tractors, 
as well as irrigation farming is rarely used .in the smallholder farming. In 
1975, Ox ploughs were recommended as an alternative to better farming and as a 
a means to intensive agricultural production. The June 1980 Prime Ministers' 
Budget speech to Parliament and that of the Minister of Agriculture, all re-
commended the introduction of tractor farming in the villages. However, 91.7% 
of all holdings cultivate less than 3 ha, 5.6% cultivate between 3-5 ha and 
only 2.7% cultivate over 5 ha. (See Table 5). 
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Table 5: Size Distribution of Land, 19 72. 
Farm size (ha) Number of holdings % Total holdings 
0.5 77.1954 31.5 
0.5 - 1.0 651386 26.6 
1.0 - 2.0 605 291 24.7 
2.0 - 3.0 218375 8.9 
3.0 - 4.0 88696 3.6 
4.0 - 5.0 499 85 2.0 
4.0 - 10.0 53252 2.0 
10.0 11625 0.5 
Source: Dharama Ghai (edits) a.o. Agrarian Systems and Rural Development, 
The Macmillan Press Ltd. 1979, p,243. 
This pattern of rural structure, gives little opportunity in the 
use of modern farming machinery, which demand large areas of land to be ploughed 
Unless the rural (settings) farms are properly organized such as in the form 
of block-farms; state farms will still be the most appropriate place of 
introducing modern farm machinery, for both experiment and production. 
The use of bettern seeds (High yielding varieties HYV) is not very 
common in the farming communities. Together with this, is the insufficient 
use of agro-chemicals and other intensification factors, which can improve 
and hold the soil fertility and the crop yields. As a result of this, the 
recorded Tanzanian cr>op yields are well below the world averages and of 
industrialized countries (See Table 6). As mentioned earlier, the use of 
agrochemicals (fertilizer, plant protection chemicals) in the peasant holding is 
still insignificant. 
Table 6. A Comparison of Selected Tanzanian Crop Yields to International 
Yields ( 1978 in 100 Kg/hectare) 
Crop World Africa Tanzania 
Maize 
Rice 
Wheat 
Sorghum 
Beans 
Sweat Potatoes 
Irish Potatoes 
30.8 13.2 7.7 
25.9 17.4 13.0 
19.0 10.7 13.0 
13.3 7.4 7.1 
5.8 5.7 5.2 
83.6 62.0 62.1 
150,3 87.1 38.3 
Source: FA0: Production Year Book Vol. 32, Rome 1978. 
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Compared to other countries, the use of fertilizer is as shown in Table 7. 
Table 7: Use of Fertilizer in Tanzania as compared to other International 
Values (Kg/ha Arable Land NPK) 
Tanzania 1960/61 .1.965/66 19 70/71 1974/75 1975/76 
Tanzania o.ix 0ol0 0. 2 X X 0.5XX 0.6XX 
World 7.7 8.50 11.4 19.5 20.8 
Africa 0.8 1.18 1.8 2.3 5.0 
Europe 55.7 74.00 103.8 123.6 126.6 
x 1961 to 1965 
xx Calendar year. 
Source: FAO: Annual Fertilizer Review 1971, Rome 1972, p.47. 
FAO: Annual Fertilizer Review 1976, Rome 1977, p.10, 12. 
Table 7 indirectly indicates the reason behind the low yields of crops. In a 
country like Tanzania where unorganized peasant production is predominant 
state farms seem the possibility of having targeted and specialized production 
implemented (at least in the near future). 
2.2 Agriculture's Contribution to Economic Development Production 
Agricultural production still remains the major contributor to the 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP). It contributed 46.7% at the beginning of the 
first five year plan i.e. 1964, 42.0% in 1969 and 36.7% in 1974. In 19 78 it 
stood at 39.5%. Industrial sector contribution to the GDP is about 10% 
(Refer Hali ya Uchumi wa Taifa (HUT) 1979/80, p. 10-12). Production of impor-
tant agricultural crops in Tanzania is as shown on Table 8. 
Table 8. Production of Agricultural Crops in Tanzania in 1000 Metric Tons 
Crop 1970/71 1974/75 1975/76 1976/77 
Mai ze 650.0 623.0 825.0 896,0 
Paddy 182.0 134.0 150.0 172.0 
Wheat 61.0 35.1 46.1 57.6 
Sorghum/Millet 150. 3 189.6 339.0 360.0 
Coffee 49.7 52.1 55.4 52.7 
Cotton 76.6 70.5 42.5 67.1 
Tea 8.5 12.9 13.7 16. 7 
Tobacco 12.0 14.0 14.9 19.1 
Sisal 202.1 142.1 127.8 105.0 
Cashewnuts 111.2 117.2 83.0 96.8 
Source: TFNC: Data report on the Food and Nutrition Situation in Tanzania 
1973/74 - 1977/78. Bank of Tanzania: Econ. Bui.Vol.XI - No.2,p. 
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These crops play a key role in Tanzania economy, for they include 
among them important staple food crops and export crops. Efforts are being 
made, in order that farmers produce more food - and cash crops. Important 
measures include changes in the pricing policy and the opening of new agri-
cultural projects (United Republic of Tanzania (URT) 1979). 
Exports vs Food Production: The nature of agriculture in the economy 
is clearly identified through agricultural exports (compare with Table 9). 
Table 9. Agricultural Exports as Compared to Total Exports in Tanzania (in 
mill. Shs.) 
Year Total exports 
Agricultural 
exports 
Agricultural Exports as 
a % of Total Exports 
1969 1795 1386 77.2 
19 70 1852 1417 76.5 
1971 1989 1383 69,5 
1972 2277 172 3 75. 7 
1973 25 81 1991 77.1 
19 74 2861 2292 80.1 
Source: Government of Tanzania: Third Five Year Plan, op.cit. p.66. 
The greater part of agricultural exports (60...65%) is made up of eight 
important crops: coffee, sisal, cotton, cashewnuts, tobacco, tea, pyrethrum 
and oil-seeds (Govt, of Tanzania 1974/75; Malecela 1976; TFNC Data 1980; HUT 
1979-80). 
Such an export'situation weakens Tanzania's ability to bargain in the 
world market, thus accepting dictated pricess which are not even enough to buy 
the necessary goods for development, Tanzania's industrial sector is still 
underdeveloped, and there are only a few state farms, which are economically 
stable. The integration between agriculture and the few established proce-
ssing industries Is also insufficiently developed, This situation is partly 
because of the available industrial capacities, which cannot process all the 
raw materials marketed (See Table 10). On the other hand, it is caused by the 
common phenomena and dilemma i„e. under-capacity utilization and the shortage 
of competent manpower, As evidenced by Table 10, about 75% of the produced 
cash crops are exported unprocessed. This has a severe impact in terms of 
i prices, and the producer Is always at the mercy of the buyer. 
As a consequence of low degree of agricultural intensity and heavy 
dependence on natural blessing, the agricultural economy is always disrupted 
by natural calamities, such as drought., floods etc. Statistics indicate^ that 
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Table 10: Production, Internal Processing and Export of Cash Crops 
(Estimates) 
1973 1981 (Projections) 
Total Internal Unproces- Total Internal Unproce-
Crop Produc- Process- sed exp- Produc- process- sed exp 
tion ing % orts tion ing % orts 
1000 t % 1000 t % 
Cotton 68.6 16.0 84.0 110.0 21.0 79.0 
Sisal 155.4 2.6 97.4 200.0 65.0 35.0 
Tobacco 12.7 23.6 76.4 38.0 15.8 84.2 
Tea 12.7 21.3 78.7 24.0 16.7 83.3 
Coffee 54.6 2.4 97.6 65.0 3.1 96 .9 
Cashewnuts 139.4 0.1 99.9 166.0 44.6 55.4 
Pyrethrum 3.5 - - 81.0 1.2 98.8 
Source: Govt, of Tanzania: Third Five Year Plan for Economic and Social 
Development 1976-1981 Vol. II, op. cit. p.17. 
Tanzania is hit by natural calamities, which lead to hunger after every five 
years. The 1973/74 drought forced Tanzania to spend about Shs 800 million 
worth of foreign exchange for importing maize, rice, wheat and sugar (Refer 
Bank of Tanzania (BOT) 1975; Govt, of Tanzania 1978). The problem of in-
adequate food supply, which leads to food import dependence is also evidenced 
by Table 11. 
Table 11: Purchase and Sale of Important Food Crops in Tanzania 1969/70 to 
1975/76 (in 1000 t) 
• 
Year Maize Rice Wheat Sugar 
Purchase Sale Purchase Sale Purchase Sale Purchase Sale 
1969/70 • 54.1 123,4 58.9 41.8 21.0 56.7 76 .6 90.8 
1970/71 170.0 111.6 93.5 52,1. 42.9 59.7 89 .5 107.7 
1971/72 43.0 160.0 68. 6 75.8 57.1 88,6 94 .2 130.2 
1972/73 114.1 154.0 73.1 97.8 51.3 53 .9 92 .6 133 .1 
1973/74 73.6 242.4 59.7 82.3 32.8 32.7 106 .1 139 .0 
1974/75 24.9 190.7 23.6 36.7 15 .0 43.0 1.01 .6 93.0 
1975/76 91.1 51.1 11.6 99.8 25.8 18.1 95 .7 97.0 
Source: Govt, of Tanzania: Third Five Year Dev. Plan for Economic and Social 
Development 1976-1981, Vol. 1. op. cit., p. 13. 
Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania: Hali ya Uchumi wa Taifa katika mwaka 
1979-80, p.5. 
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Table 11 indicates, that in the period between 1969/70 and 1975/76 practi- . 
cally every year food had to be imported (except 1970/71 for maize and rice 
as well as 1975/76 for maize, wheat and sugar), to supplement to the local 
supply, in order to meet the local food demands. Such a situation seriously 
affects/distorts the countries economic stability. 
It. is hoped, that state farms, if properly managed and organized 
can give solutions to some of the most basic problems described above. 
Rural Incomes: In the farming units, the volume produced is low, the per 
capita income is low, accumulation is low and finally the economic growth is 
also very slow, This partly explains the reason why, in general the farmers 
have low yearly incomes, which again vary from one region to another. In 
1970, the average upper limit of the farmers income recorded Shs 760.00, 
and the lower limit was Shs 370.00 (Msambichaka, Mabele 1979, Markie 1976). 
Farmers, who had a per capita income exceeding Shs 500.00 were found in 
areas, which produce primarily export crops and are in access to better 
communication system (infrastructure). Per capita income increased from 
Shs 515 in 1964 to Shs 580 in 1969. At the end of the second five year plan, 
that is in 1974, the per capita Income recorded Shs 660.00. Five Year later 
that is 1979, the per capita stood at Shs 1894.80. This is almost three 
fold that of 1974 (HUT 1979/80, WB, 1980). 
2.3 Problems of Agricultural Development in Tanzania 
There are many problems of agriculture. However, some of the most 
basic ones fall within the following frame-work: 
(a) Organizational Units: 
Here it is referred to the problem of organizing and managing 
production units, such as individual farms, communal and state farms so 
that more is produced and earned. Many production units are faced with the 
problem of increasing their efficiency and productivity. There is also a 
great need of examining the efficiency of marketing institutions/crop authori-
ties in produce collection, 
(b) Productive forces: 
The problem of manpower is stil.l acute in the agricultural sector. 
There were 8492 kilimo staff in 1977, out of which 531 were graduates, 781 were 
field officers and the rest were assistant field officers. In 1976 there were 
3438 agricultural staff and 326 7 veterinary staff. The intensity of extension 
staff showed that there was one staff per 1.1 ha crop area and one veterinary 
staff ner 4.4 ha. 
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On the other hand there is the problem of getting better instru-
ments of production, and farm machinery. 
Moreover, there is a need of emphasizing and encouraging production 
under irrigation. At the moment, area under irrigation is still insignificant. 
In 1973, out of 14435000 ha. which were under cultivation, only 126400 ha, were 
under irrigation. The increase of irrigated farming will increase the 
intensity of the area under cultivation, thus increasing production. 
There are problems which are connected with the way researchers are 
conducted. There is a need to examine their appropriateness, urgency and the 
degree of duplication. However, the Tanzania National Scientific Research 
Council (TNSRC) in collaboration with other institutions are trying to look 
at this irregularity. 
(c) Dependent Structure: 
The export orientation (direction of agricultural trade and prices) 
and the overall economic instability greatly affects agricultural development. 
In addition, lack of processing capacities, the utilization of the existing 
ones below optimum level, and the lack of proper linkages between agriculture 
and industrial sector also contribute to the inconsistency and slow growth of 
agricultural development. 
(d) Financial Resources: 
A consistent and steady increase of development expenditure on 
agriculture is necessary. In recent years 1974/75 - 1978/79 actual per 
capita development expenditure on agriculture has undulated from Shs 3.70 in 
1974/75 to Shs 8.20 in 1975/76, It went down to Shs 4.60 in 1976/77 up to 
Shs 5,00 in 1977/78 and then to Shs 6.30 in 1978/79 (TFNC Table 30.5). The 
problem of credit facilities has to be examined and made more available and 
diversified with a purpose of increasing agricultural production as well as 
productivity. 
(e) Institutions of production: 
They should contribute to output more productively and at the same 
time, safeguard the peasant production shortfalls of essential agricultural 
commodities, such as food. In addition, there should be institutions of 
innovation which would then spread the adoption of new technology to the 
farmers. 
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3. The Composition and Role of Public Agricultural Enterprises in Tanzania: 
A Brief Ouxline: 
The establishment of public agricultural enterprises in Tanzania 
soon after Independence was considered an appropriate basis for economic 
development. After the Arusha Declaration, it was documented as one of the 
instruments of economic development. Most of the enterprises have been 
established through two distinct ways; 
(a) Nationalisation of big enterprises, which belonged to 
rich farmers; 
(b) Establishment of new enterprises. 
There were 8 agricultural parastatals in 197t+ which employed 30,540 workers. 
Total employment in the total agricultural public sector was 52,365. Contri-
bution of agricultural parastatals to GDP was 1,5%, Total parastatal 
contribution was 10.7% and of public enterprises was 14.9% (Lyakurwa, Mabele 
a.o„ 1979). Public agricultural enterprises in Tanzania include the 
following major areas of activities: 
1. State farms: These type of enterprises function primarily as production 
units. Their activities are being economically directed by respective holding 
companies, such as the National Agricultural Food Corporation (NAFCO) and 
Tanzania Sisal Authority (TSA). Other farms are under Regional Administration 
or District Development Corporations (DDCs), There are also experimental 
stations and research center ? , which are mainly under the Ministry of Agri-
culture, These units are expected to spread and teach the latest achievements 
of science and technology to the nearby villages and the country at large. 
Since 1974/75, most of the former mixed state farms have now 
specialised in either crop, nainly grains, or livestock production. Livestock 
farms are based on extensive pasture feeding. Poultry farms have been started, 
but they still have to be developed. State farms seem to dominate the public 
agricultural sector in Tanzania. 
2. Processing and Manufacturing Industries: Publicly owned processing 
industries for agricultural products are considered crucial in Tanzania economy. 
Most of the processing industries are engaged in fruit canning and cereal 
processing, National Milling Corporation is the holding company for all 
public owned subsidiaries, which are connected with ^he processing of fruits 
and grains, Tanganyika Packers Ltd. is for meat processing and Tanzania Dairies 
Limited is for the processing of milk and milk products. There are also public 
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textile industries, which manufacture finished and semi-finished textile 
products. In addition there are public Industries for the processing of 
coffee, sisal, cashewnuts, tobacco, pyrethrum, tea and oil-seeds. 
The establishment of agricultural processing industries, has 
relatively contributed to the industrialization programme, and to the weake-
ning of subsistence economy. On the other hand, the dependence of these 
commodities from foreign countries has been minimized. The processing of 
locally produced agricultural raw materials into high quality products has 
been advocated since the first five year plan. These industries which fall 
under the umbrella of "Import substitution policy" were considered necessary 
for economic independence. 
3. Corporation and Crop Authorities ' (Marketing) Because of its socialistic 
policies, public enterprises in the field of agricultural marketing are 
considered a necessity for a stable agricultural economy. It is a fact, 
that the Tanzanian agriculture is on transition from subsistence to market 
economy. This development process demands for a proper and well organized 
public marketing system, with a high economic efficiency. For more than 
a decade, the agricultural marketing system in Tanzania had been in the 
hands of cooperatives and marketing boards. The only noticeable change 
during the period was, the establishment of a single channel marketing system 
in 1969 (Lyakurwa, Mabele, a.o. 1979). A major change occured in May 1976, 
when all cooperative societies were abolished. All marketing activities 
were subsequently assigned to eight (national institutions) public agricul-
tural enterprises; namely: 
National Milling Corporation (NMC) 
- Tobacco Authority of Tanzania (TAT) 
- Tanzania Cotton Authority (TCA) 
- Coffee Authority of Tanzania (CAT) 
- Tanzania Tea Authority (TTA) 
- Tanzania Sisal Authority (TSA) 
- General Agricultural Exports (GAPEX) 
Each of the eight institutions has been assigned districts of collecting 
the produce. The authorities buy their crop and other crops grown in the 
area. CAPEX is mainly buying oil seeds, and NMC buys cereals, and it is 
the largest produce collector of all (eight). There are indications, that, 
farmers associations, which are slowly coming to the surface, might be 
assigned some of the authorities' functions. 
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This method of marketing through public enterprises has 
in a way helped in strengthening and controlling though not very effectively, 
the internal market and in centralizing ( or knowing where they are located) 
food crops and raw materials„ It remains to be seen whether the producer 
has benefited more I 
4. Financial. Institutions: A public fins, lal institution, with a strong 
agricultural bias has been established, Ln order to issue production credits 
to farmers, thus ending the speculative activities of the private money 
lenders. The Bank known as the "Tanzania Rurai Development Bank (TRDB)" was 
established by Act No.7 of 1971. The Bank replaced the National Development 
Credit Agency (Msambichaka & Mabele 1979; Caselli 1975). Since its establish-
ment, the Bank tries hard to fulfill Its obligation of disbursing loans for 
agricultural development (See Table 13 and 14). Table 12 and 13 show changes 
in both the volume and distribution pattern aftei1 TRDB had started its 
activities in May 1971. Agricultural parastatals and companies (public enter-
prices), which receive credit from TPDB are usually those, which are connected 
with rural transport, ranching and dairy farm development, 
In addition to TRDB, there is the Tanzania Investment Bank (TIB). 
This bank mainly issues long-term loans for industrial development and also 
large scale farms. Farm credits are also received from the National Bank 
of Commerce (NBC Credit Plan 1972-1979). 
Farm Implements 0n?tJ and Other'_Farift 1 Sei^/lces/Iristitutions: This area of 
public enterprises is not yet well developed in Tanzania, despite its 
importance for increasing and intensifying agricultural production. There is 
an idea of establishing tractor centres, whose implementation is still being 
worked out. At the industrial level, there is the Ubungo Farm Implements 
(UFI), which produces simple farm equipment (maehinary). There is also the 
Tanzania. Fertilizer Company (TFC). Cn the supply of farm machinery there is 
also the Tanzania Fertilizer Company (TFC), On the supply of farm machinery 
there is the Agricultural and Industrial Supplies Company (AISCO). There 
is still much to be done In connection with the establishment of centres, 
which look at the problem of plant projection chemicals, irrigation, and 
of agricultural transport. 
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Table 12. TRDB Loan Disbursement as Compared to Previous Financial Activities 
Type of Borrowers & Amount in % 
Year 
Total Loan 
(mil. Sh.) 
Coopera-
tives 
U j amaa 
Villages DDCs 
Agric. 
Paras,/Cos. 
Associa-
tions 
Partn-
ers 
Indivi-
duals 
1966/67 35.30 95.47 - - 0.85 0,85 - 2.83 
1967/68 14. 80 89.19 - - - 4.05 - 6.76 
1968/69 23.20 81. 90 - - 6.03 - - 12.07 
1969/70 27.20 76.47 - - 1.47 - - 22.06 
1970/71 62.90 93. 64 - 0.79 0.00 0,16 - 5.61 
1971/72 35.80 65. 64 13.68 4.47 6.42 2.24 0.84 6.71 
1972/73 107.60 58,18 18.96 4,18 6.69 11.99 - 6.41 
1973/74 160.70 37. 34 20.04 16.80 14.00 11.70 - 0.12 
1974/75 203,20 24.70 40.55 6,50 17.67 10.48 - 0.10 
1975/76 100.00 22.19 19,80 8,66 42.09 72.26 - -
1976/77 77. 30 16.95 43.08 5. 30 25.23 9.44 - -
1977/78 246.90 - 41.64 0.24 28. 51 29,12 0.08 0.41 
1978/79 185.90 0. 32 59,66 1. 83 17.43 17,05 0.59 3.12 . 
Source: Anonym: Rural Credit in Tanzania; Tanzania Annex 1 (No year). 
Table 13. TRDB Disbursement of Loans by Type as Compared to Previous Performance 
(Shs, million) 
Year Total Agric. Farm Rural Storage Crop Live- Fisheries Small scale Loan Inputs Mach. Trans. Dev. stock Industries 
1966/67 35.30 19. 90 8. 80 0.10 2.00 1. 90 0.10 - 2.50 
1967/68 14.80 11.00 1,10 0.00 - 0. 50 - - 2.20 
1968/69 23. 30 15, 20 0. 90 0. 57 2,10 3. 81 - - 0.70 
1969/70 27.20 23.0 0.90 - 0.20 2.04 0.20 - 0.90 
1970/71 63.20 33.70 1.60 16.50 3.20 1.30 1.00 - 5.70 
1971/72 35. 90 21.00 1,00 6.50. 5.30 1.00 0. 50 - 0. 50 
1972/73 107.80 62.0 2.0 8.50 1.90 24. 50 7,80 0, 90 0.10 
1973/74 160.00 85,90 1. 30 30.40 0. 50 12. 80 25.80 1. 30 2.70 
1974/75 203.20 141.80 4.10 15.70 0.20 0.10 37.60 1.10 2.60 
1975/76 100.50 38.10 1.00 1.10 1.40 - 57.70 - 0. 90 
1976/77 77.10 52,90 0. 30 5.20 0.70 0. 30 14.70 0.60 2.40 
1977/78 247,10 170.70 1.50 4.60 0.20 - 58.10 10.30 1. 70 
1978/79 185.80 125.90 7.30 6.50 2.20 4.60 14.50 13.50 11.30 
Source: Annonym: Rural Credit in Tanzania... op. cit. Annex 2. 
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4. Development Trend and Contribution of State Farms to the Tanzania Economy 
4.1 Development and Trend before independence 
State farm development in Tanzania basically started after promulgation 
of the Ujamaa Concept. However, large scale agricultural production existed 
even earlier. During the colonial period, production was conducted mainly for 
sisal, rubber, coffee etc. The colonial government's policy on the production 
of these crops was: 
support the establishment of plantations for the "white farmers" 
force/encourage small-holders to produce export crops on the basis of 
demand of the colonial (mother country) government. 
As a result of this policy, in 1909/11 there were 54 sisal and rubber 
plantations, with a total hectareage of 19274, Before independence that is in 
1958, about 868,863,4 ha (approx. 1.1% of the land area) were under plantations, 
which belong'to 1631 foreigners and 35 indigenous big farmers. In 1960, about 
97783 ha, were under large scale farms with an average of 585 ha. per plantation 
(Shah 1976), 
4.2 Post-Independence development and trend 
In 1962, land was declared a public property, people were allowed to 
use it, but prohibited its selling. This helped to abolish some of the dis-
criminating land laws which existed during the colonial period (Read Fimbo 1974; 
Govt, of Tanganyika, no year given). 
During the first five year plan 1964/65 - 1968/69, six livestock farms 
(Breeding, 4 cattle ranches and one sheep farm) were to be established with a 
total investment of £543,150, Kongwa and Mkata ranches are still functioning. 
Two crop farms (Oil seeds and Rice) were to be established at a cost of £310,000. 
In addition, breeding and experimental stations were to be established in the 
regions (Govt, of Tanganyika 1964), The supply, the production of oil seeds 
and to introduce to the farmer, better seeds of paddy. 
State farm development increased rapidly after the 1967 Arusha Declar-
ation and the introduction of new rural development policy which was based on 
ujamaa development. The new agricultural policy was first applied in the sisal 
plantations; where in October 1967, the government took over 60% of the shares 
in 33 plantations and nationalized 6 sisal plantations. The new ownership 
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pattern brought changes in the whole organization of the sisal industry as 
well as in the traditional markets, which severely affected the economy. 
Initially, there developed problems, because most functional managers did not 
possess the necessary experience needed for farm management and foreign trade. 
During the second and third five year plans, more state farms were 
established. In 1977 there were about 108 state farms, which were under TSA, 
NAFCO, LIDA, the Ministry of Agriculture and the University of Dar es Salaam. 
Experimental and research stations were not included in this list. The total 
area covered by the public agricultural sector was as shown on Table 14. 
Table 14. Distribution of Land Utilized within the public Sector (1977) 
Land utilized Percentage to total 
1000 ha. utilized 
Total Agricultural Public Sector 1790 
Total area of state farms 1600 89,4 
Grazing area of TLMC1 190 10.6 
1 - Tanzania Livestock Marketing Company. 
Out of 1.79 mil. ha, of arable land, only 0.89 mil. ha or 49.9% of the 
total area was used by the 108 state farms. Ranches occupied 73.2% of the 
892,579 ha. dairy farms 2.3% and 24.5% by crop farms. Sisal production covers 
88.6% of the total state farms crop area. The other remaining major crops are; 
wheat, rice and maize. With the expansion of wheat area in the Hanang - Wheat 
Complex, the total state farm annual crop area is bound to increase rapidly, 
4.3 Contribution of State Farms to Tanzania's Development 
There is a general feeling that state farms have not been doing well 
over the years. This allegation is rather too general to support, since there 
are state farms, which have production yields, which rank among the top in 
the world. However, one general observation is that, state farms play a small 
but significant role in export production. Some of the contributions, which 
have developed over the period of almost two decades of state farms development 
in Tanzania, can be summarized as follows: 
1. Utilization of large land reserves: 
A large area of potentially arable land is being used. A few examples 
will illustrate this. In the sisal industry, the total area, which was under 
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public sisal plantations increased from 104,4 thousands ha. in 1969 to 194,0 
thousands ha, in 1976. An increase of about 86% over a period of eight years. 
The Hanang - Wheat complex which covers at the moment about 10,000 ha. has 
plans to expand it to more than 40,000 ha. Mkata and Kongwa ranches, which 
are the oldest and also pioneer ranches, which had a few thousand hectares of 
grazing, now occupy each 32,375 ha; with a planned animal capacity of 14,000 
and 13,500 respectively. Since potential arable land is still available, 
there is every possibility of using the large land reserves more effectively 
through expansion of the existing state farm hectareage or the establishment 
of new ones, 
2, Better use of modern farm techniques: 
Despite the high prices of tractors (an agricultural tractor of the 
model 444 with 45 H.P, cost Shs 72,000 in 1978) most of state farms are highly 
mechanized (TFNC Table 7.1). The farm operations are mainly capital intensive. 
1 2 
Livestock farms, both NAFCO and DAFCO farms use graded and cross-breeds. 
Heifers are being imported at exhorbitant prices. Despite their capital 
intensiveness, there is an indication in certain state farms that the prescribed 
production methods and techniques are properly followed. Most revealing example 
is the Mbarali Rice State Farm, which for more than four years is ranking one 
of the top in terms of average production yields (Read also Malecela 1978). In 
1976, when Mbarali Rice State Farm started to feature prominently in terms of 
paddy production, the following comparable yields were reached (Table 15), The 
same farm is using irrigation for' the purpose of production as well as better 
seeds (HYV), which have higher yields. The most popular varieties which are used 
at the farm are as shown on Table 16,. This same farm is not doing Impressively 
in terms of production output alone, but also in terms of costs. The costs 
incurred by Mbarali state farm for inputs as compared to other farms is as shown 
on Tables 17, 18 and 19, 
Table 15: Mbarali State Farm Rice Yields as Compared to Other Average Values 
in 100 kg/ha. 
1961-1965 1976 
Mbarali State Farm 19,51 70.8 
Tanzania 13. 5 14.8 
Africa 17.2 17.4 
Developing Countries 16.2 CT> 
rH
 
Developed Countries 49.1 54,3 
World 20.4 24,3 
1 = 1965/66: Source: NAFCO, Historia fupi ya Mbarali, Mbarali 3.5. (unpublished) 
FAO: Production Year Book, 1976, Rome 1977, Vol.30, pp 92-118. 
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Table 16: Area cultivated and yields of rice in Mbarali State Farm 1976/77. 
Type Yield 
100 kg/ha 
Cultivated 
area in ha. 
IRRI - 579 88. 7 828, 6 
IRRI - 790 55.4 504. 4 
Surinam Awini 86,1 91, 7 
IRRI - 8 43.2 206. 8 
Lindi Safari 64.3 17. 0 
Taiwan 14 89,7 31. 1 
Kilombero 79.4 27, 1 
Experimental seeds 50.0 1. 0 
Average yield/type as well 
total area cultivated: 
as 69.6 1707. 7 
Table 17: Cost units as a percentage of total costs in four state farms 1976/7"/ 
State Farm 
Total 
costs 
1000 Sh, 
Seeds 
and 
Feed 
Agro-
chemi-
cal 
Fuel Machi-
nery 
Labour 
costs 
Mbarali Rice Farm 4695.2 2.5 24.1 7,0 9.5 56. 9 
Uyole Agric. Centre 1931.0 38.7 15,6 2.3 23. 3 20.01 
University Farm 5088.8 47.7 16.6 5.1 - 30.6 
Kilangala Rice Farm 1716,6 5.2 34.1 12. 9 13.7 34,1 
1 = Salaries of expatriates not included. 
Table 18: Costs of fertilizer in four state farms 1975/76 - 1976/77. 
State Farm 
Harvested area in 
1975/76 
ha. 
1976/77 
Fertilizer costs 
in Shs, 
1975/76 
per ha. 
1976/77 
Uyole Agric, Centre 583.0 643.0 961, 00 357.70 
Mbarali Rice Farm1 1606.6 1647.1 344, .80 672.10 
University Farm 38000.0 1630.0 391, .10 149.10 
Kilangali Rice Farm 291.0 286.0 343, .65 139.90 
1 = 1975 and 1976 Calendar years. 
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Table 19: Relation between farm incomes and labour costs 1976/77 
State Farm 
Farm income 
in 1000 Sh. 
Farm income 
per 100 Sh labour 
costs 
Labour costs 
per 100 Sh. 
farm income 
Uyole Agric„ Centre 3041.5 
University Farm 4918.9 
Mbarali Rice Farm (1876) 7708.5 
Kilangali Rice Farm 433.1 
7 86 
316 
289 
72 
12.73 
31.65 
34.60 
138.90 
One of theospects of interest to note in Table 17 is the high per-
centage of labour costs, as compared to other costs. The results of high 
costs of fertilizer which appear in Mbarali and Uyole reflect themselves 
in the good farm yield (Table 18). Despite good farm results in some 
State farms there are those, which are faced with economic problems. For 
instances Kilangali farm earned Shs. 77.00 for every 100.00 Shs spent for 
paying the employee. The government had to extend subsidy in order to make 
the farm continue with its production. 
Production costs of small-holders showed, that Shs. 723 and Shs 480 
were required to produce kg. 850/ha and kg 400/ha of maize and paddy res-
pectively. These results show clearly the advantages of modern farming 
technologies as compared to conventional. 
A research conducted in the livestock state farms, showed that out 
of 10 dairy farms, eight farms had an average milk production per cow and 
year of more than 1000 but less than 1500 kg. Five farms had an average 
of between 1500 and 2000 per cow per year, and one farm (Kitulo Dairy Farm) 
recorded 3965 kg per cow per year. Good results have also been recorded 
in Uyole Agricultural Centre, where milk output increased from 1115 kg 
1973/74 over 2343 kg 1975./76 to 2887 kg 1976/77. Top performance in this 
farm has recorded 5000 kg per cow per year. 
There is every hope, that state farms if well managed organized and 
supported, can contribute to the economy more than they do now. 
3. Increase of employment opportunities 
State farms are an additional source of employment to both qualified 
and non-qualified persons. The sisal plantations are the largest single 
employers because of the natuie of work which exists in the plantations. 
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It employs about 20% of the total estate labour force. In the period between 
1970 and 1976, the government sisal plantations employed between 22007 and 
20193 permanent workers respectively, a decline of about 8.2%. The number 
of employees per plantation were approximately 294 and 367 respectively. 
However the total number of workers (permanent plus season) increased by 2.3% 
i.e. from 26632 in 1970 to 27240 workers in 1976. Correspondingly, the 
employment opportunity also offers an increase of incomes to the rural popul-
ation. When the minimum wages were increased to Shs 380.00 in 1976; wages in 
the sisal plantations also increased from Shs 140.00 to Shs 315.00 (refer 
Tanzania Sisal Authority 1977). Wages for the seasonal labourers increased 
almost two-fold, from Shs 6.30 to Shs 12.10 per day. 
Other state farms employ much less people because most of the farm 
operations are mechanized. For instance in 1977, 18 NAFC0 farms with an 
average hectareage of 24889 ha employed 1820 workers. During the same year, 
the livestock state farms also employed less than 2000 workers. The low 
level of employment in the livestock farms is because of the extensive nature 
of rearing the animals (1 wage earner looks after 150 cattle). 
With the increase and expansion of state farms and the establishment 
of more agro-industrial enterprises more employment opportunities are likely 
to increase. This will help in using better, the available rural labour 
force and in the gradual absorption of the excess rural labour force into 
productive economic activities. 
4. Better opportunities to agricultural planning 
In a predominantly peasant production, agricultural planning is more 
of an estimate than actual planning itself. Since to have actual plan demands 
the knowledge of knowing the producer and the produced, and the ability to 
control and .check production. In other words it is at the moment possible, 
for instance in the 55 (1976) government sisal plantations, to put a target 
of production, control or influence both production and distribution. It is 
also possible to check and question on the set targets. The same can apply 
to the 23 NAFC0 farms (1980), 31 livestock farms (1977) and other similar 
government farms, which are under the control of various public institutions. 
It is anticipated, that state farms also give light to. some of the 
basic problems of farm management common in small-holder production. 
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5. Development of attractive farm work 
Unlike in the villages, where more than half of the work force is 
over 35 years, research findings conducted in the state farms indicate the 
opposite. Apart from the young age structure about 89% of the workers in 
eight, state farms (331 workers per farm), 1977, could read and write. At 
least every state farm had a diploma-holder or a University graduate. Kitulo 
dairy farm with 7 and Uyole Agricultural Centre with 10 topped in the list 
of having diplomas r- and University graduates in the eight state farms, 
The work in the farms (except sisal cutting which is compensated by 
a better pay and bonus) is less odious, pays relatively well and is intere-
sting. Surveys conducted in state farms in 1974/75 indicated, that every 
farms had a minimum of 3 tractors (min H.P. 50) and 3 combine harvesters. 
Capital intensive farms like Mbarali, had over 20 tractors and 18 combine 
harvesters. This makes the work particularly more interesting and attrac-
tive to the youth and as an educational impact to the neighbouring 
villages. 
6. Basic issues of concern and conclusion for further state farm develop-
ment in Tanzania 
Although the information given on state farms is incomplete because 
of difficulty in getting information, still there are basic problems, which 
researchers have identified. The response of the relevant institutions to 
the problems listed will help greatly, in making the state farms contribute 
more to the nation. Issues of immediate importance are: 
Possibilities of expanding state farms and their regional distribution 
have to be examined 
Appointment of qualified farm managers professionals, and training of 
farm personnel 
Standardized methods of farm management and planning, have to be introduced 
Efficiency and profitability (cost effectiveness) of production has to be 
increased 
More effective methods of financing state farms have to be introduced 
- State farm work-force and personnel, needs the minimum education, if higher 
productivity is to maintained. Findings indicate that most of the farms 
with better farm yields, have a high percentage of literacy e.g. Mbarali, 
Kitulo, Uyole and University farm 1976/77 
Relation between state farms and villages has to be encouraged. 
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The available large land reserves allow and encourage the increase 
of area cultivated, both in the peasantry sector, as well as the expansion 
of and establishment of more state farms. 
The increase and guarantee of agricultural production is a societal 
and economic problem of development, which confronts Tanzania. The aim of 
Tanzanian agricultural policy is to eliminate and replace the agricultural back-
wardness through modern agriculture. This modern agriculture should be 
able to produce enough for food, for industrial raw materials and for export. 
In this connection on state farm development, which will 
be well planned, organized and managed will not do less to the nation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In underdeveloped countries, where there is a phenomenal dearth 
of capital, technical know how and entrepreneurial ability, development 
corporations are expected to fill a big gap. Mobilization of domestic 
financial resources, either to supplant or to supplement external financial 
assistance where it is available, has assumed a central role in development 
planning. Development corporations, and indeed other financial institutions, 
are being increasingly utilized to channel such resources to economic 
sectors considered essential for growth and social equity, 
In Kenya, the Industrial Development Council (IDC) (a forerunner 
pf the present industrial & Commercial Development Corporation) was set up 
under Ordinance 6 3 of 1954. The IDC was designed to facilitate the industrial 
and economic development of the colony by initiating, assisting or expanding 
industrial, commercial and other undertakings in the colony. (1) When its 
activities extended into the commercial sector on a significant scale. The 
IDC changed its name to Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation 
(ICDC) in 196 7. Basically the activities of ICDC were not different from 
those of IDC: By equity participation, the extension of medium and long-term 
loans, and the establishment of its own subsidiaries, the ICDC was to encour-
age industrialization in Kenya relying on loans and grants from government 
and loans from foreign governments and institutions. 
The Development Finance Company of Kenya (DFCK) was established 
ip 1963 with 25% equity participation by the government through the ICDC. Other 
shareholders are; development corporations in Great Britain, West Germany, 
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and Holland, The activities of the DFCK have been directed at attracting 
overseas capital and entrepreneurship through its facilities for setting up 
joint ventures with foreign investors and making loans at low interest rates 
to potential and existing entrepreneurs. (2) The role of the DFCK was defined 
in the Development plan (1966-70) as follows: 
....to stimulate the flow of private investment by-
providing loans and share capital to fill marginal 
gaps in private project finance, (p.81) 
In 1973, the ICDC set up its subsidiary, the Industrial Development 
Bank (IDB). The IDB was allocated the task of supplying finance to industrial 
projects only in excess of £50,000 with the emphasis upon attracting foreign 
enterprise to Kenya.. The three parastatals have become important vehicles 
through which the government carries out her investment and industrialization 
policy. By 1978, the three parastatals had invested KShs 470 million in 
equity capital in 85 firms. The purpose-' of this paper is to evaluate the 
performance of these firms on the basis of the criteria which we shall define 
below. The paper is divided into three parts: Part I examines regulations 
and incentives affecting industrialization, and the role of state finance 
capital in industrialization. Part II outlines our method of analysis and also 
discusses the sources of data and realibility. In part III we present our 
results and make some conclusions, 
PART X 
Since 1963, emphasis has repeatedly been placed in the development 
plans upon achieving an ambitious rate of growth of industrial output, Invest-
ment incentives and regulations have been introduced to ensure rapid industria-
lization via the import-substitution strategy. The government's investment 
policy is clearly spelt out in the Development Plan 1966 - 70, (3) 
The government's policy towards investment and industrialization 
is therefore basically positive and non-restrictive, characterized 
by encouragement and support where needed, in order to secure a 
maximum rate of economic growth and the structure and location of 
industry which will benefit the country, (p. 235). 
Kenya's industrial performance over the'last fifteen years has been 
impressive. Real product grew at an annual rate of 8.9% over the period 1966-72. 
In the subsequent quinquennium, despite a severe Opec induced recession in 
1974-7 5 and its aftermath of continuing inflation* output advanced at an average 
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annual rate of 10.5% or about twice that of GDP.* The performance and the 
characteristics of the manufacturing sector can be partly attributed to the 
country's political stability, partly to the attractive investment incentives 
and finally to high levels of protection to commercial firms. 
The government chose to rely heavily upon inflows of foreign 
capital, entrepreneurship and technology to generate vigorous industrial growth. 
This was necessary because of the existence of a domestic resource gap which 
5 
constrained the achievement of target growth rates. Local enterepreneurs were 
few and technical knowledge about many lines of production was incomplete or 
non-existent. The atmosphere was therefore quite favourable to the foreign 
investor. The foreign investor has not only been willing to bring in capital 
but in rost cases has gone into a joint venture with the government. Now why 
would a foreign investor be willing to go into a joint venture? 
Theoretically, it may be possible for the foreign entrepreneur 'to 
reduce the risks and costs by sharing them with investors in the host economy. 
For example by raising the finance for the investment from the host economy's 
capital markets, he may be able to reduce the opportunity cost of the capital 
and the risk of an exchange rate fluctuation undermining the value of his 
investment through nationalisation without compensation. Entering a joint 
venture with a participant from the host economy's private or publifc sector can 
offer similar advantages. (6) The government, for its-part, has given the 
following reasons for entering joint ventures: 
(a) the creation of a local entrepreneurial class, 
(b) the generation or conservation of foreign exchange, 
(c) the provision of employment 
(d) utilization of locally available raw materials, 
(e) dispersion of industries and diversification of the 
industrial structure (7) 
It must be recognized that these growth rates reflect the growth in 
the value of production in Kenyan prices. Where these prices have risen, as a 
result of protection, to above world prices the economic value of the increases 
is accordingly overstated. There is evidence that protection-induced price rises 
have been more marked in the manufacturing sector so that intersectoral GDP 
comparison must also be treated with caution. 
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It is in this light that the role and activities of ICDC, IDB and 
DFC must be seen. To what extent have the parastatals succeded in the 
attainment of the above stated goals? What are the characteristics of the 
firms in which the parastatals participate financially? Should these firms 
operate differently from other firms in the industry? If so do they operate 
differently? 
Several studies / Vinnai (1973), Egglin (1978) / have shown that, 
in terms of attainment of developmental objectives, the performance of 
parastatals has been less than encouraging. Vinnai (8) has said of the 
DFCK, 
,...by December 1972, total investment and commitments of 
£4,595,000 had been made in 41 projects, all of them industrial 
ventures or hotels. Almost all of these investments were made 
in three groups of firms, subsidiaries of large international 
firms, joint projects of several foreign partners in cooperation 
with local groups, and local ex-colonial firms, 
Vinnai, notes further that placing the investment minimum at KShs 400,000 
while preferring limited liability companies, the DFCK effectively shuts out 
the few emerging African enterprises from its financing activities. Egglin 
(1978) however has gone further and stated that the DFCK has acted as a 
"validating agency", in the sense that foreign and local entrepreneurs have 
collaborated with it as a way of courting official favour and in the hope of 
safeguarding their position vis-a-vis the government. Time does not allow 
us to discuss each individual parastatal and indeed the subject transcends 
the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say that the ICDC.and I DP' cannot at all 
be exonerated from the foregoing, 
PART II 
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
Ideally, in comparing the performance of parastatal enterprices 
defined in this study as companies with parastatal equity and/or loan investment, 
and other firms which for the sake of comparison we shall refer to as private 
firms, it is best to use data for firms operating in thesame industry producing 
an identical or at least similar products. Unfortunately our data limits us 
to only a handful of firms in six industries. The number of observations in 
individual industries was too small to permit running statistical tests of 
significance to discern whether or not public firms perform differently from 
private firms, 
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The analytical framework we have adopted, follows closely that of 
Gershenberg and Ryan ( 1978) (9) which they used in comparing the performance 
of transnational firms with indigenous firms, In our study, five performance 
and/or operational characteristics were defined for each firm in each industry 
for which we had comparable data* The absolute size of firm is represented 
by the number of workers employed„ Profit as a percentage of value added is 
our measure of profitability, Average wages and salaries are included to 
give an indication of skill intensity, Value added per worker and non-wage 
value added per worker allows us to analyze factor intensity* This deserves 
comment, 
Due to the lack of reliable data and defects of the capitaliiabour 
ratio, Kilby (1979) (10) has suggested the use of a technique which he refers 
to as the "payment for factor services approach"„ Within this framework 
production inputs are segregated into three groups: fixed and circulating 
physical capital, human capital and raw unskilled labour, These inputs are 
measured in terms of their contribution to value added per worker. Thus non-
wage value added per employee is the payment for services of material capital 
(rent, interest, depreciation) per worker: if this figure is high it: suggests 
that a high ratio of capital inputs are being utilized per worker. If the wage 
and salary per worker component is large. It suggests that intensive use is 
being made of human capital in the form of technical skills and managerial 
inputs. If neither the wage nor the non-wage component is low-(that is total ' 
value added is low per worker) then productive inputs are primarily those of 
unskilled labour. The results of this exercise are given.in Table 1 of the 
Appendix, 
DATA SOURCE 
The data used In this paper Is from a survey carried out by the 
Central Bureau of Statistics, This was done by sending out questionnaires 
to individual firms employing at least 5 people. The information in the 
questionnaires is, of course, confidential and for this reason the names of 
the firms are withheld, Some of the data is certainly not reliable. The 
errors in data may have arisen from the intentional or unintentional provision 
of mis-information by respondents or as a result of clerical error in various 
stages of processing in the Central Bureau of Statistics, 
We also went through the Industrial Protection Committee files to 
see the concessions the firms received from the government. Finally, we had 
a list of all exporting firms from Kenya External Trade Authority, 
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RESULTS 
Employment (11) 
The picture that emerges from Table 1 of the Appendix is that public 
firms are large in terms of numbers employed. Starting with the canned 
vegetable, fruit, fish and oils industry, we see that all parastatal client 
enterprises employed a number higher than the sectoral average. Twenty Two 
percent of the firms in this industry employed more than 100 people. These 
firms contributed 80.4% of total employment in the industry. 
In the electrical machinery industry, 100% of the parastatal firms 
employed more than 100 people. On the other hand, the private firms not only 
employed less than the sectoral average but also less than a hundred people. 
In this industry, firms employing more than 100 people made for 92,5% of 
employment. The picture is not very different in the non-electrical machinery 
industry. The only parastatal client firm was employing over 4 times the 
sectoral average, in an industry where firms employing over 100 people make 
only 1% of the total number of firms in the industry, In fact, it is likely 
that the parastatal firm is the only one that employs more than 100, Turning 
to the metal products industry, the Table shows that 36% of all the firms 
have parastatal participation. In this industry, firms employing over 
100 people, contribute 76.1% of total employment. Eighty nine percent of all 
parastatal firms in this industry employed 100 people or more. It is also 
noteworthy that firms employing more than 100 people made 15,8% of the total 
number of firms in the metal industry. 
In the paper and paper products industry we again see that 
parastatal firms are bigger than private firms. Here 21% of the firms employ 
100 people or more. These firms contribute 78.9% of total employment in the 
industry. From our sample, 100% of parastatal firms employed more than 100 
people. The picture remains the same for the texile industry. In this 
industry roughly 9 3% of total employment is attributed to the class of firms 
that employs more than 100 people. These firms made up only 38% of total 
firms in the industry. All parastatal firms belonged to this class. 
A cross-sectional analysis of all firms was carried out. It was 
clear that the proportion of firms with parastatal participation varied 
directly with the number of people employed. (see Table 1) 
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Table 1. Percentage of firms with Government Participation by Firm Size 
% of Firms 
""•'5 - 19 1 0 
20 - 99 50 10 
100 - 199 37 41 
200 - 499 28 43 
Over 500 18 61 
It is clear then that there is a clear relationship between firm size and 
the probability of government participation. It is also noteworthy that out 
of the firms that employ less than a hundred people, the parastatals parti-
cipated in only 10% of them. 
Average Wages and Salaries 
The comparative performance in all industries is undeterminate. For 
example, in the canned vegetable, fish and oils industry, a parastatal 
client firm is below the sectoral average and the other is above the sectoral 
average while one is jlust below. The picture is more or less the same in all 
the other industries. 'In three industries, a parastatal firm had the highest 
average wage while in two. industries a parastatal firm had the lowest average 
wage ratio. 
Factor Intensity 
Looking at the canned vegetable, fish and oils industry, we see that 
one of the parastatal firms has the highest value for both non-wage and total 
value added per worker. The other parastatal firm has values lower than the 
sector averages in both cases, Turning to the private firms, all of them have 
lower than sector average values for non-wage value added per worker. It 
seems then, on the whole parastatal firms are more capital intensive than 
other firms. 
The picture is clearer in the electrical machinery industry where 
we see that all parastatal firms have values for value added and non-wage value 
added per worker higher than the sector average, In the non-electrical machinery 
industry it is clear that the parastatal firm is far more capital intensive 
than the private firm. 
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In the metal products industry the picture is not so clear. Two of 
the parastatal firms had jjrhe lowest averages in both the value added per worker 
and non-wage value added per worker, Two of the private firms, on the other 
hand, had the highest values. In between the two extremes parastatal firms 
and private firms seen to be more or less evenly scattered. 
In the paper and paper products industry as well as the textile 
industry the parastatal firms seen to be more capital intensive than the other 
firms, In both industries the public firms have the highest averages in both 
value added per worker and non-wage value added per worker. 
Protection 
Table II shows the percentage of parastatal firms that are protected 
by quotas, bans and No Objection Certificates (NOCs), Bans and NOCs represe-
nted the must powerful protective devices in that they protect the firm 
from all foreign competition, regardless of prices. 
Table II. Parastatal Firms & Protection, Public Firms 
Protection No. of Firms as % of No. of firms 
quota 35 17 
ban 84 17 
Noc 23 39 
Source: Industrial Protection Committee files. 
From the table it is not clear whether parastatal firms are more protected than 
private firms, However, it is noteworthy that of the parastatal firms that 
received protection, 49% of them had the authority to issue NOCs. 
The evidence from our study does not show whether parastatal firms 
were any more profitable than private firms. Bowever, none of the parastatal 
firms indicated making a loss. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Lack of adequate data has made it impossible to run statistical tests 
of significance. Any conclusions from the study, therefore, can only be. 
impressionistic. In discussing, the performance of parastatal client firms 
vis-a-vis private firms and how the parastatal-client firm-government relation-
ship"' affects that performance, the results of our study must be implemented 
with the experience and. information we received through interviews with 
parastatal and government officials, 
This study suggests that the parastatal investment companies have 
done little or nothing to push the manufacturing sector in the directions 
specified by the policy statements of government. Rather, they appear to 
have aided and abetted some of the least appropriate features of the Kenyan 
industrial structure. The parastatal client firms tend to be.large, capital 
intensive, import intensive and almost exclusively oriented toward a protected, 
over priced local market. The parastatals have concerned themselves almost 
exclusively with the financial well-being of their client firms. 
Elsewhere in the paper, we have stated that there is a strong policy 
pressure for local participation in foreign-owned manufacturing firms in Kenya, 
the concern being the development of indigenous entrepreneurship and business 
skill as well as for local control. For large number of foreign firms, local 
parastatal finance is a painless and antiseptic way of responding to such 
pressure. By making available relatively large sums as both equity and loan 
finance, by a record of minimal interference in the working of the firm, and 
i • 1 • ' 
by substantially reducing.the firm's risk by providing vital contacts and a 
powerful ally in the firm's negotiations with Government, parastatal firms 
make attractive investment partners, This is especially so in the tropical 
import substituting lines of production where the firm's profitability is 
dependent on concessions and interventions from Government, Whether this 
participation increases indigenous entrepreneurship, business skill or even 
management control is a separate question, 
A recent survey of U.S. firms in Kenya, part of an annual series by 
U.S. Embassy staff, included return from 16 manufacturing firms, Three 
quarters of these indicated local financial participation, almost entirely 
from Kenya parastatals. All but one of these firms produce entirely for the 
Kenyan and, to a far lesser extent, the regional market. Virtually all of them 
operate behind protectiop from competing imports in -the form of tariff 
barriers, quantitative restrictions (generally a complete Bam on competing 
imports) or both. Eighty percent of the inputs of this sample of firms are 
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imported and this figure would be higher but for the food processing, 
mining and ranching firms. In general the expansion plans of these firms 
are limited, the main reason being the limited local market and a complete 
lack of concern, for exports. 
We would like to point out that this series of characteristics 
has nothing to do with nationality; it is typical of the sector's import 
substitution bias, its heavy dependence on imports and its slow growth. These 
characteristics are a consequence of the range of trade and exchange rate 
policies affecting manufacturing firms and it would be unrealistic to hope 
that they could be changed by investment policies and agencies are an integral 
part of a policy regime that allows very considerable profits to firms where 
economic contribution may be low or even negative. Firms, in these circum-
stances, are quick to perceive their optimal strategy as involving Government 
financially as much as possible and then using that involvement to extract 
further concessions which then have the appearance of being in the Government's 
interest. When Government or a parastatal has substential holdings in a 
commercial firms it is not easy for government officials to differentiate 
between the interests of that firm on the one hand, in seeking rents and 
transfers to itself, and the interests of the economy on the other where such 
rents and transfers may not represent real economic benefits, 
Financial participation by government ( or parastatal) has in Kenya, 
become the best guarantee obtainable that a firm will make high and secure 
financial profits regardless of its economic efficiency or its international 
competitiveness, It is the key element for entry into what has been called 
the "corporate aristocracy" in Kenya, Membership of this aristocracy virtually 
ensures that the firm involved will be on the right side of the discriminatory 
series of measures that government uses to promote manufacturing activity. 
These discriminatory measures tend to promote monopoly power in 
the favoured firms and to result in a rise of domestic prices ( or, equiva-
lently, a decline in the quality of domestic products), The measures tend, 
therefore to discriminate against the relatively poor and powerless individuals 
and sectors in the domestic economy. Since price increases can, however 
unevenly, be passed on by everyone except the exporter the discriminations 
are finally against exports. Their effects run counter, therefore, to the 
objective of improved income distribution or the objective of self-sustaining 
industrial growth. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 1: 
INDUSTRIES & FIRMS 
No. of Profit as 
% of 
Workers Value Added 
Annual Value-Added 
Wages & per Worker 
Salaries 
PER Worker 
('000 KShs)('OOOKShs) 
Non-Wage 
Value 
Added 
per Worker 
CANNED VEGETABLE, 
FISH,OILS & FATS 
Joint Venture 
Joint Venture 
Private Firm 
Private Firm 
Private Firm 
Sector Averages 
110 
184 
1102 
166 
63 
107 
11.1 
65.4 
8,0 
11.9 
Loss 
16,8 
5,19 
6,13 
16,4 
9,78 
6.7 
30 
15,8 
12,7 
23.3 
17.4 
18,2 
13,2 
10.6 
6,54 
6.96 
7,65 
11.5 
ELECTRICAL MACHINERY 
Joint Venture 289 
Joint Venture 147 
Private Firm 24 
Private Firm 35 
Sector Average 242 
37,8 
76,4 
83,2 
16,1 
10,7 
7,38 
14.1 
10,9 
32.1 
70.2 
46,2 
19,2 
18.0 
15.9 
59. 5 
38,8 
5.01 
7.1 
NON-ELECTRICAL. MACHINERY 
Joint Venture 102 74,1 
Private Firm 39 12.4 
Private Firm 56 44.1 
Sector Average 23 
22,08 
26,4 
17,8 
8,4 
137,5 
35.1 
34,8 
14.2 
115 
8,71 
17.3 
5,7 
METAL PRODUCTS 
Joint Venture 160 8.02 10,0 1,96 
Joint Venture 143 45.5 1.0 11,0 6.91 
Joint Venture 588 58,9 16,2 46,6 30,44 
Joint Ventures 137 23,9 15,3 34,1 18,9 
Joint Venture 184 47,2 16,0 43,9 27,9 
Joint Venture 235 143,1 16,3 17.8 1.5 
'Joint Venture 53 29,1 18,2 34.2 16.0 
Joint Venture 485 54,1 2,24 13,8 11.5 
Private Firm 84 3,0 8,6 11.0 2,45 
Private Firm 218 21.7 12,4 19,2 6.84 
Private Firm 23 40,5 8,1 18,9 10,8 
Private Firm 228 Loss 14,7 186.2 171.5 
Private Firm 127 73,0 6,5 40,1 33.8 11 45 99,7 1,0 105,1 104,2 II 56 22.5 9.0 14.1 5,1 II 159 88,7 25,3 224.3 199 
72 2,0 9,3 15.0 5.6 II 69 8,5 9,1 14,1 4,94 II 223 50.7 17,6 50.0 32,3 II 363 28.7 6,8 15.1 6,32 
213 60,4 23.1 85.1 61,9 
Joint Ventures 289 53,6 18,5 46.07 27,6 
Private Firm 46 54,6 24,5 117,7 93,2 ii 290 29,6 19 .'8 34.9 15,1 ii 57 22.8 9.8 19,7 9.86 it 53 14,2 26.8 31.9 5,05 
Sector Average 52 8,6 16.5 7.9 
No. of 
INDUSTRIES & FIRMS 
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Value Added Non-Wage 
per Worker Value 
Added 
('000 KShs) 
PAPER AND PRODUCTS 
Joint Venture 1,411 33.7 16.4 80.5 64.1 
" 178 - 6.1 10.0 3.5 
" 263 68,3 6.9 42.9 35.9 
Private Firm 77 4.8 5.6 7.36 1.74 
" 111 68.6 9.7 38,7 29.0 
" 75 Loss 11,6 12,3 0,71 
" 161 34,2 18.3 32,1 13.8 
" 478 10,7 29,0 40,4 11,48 
Sector Average 75 10.6 18.2 7.7 
TEXTILES 
Joint Venture 232 14.0 8.9 98,2 89.2 
n 
it 
ti 
422 9.1 
694 11,4 6.9 13.9 6,50 
796 8.8 8.5 13.8 5,24 
" 685 43,1 9.4 16,5 7.11 
Private Firm 53 19,5 12,5 18,4 5.88 
Private Firm 160 57,0 7,4 19.7 12,3 
" 503 Loss ,91 19,4 18,5 
" 174 13.4 5.61 7.9 2.26 
» 162 45,2 6,0 11,0 4.95 
" 467 10.2 58.6 9.6 3,7 
" 92 33,6 25.3 45,5 8.48 
" 232 20.6 8.9 16,3 7,35 
Sector Average 182 4.6 9,3 4,8 
SOURCE: CENTRAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS 
CONFIDENTIAL DATA. 
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PUBLIC ENTERPRISE AND FOREIGN CAPITAL IN KENYA: 
THE POLICY ENVIRONMENT. 
By 
David Wainaina Gachuki 
Like in many other countries, public enterprise in Kenya is 
expected to play a major role in the economic development of the country. 
Public institutions have been set up in every conceivable economic field, 
for example manufacturing tourism, commerce, agriculture etc. The 
history of public enterprise in Kenya goes back to the colonial days 
when public institutions were set up to facilitate the development of the economy 
to suit the political ideals of the time. The function of public enterprise 
are, to a large extent dependant on the state. Its no wonder or contradiction 
then, that public enterprise is to be found in all nations of the world 
irrespective of their political and ideological foundations. However, the 
objectives for which they are set up are of marked difference depending on 
each states political philosophy. At times, the difference is more rhetoric 
than real. In some cases, the rhetoric is a design to cover up the reality 
and the difference with reality is thus pure hipocrisy while in other 
cases the difference is accounted for by failure to achieve the objectives 
set in the political rhetoric. Such failure may and usually does result 
from a combination of both internal and external factors. The organisation, 
operation and control of any public enterprise will be heavily influenced by 
the political atmosphere prevailing in any country. It is for this reason 
that we feel it is necessary to briefly set out Kenya's economic policy against 
which public enterprise should be evaluated. . 
It is axiomatic that public enterprise is contrasted to private 
enterprise. The latter is, in Kenya divided into two: local and foreign. 
Public enterprise in Kenya has been involved in economic areas largely 
dominated by private foreign enterprise. To a certain degree then, public 
enterprise in Kenya so far may be contrasted to private foreign enterprise 
operating in the country since there was little local private capital to 
be taken over by public enterprise. 
- 199 - IDS/OP 39 
Historically, Kenya has always had a soft point for private 
capital and did not change with Independence. Prior to independence, the 
basic assumption of development policy was that, apart from modernisation of 
agriculture, the only pattern of economic expansion was through the 
infusion of foreign capital and skills for the creation of industrial and 
commercial sectors of the economy. This assumption has been continued 
albeit, it is now mainly limited to industrial strategy. Owing to fear 
by private foreign investors of a radical change In economic policy after 
independence, Kenya experienced a great deal of capital outflow. However, 
the expected changes in Kenya's policy towards private foreign investment 
did not come about. In fact, Kenya's reliance on private foreign investment 
increased and she became a staunch supporter of the same. Private foreign 
investors were encouraged and accorded extremely favourable treatment. 
The 1974-78 Development Plan states that: 
"The government is committed to a mixed economy of 
private and government enterprises in the manufacturing 
sector, however, heavy reliance will be placed on 
private enterprise, including investment from abroad. 
Foreign enterprise will be welcome and will be assured 
the possibility of adequate repatriation of profits."1 
2 This assurance has been reiterated in the latest Development Plan. Indeed, 
only recently the nation was told that it could not be independent without 
3 
foreign investment. The protection of private property local or foreign, 
is enshrined in the country's constitution. Kenya's position on foreign 
investment is founded on her wider commitment to the institution of private 
enterprise. As long as Kenya keeps its present economic philosophy, the 
danger of nationalization will remain slim. 
After independence, the global targets established for increased 
investment in industry were left to be implemented primarily by private 
enterprise, fostered by a government policy "characterized by encouragement 
and support where needed, In order to secure a maximum rate of economic 
growth and the structure and location of industry which will benefit the 
5 country most". Under this policy, 86% of investment in manufacturing was 
1. Development Plan 1974-8 p.279 
2. See Development Plan 179-83 p.332 
3. See Daily Nation 17/10/80 p.l' 
4. See for example s.70 
5. Development Plan 1966 - 70 pp.235-6. 
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was expected to come from the private sector. Thus public ownership 
was ruled out of independent government policy right from the beginning. 
The g o v e r n m e n t argued and still largely argues that state ownership is 
not necessary to ensure that industry operated in the national interest 
and that increased state ownership might, to the contrary, have a 
detrimental effect on industrial development by (1) discouraging overseas 
private investment and government aid (2) by syphoning off public funds 
into compensation payments to investors whose investments are expropriated; 
and?(3) by blunting the edge of the incentives for aspiring local capitalist 
entrepreneurs. Having weighed the pros and cons of nationalization, the Prime 
Ministeraannounced to a group of Nairobi businessmen in 1964- that the 
government considered "that nationalization will not serve to advance the cause g 
of African Socialism". The government has changed once since then, but not 
the policy on nationalization. Indeed if anything, anti-nationalization 
sentiments have increased with the development of an entrenched and privi-
leged local political and economic elite class that has found its interests 
in the development of intensive foreign investment the spillover from which 
they, being the privileged few, find the source of lucrative jobs and 
partnerships. It is amongst these that one finds incredible ostentation and 
extravaganza in living with an almost insatiable propensity to consume more 
and more of the luxury products from the western world. These are the main 
allies of foreign investors. As very junior partners of international 
capital, they render their unqualified support to it and as long as they 
hold the reigns of power nationalization is likely to remain just another 
vocabularly in the dictionary. 
The blueprint of independent Kenya's economic development policy 
was embodied in a government white paper on African Socialism and its 
7 
Application to Planning in Kenya. In this document it is stated that if 
public control is necessary and if other less costly controls are ineffective 
nationalization must be undertaken regardless of the cost. It went on to 
5. Development Plan 1966 - 70 pp. 235-6 
6. A. Saidmann "Comparative Industrial strategies in East Africa p. 91 
7. Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965 
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state the circumstances under which nationalization might take place despite 
the stated basic policy of non-nationalization. These are: 
i. "when the assets in private hands threaten the security or 
undermine the integrity of the nation; or 
ii. when productive resources are being wasted; or 
iii. when the operation of an industry by private concerns has 
a serious detrimental effect on the public interest; and 
iv. when other less costly means of control are not available 
or are not effective." 
This policy has to the best of my knowledge, not changed to date. 
The same policy in relation to nationalization has been applied to 
joint ventures. Public equity participation in projects in Kenya has not 
been specially utilized as an instrument for the development of the public 
sector. Such participation, resulting in parastatal organizations, is geared 
towards bringing about a broader base of local private control and ownership. 
As the economic blueprint stated, joint ventures are to be supported in 
four principal cases. These are: 
i. "Where a project is profitable but risky and, therefore, 
private capital is not prepared to undertake the risk. In 
this case, government participation is to be used as a means 
of minimizing the risks involved; 
ii, where a project may be only marginally profitable 
inself but may give rise to social benefits, such as 
employment or foreign exchange earnings that may make it 
desirable from a national point of view; 
iii. where the project may require more capital than 
can be found by private domestic investors; and 
iv. where public financial participation is required to 
establish public control over enterprises in which a strong 
public interest exist or to promote Kenyanizations," 
In the past, joint ventures have been utilized primarily to bring in foreign 
capital. The philosophy that capital per se is the key to industrial develop-
ment is now changing to a more realistic one. So, the government has 
finally adopted the view that foreign participation in joint ventures 
on an equity basis is only useful if the foreign investor also brings in skills, 
know-how, patent or patent rights, marketing organization or other benefits 
required by Kenya. Thus the 1974-78 Development Plan states that the joint 
ventures in which the government has participated with foreign investors will 
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be continued, but adds that: 
"The inflow of capital is not generally the most important 
benefit to be achieved from such ventures. More valuable 
are technology, skills and techniques, which will enable 
Kenyan to staff and manage complex production processes, 
as well as Experience and knowledge in the design and 
marketing of exports. 
This, it is submitted, is a policy consideration that should be strictly 
adhered to, but which has not been so far. If only capital were necessary, 
the government would do well by borrowing the required capital abroad 
which will leave a lot more control in its hands to shape the operational 
policies of a project in accordance with overall national development policy. 
The provision of equity by foreign investors should be seen as beneficial 
not so much for financial reasons, but rather as a means of tying the 
foreigner to the project in order to offer him stronger incentives to make 
it a success. There has not yet been any fixed policy on majority local 
shareholding in joint ventures. 
The government has employed three agencies to promote industrial 
development; the Industrial and Development Corporation (ICDC), the Development 
Finance Company of Kenya (DFCK) and the Industrial Development Bank (IDB). 
It is these three agencies that act as government instruments for engaging 
in joint ventures or partial nationalization. 
The policy behind these actions has been the desire to introduce 
public involvement in strategic industries. The reasons behind this desire 
are not clear, particularly in view of the fact that even the new partnerships 
are to operate on "sound commercial principles," It is doubtful whether 
government participation gives it much more control to enable it to operate 
the business in any other way but as profit making operations. In the case 
of the banks, where local elites quickly took control of high management 
positions, there has been a significant shift in credit policy in favour 
of African borrowers. The African borrowers had been discriminated by the banks 
in their lending policy during the colonial days and in the early years after 
independence. It is submitted that the shift in the banks' lending policies 
was inevitable with or without government participation., It is not feasible 
that the banks could have possibly ignored the local elites' demands for 
8. Development Plan 1974-8p. 284 
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credits that would enable them to enjoy their privileged economic positions 
in the country. These elites control the political reigns of the state 
and the cry for outright nationalization of the banks may have been their 
immediate reaction. Nevertheless, the participation did accelerate the 
rate in change of policy. Government participation in economic activities 
is to re-inforce the private - enterprise system rather than diminishing 
its presence. The private - enterprise system in Kenya is overwhelmingly 
foreign owned, particularly in the manufacturing sector, and as Professor 
Leys puts it, this mild government participation only "represented a new 
dimension in the evolution of periphery capitalism, not a departure from 
Indeed, public enterprise in Kenya was initially conceived not to 
take control of the economy, but, inter alia, to help in the Africanisation 
policy. The government's Africanization policy can be classified into two 
categories. The first is the Africanization of equity ownership and second, 
that of managerial positions in firms. In theory, the policy is not one of 
Africanization, but of Kenyanization, However, in practice, it is the Africans 
that need the upgrading economically and that is where the government has 
concentrated its efforts. As one notable politician put it, "the predominance 
of non-Kenyans in the ownership, management and control of private enterprise 
is one of the most glaring defects of the private sector in Kenya. No 
country can accept the continuance of this kind," The solution to this 
'glaring: defect' was Kenyanization, which must of necessity lay considerable 
emphasis on Africanization for "to turn a blind eye to the racial imbalance 
in the economy would be tantamount to inviting racial disharmony and conflicts 
12 m the future". 
Initially, official Africanization policy laid emphasis on inducing 
large foreign companies that were operated as private companies to "go 
public", and thus enable Kenyans to buy shares in such firms. This policy 
was reinforced by the commercial and industrial licensing system. For 
instance, the Transport Licensing Board has threatened not to approve the 
9. Colin Leys, Underdevelopment in Kenya: The Political Economy of 
Neo-Colonialism University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 
•"1971+. p. 135 
12. T.J. Mboya, the Role of The Private Sector in Kenyan National 
Development in Private Enterprise And The East African Company Ed, P.A, Thomas, 
T.P.H, Dar-es-Salaam, 1969, p,203 
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annual renewal of licences unless more than 50% of a company's equity was 
sold to the public. East African Road Services, the largest bus company, 
complied with this condition by issuing 25% of its shares to the public in 
13 
1.969 and a further 32,5% in 1971. Other companies decided to do the same 
and owing to an existing state of liquidity in the country, the issues were 
heavily oversubscribed. The immediate effects of this policy of encouraging 
companies to "go public' were two-fold; one, it enabled foreign companies 
to disinvest by selling old shares and repatriating the proceeds and, two, it 
did enlarge Asians' shareholding, rather than African's since the former had the 
savings to buy the shares, something which the Africans did not have. 
These effects were illustrated most clearly in the case of East 
African Packaging Industries, a subsidiary of Canadian Overseas Packaging 
14 
Industries. The company offered K.£200,000 worth of shares to the public 
in April 1971. The previously issued capital in the prospectus was K.£.100,000 «_ 
down to March 1971, on which dividend had been paid to the parent company at 
the rate of 25% 25%, 100%. 198,5% and 100% in the years 1966-70, respectively, 
i.e. just under K.£.450,000 in all. On March,23,1971 the issued share 
capital was increased to K,£,600,000 by giving the parent company a bonus 
issue of five new shares for each existing one, paid for out of accumulated 
profits and from the capital reserve 'arising from the valuation of the company's 
properties'. On March 24, 1971 a special 50% dividend was declared payable 
to the 'shareholders on the register at that date' „ The parent company thus 
received a further K,£t3000,000 and stood in line to receive three-quarters of 
all subsequent dividends when the share issue of K.£,200,000 worth of new 
shares had been issued. The new shares were issued as K,£,430,000 of new 
capital, The dividend yield on the new shares at the issue price would, the 
director thought, be no less than 8.6%, i.e. about 18% to the parent company 
which had got its K,£,600,000 worth of shares at par! At this point the 
company was informed by the Ministry of Finance that its shares issue "did 
not have government support". However, the transaction was absolutely legal 
under Kenyan law and the issue was eventually allowed to go ahead. 
13„ Colin Leys, Op cit. at p.128 
14, Ibid, at p. 120-30 from where this account is taken. 
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The negative effects of the move to go public as illustrated by 
the above account were obvious even to the government which set up a Capital 
Issues Committee which has to supervise all capital issues and capitalization 
of reserves in companies having a substantial foreign interest. The impact 
of the public's share purchase and that by the government in foreign owned 
enterprise was clearly shown in the 1970-71 balance-of-payment account: 
K,£.7 million flowed out, reducing net private foreign investment from over 
K.f.ll million in 1970 to K.J.5 million in 1971, The government fell back 
on its 1965 policy statement which had stated that the government's efforts 
would be directed "towards establishing Africans in a firm position in the 
monetary sector by ensuring that a large share of planned new expansion is 
15 African owned and managed", 
Since the Africans had little or no capital to buy into the new 
planned expansion, government aid was required. The main instruments for 
executing this policy were the Industrial and Commercial Development 
Corporation (ICDC) and the Development Finance Company of Kenya. These two 
are public bodies to facilitate public participation in economic activities. 
The ICDC represents the single most important statutory body in the government's 
efforts to Africanize the commercial and industrial sector in the country. 
It participates in joint ventures with foreign investors by subscribing for 
and holding shares with the aim of transferring them to Africans whenever they 
have the necessary capital to acquire them and also by provision of loan 
capital. The loans, investments and any kind of participation by these 
institutions are directed towards the African ownership of business rather 
than towards public control of the means of production. Thus the dominant 
theme of public enterprise in Kenya is Africanization, ICDC stated in its 
1970-71 Annual Report that: 
"... the ICDC relentlessly pursued its promotional role as an 
effective mechanism for the implementation of the policy of 
Africanization in trade and industry in furtherance of government 
policy,"16 
This it did while still pursuing its open door policy aimed at encouraging 
the investment of foreign capital in the development of the resources of the 
country. Accordingly ICDC has established a subsidiary, the ICDC Investment 
Company, to enable citizens to have a stake in ownership of existing profitable 
15. Sessional Paper No.10 of 1965 p,26„ 
16. P. Nowrojee, "Public Enterprise And Co-operatives in Kenya and 
Tanzania." (1972) E.A.L.R. P, 144 
- 206 - IDS/OP 39 
companies thereby increasing the degree of local ownership in such 
enterprises. It is significant to note here that the effect of such a 
policy is not African participation in domestic enterprise, but their 
participation in foreign enterprise. Incidentally, the public shareholding 
of the ICDC Investment Company has been described as "a roll-call of the 
Kikuyu middleclass", These happen to hold the political and economic power 
in the country. This belies a former minister's rationalisation of the 
policy of "going public", that "the public company is regarded in Kenya as 
a particularly desirable form of private ownership because it does ; • "I 
17 
permit a widespread distribution of ownership". This distribution was 
only among the elites who constitute less than 1% of the population. 
In addition to such financial institutions providing capital 
to local elites, the government has used other public and statutory 
corporations as conduits for government assistance in the establishment of 
Africanized domestic private enterprise. Examples are, the National 
Construction Corporation which was originally set up as a company under the 
Companies Act and changed into a statutory corporation in 1972. Its 
functions were outlined by the Assistant Minister for Works in the National 
Assembly as being; 
"To help African contractors to take up more challenging 
contracts being undertaken currently by foreign companies, 
African contractors had been under pressure because of 
insufficient funds to keep them at par with competitive 
contractors from overseas. The government was anxious to 
see that Africans fully participated in the construction 
and contracting industry."18 
what this means in practice is that the construction contracts of the 
Ministry of Works will be given to the Corporation unless the contract 
demands more technology or facilities in general than the Corporation can 
muster, In this sense, the business has been Africanized via the medium 
of a statutory corporation. Like the case of the insurance business, no 
assets have been taken over. The other public corporation is the Kenya 
National Trading Corporation ( 'KNTC). This is a wholly owned subsidiary 
of the ICDC set up under the companies Act and falls under the supervision 
17. Mboya op.cit.at p.200 
18, Nowrojee,op. cit,at p.145 
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of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, its functions include promotion 
of citizen participation in wholesale and retail distribution in the import 
trade. The government has sought to break non-citizen, non-African control 
of the wholesale business by granting exclusive import licences to KNTC. The 
corporation then appoints its own agents, who, needless to say, are mainly 
Africans. In this manner, the KNTC acts as a channel by which government 
controls not the commodity and its supply, but the Africanization of distribu-
tion outlets and the import and wholesale business. 
The government's nationalization policy in Kenya might as well have 
been formulated by the foreign investors. The circumstances under which 
nationalization may be undertaken are narrowly circumscribed, Given the 
government's willingness to even over-compensate, its ability to nationalize 
any significant sector of the economy is strictly constrained by the nation's 
lack of finances to meet these costs. In its attempts to purchase stakes 
in foreign owned enterprises the government is reluctant to .change the invest-
ment pattern of the foreign investors, preferring, instead, to let them choose 
their field. Such participation by the government in foreign enterprise is, 
contrary to a common general misconception, viewed by many investors as the 
best insurance policy against political risks and industrial disputes. 
The government stake in an enterprise gives it a vested interest in the success 
of the enterprise. Commenting on the Zambian nationalization of the copper 
industry in 1969, the Economist wrote: 
"The shrewdest businessmen in that part of the world (Africa) 
have argued for some time that 40% stake in a business 
whose success is underwritten by government participation may 
be more valuable than 100% of a concern exposed to all the 
winds that blow. Companies that have anticipated the direction 
of events and invited the government partnership have no 
reason to regret Zambian investment." 
Government finance in Kenya is a concession firms often seek in 
their entry negotiations wfoich the government. This is basically the beginning 
of government participation. From the foreign investor's point of view such 
participation lessens the capital commitment the investor must make. It 
institutionalizes special access for an enterprise to ease problems such as 
obtaining work permits, exemption from local borrowing restrictions etc, 
19. The Economist August, 23, 1969 p,56 
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Other firms view government participation as a guarantee that they will receive 
the other concessions promised on enttry such as tariff protection, import 
restriction, exemption from duty on imported inputs, etc. This is so because 
the government will have a financial interest in the success of the firm. 
One subsidiary of a foreign company was noted as having insisted on a 
government loan for a new factory; 
"to ensure that we get absolute protection, because the day 
that we see anything else coming in, we are ready to hammer 
on the government's door and say "look, it's your loan, you 
have got to protect it!"20 
Used in this manner, government participation means that the investors hold it 
as a hostage against the government to extract concessions to certain privi-
leges, 
State shareholding in foreign enterprises, is thus a valuable channel 
to foreign investment economic benefit rather than unwarranted government 
interference. This is particularly profitable in view of the fact that foreign 
investors have the ability to repatriate surplus from subsidiaries through 
channels other than dividends (such as transfer pricing and service payments). 
Without engaging in a detailed discussion of the pros and cons of 
nationalization, I would like to give two examples of business that should be 
nationally run. These are the banking and insurance business. There are 
three reasons for making this recommendation. First, is that these businesses 
are entirely dependent on the domestic market and therefore there would be 
little change in the market pattern. One of the main objections to nationa-
lization is that it scares away foreign investors. In banking and insurance, 
there would be no loss if, foreign bankers or insurers stayed away. Virtually 
the same amount of business will be available to nationally run banks and 
insurance companies. This is an area where the investors marketing experience 
or facilities outside Kenya, have little effect on the volume of business. 
Second, is that these two areas require very little advanced technology which 
is an industrial secret available to foreign investors only. There is little 
patented technology or trademarks in banking and insurance. The main constraint 
to nationalizing any industry is lack of relevant manpower. It has been 
successfully shown by Tanzania's experience in nationalizing the banking and 
insurance business that foreign participation is not essential. Also the 
government owned National Bank of Kenya is ample proof that the nation is capable 
( 20° Steven Langdom, "Multinational. Corporations in ^he Political Economy 
of Kenya", Ph,D, Thesis, University of Sussex p, 134 
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of running its own banks and insurance companies. Finally, and most important 
is the fact that these two business institutions are extremely well placed 
for mobilizing the nation's savings for investment in productive areas. 
Banking and insurance are not productive industries, they are rather service 
industries used to channel the nation's investible surplus to other business 
operations. Control of such an important channel of investment financing 
will give the state a substantial weapon to channel the nation's surplus to 
well planned (hopefully!) investment in areas designed to bring about economic 
development as opposed to mere economic growth. Indeed ownership of these 
institutions is controlled in what are apparently the leading champions of 
free enterprise in the world which includes such countries as the U.S.A. and 
Canada. As it has been pointed out by a Working Party in a study of the 
pattern of industrial control in Kenya.21 "In the last resort control of 
commerce and industry is exercised through control of finance". With this, 
I respectifully agree. It is high time Kenya kept control of her economic 
purse in which foreigners have, at present, a large share. Kenya has nothing 
to lose by acquiring such control and has everything to gain in the form of 
a valuable channel for mobilizing the nation's savings for investment in areas 
of long term and structural benefit to the nation's economy. 
In general, the only obstacle to nationalization is Kenya's depende-
nce on foreign technology, knowhow and capital. Opponents of nationalization 
argue that these essential elements to industrialization are available mainly 
from foreign investors who would refuse to supply these essential inputs. 
Also lack of skilled manpower is cited by opponents of nationalization. What 
if all these things were available to Kenya then what would the opponents say? 
Then they would base their opposition on philosophical and perhaps religious 
ground. It is submitted that far from being a vice, nationalization is a 
great virtue to Kenya. It enables the state to direct the then nation's 
resources to areas with long term economic benefit to the nation. It removes 
the predominance of the profit motive (in dollar terms) that pervades all 
investment by private investors that lead to underutilization of capital 
and a general misallocation of the nation's resources. For example, today, 
industrial investment by foreigners is geared towards quick return and is not 
capable of self sustenance. With the control of resources in the state's 
hands, long term development consideration take precedence over the quick 
returns investment criterion. Also the returns from such investments can be 
21. Who Controls Industry In Kenya? N.C.C.K. Working Party Report, 
EPH, Nairobi, 1968P. 218. 
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better distributed under state control than under private enterprise. 
I must here caution that the nationalization I have in mind is 
not the same as that described in this paper which the Kenyan regime has pursued. 
It should not lead to a mere change of labels - from foreign capitalists 
to local elite capitalists. For private enterprise has no geographical or 
racial qualifications, A locally controlled private enterprise system is 
as much profit oriented as one controlled by foreigners, Genuine nationalizat-
ion in my view should entail the state's participation as an agent of the 
nation at large and not as a prop to the elitinization of the Kenyan economic 
system. 
Another aspect of government participation in Kenya is its 
Africanization theme. The Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation 
(ICDC) for instance, which is the largest government investor in foreign 
enterprises is seen "as the temporary custodian of its investments pending 
22 
their eventual transfer to direct or indirect African ownership". Again here 
the emphasis is to share the profits of foreign investment with some better 
off Africans. This constitutes a symbiosis between the privileged African 
elite class and the foreigners that creates a community of interest in pre-
serving the present economic system and in protecting its component parts 
the greatest of which is foreign. The withdrawal of foreign private invest-
ment in Kenya would no doubt bring tumbling down the present economic system 
which would have the effect of "pulling the chair from under" the local African 
elite class, a prospect they would hardly cherish. 
The symbiosis of interest between local elites and foreign capital 
pervades the ideology. This is best illustrated in the speech by an ICDC 
executive director to the Kenya Association of Manufacturers, an extract of 
which reads: 
"We in the Association believe in free enterprise. This is a 
system of social, economic and political arrangements designed 
to solve basic economic problems with greatest efficiency, I am 
convinced that unless the African who forms more than 95% of 
Kenya's population feels that he is part and parcel of our 
industrial and commercial economy,,, it could be difficult to 
create a stable economy ,.,It is vital that our industry be 
identified as truly local by the ordinary man in the street. 
He must be made to feel that it is truly his Industry..., 
You have a responsibility, assist in the Aficanization of commerce 
and industry if for nothing else, at least for the preservation 
of the institution and value of ,.,the free enterprise system,,r23 
23, Leys op,cit at p,145 (Emphasis Mine) 
- 211 - IDS/OP 39 
The maker of this speech is representative of the typical Kenyan elite that 
has built its economic empire from political favours extended through 
partial Africanization of foreign enterprise. He recommended five ways of 
assisting Africanization: 
"a. conversion of private companies into public companies 
with a view to offering substantial shareholdings to Africans; 
b. The manufacturers gradually build African distributors 
and wholsesalers; 
c. the existing distributors and wholesalers could assist 
the Africans to share in the market rather than try to 
prevent their entry into it; 
d. investors could invite African participants in the 
new ventures they plan to establish; and 
e. by giving the African management opportunity in the 
enterprises and providing him with management training 
opportunities, "24 
Implicit in all, but the last of these recommendations is the assumption 
that the recommendation apply to Africans who can financially afford to take 
the opportunity if offered. In a country where the per capita income of 
over 90% of the population is below K,£ 40 these recommendations are shameless 
and opportunistic proposal for the elitinization of the African share of the 
economy. It is not hard to understand this way of thinking when we realize 
the stake of this person in Kenya's economic pie that is a direct result of 
the Kenyan economic policy of unequal distribution of economic benefits in 
the name of free enterprise. By 1973, this person was an Assistant Minister 
and also owned one-third of the shares in Concrete Pipes and Products (1970) ' 
Ltd, which had taken over a non-African concrete factory. The firm had received 
debentures of K.Shs.350,000/- from ICDC (to which he was former executive 
director! ) and K.Shs,82,500/- from the government controlled Kenya Commercial 
Bank. He owned one-quarter of the Zenith Printing Works, another enterprise 
taken over,"from non-Africans and which had been loaned K.Shs,415,000/- by 
ICDC, He owned half of the shares in Chameleon Ltd. which enjoyed privileges 
and subsidies as part of a subsidiary of ICDC, He also owned half of the 
shares in w5ka Investment Ltd,, a large scale farming enterprise in the heart, 
of Kenya's farming area which and obtained loans of K,Shs,897,000/- from the 
Agricultural Finance Corporation ( a Statutory corporation under the auspices 
24. Ibid at p, 146 
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of the Ministry in which the person was Assistant Minister!), K.Shs.300,000/-
from the government controlled National Bank of Kenya and yet another K.Shs, 
K.Shs,75,000/- from the Kenya Commercial Bank, He also had interests in 
commercial, construction and transport firms; he was involved with Asian 
capitalists in several metal working companies; and was on the board 
of Leyland Paints, a subsidiary of a foreign multinational firm. To add to 
the chipps, his wife owned half of the shares in Chania Merchants Ltd., a 
commercial enterprise - which had received K.Shs,155,000/- from the government 
25 
controlled banks. It is clear that in his case, he did not have to be made to 
-feel that Kenya's industry was truly his. The make-believe element was 
only for the "ordinary man on the street!" This pattern of benefits of the 
system can be reproduced, even in more substantial proportions, for many other 
Kenyan i politicians and administrators. It Illustrates the dependence 
on the state by the African privileged elites in accumulating capital. What 
it tells is that nationalization and Africanization of foreign equity far 
from being a threat to foreign enterprise, is being tailored to be its 
strongest ally by cementing a community of vested interests between the Kenyan 
elites and foreign capital. In other words it is not done for reasons of 
national interests which would appear to be only incidental to the personal 
interests of the Kenyan policy fomulatora 
25, This account is taken from Langdom, op.cit.atpp,68-9 
26, Y,P« Ghai, "Control and Management of the Economy! Research 
Perspectives on Public enterprise", In Law in the Political Economy of Public 
Enterprise, Ed, Y.P. Ghai, Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 
Uppsala, I.L.C., New York, 1977p,16, 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
A challenging task of any discussion on the recommendations of the 
Ndegwa Report and its relation to the emergence and management of public 
enterprises, is how to locate the phenomenon they represent in the historical 
and political economy of post-colonial Kenya. What are the salient points of 
this political economy? First, this is a period of transition from colonial 
economy to post-colonial Kenya. The second feature of this period is the 
emergence of an indigenous capitalist class which needed to accumulate 
capital, and hence needed the support of the state and state apparatuses in 
its penetration of the economy and its confrontation with the local Asia and 
European capital. At another level it needs the state apparatuses to 
challenge, and in other instances, co-operate with foreign capital. The 
third feature of political economy of this period, stems from the needs 
of features outlined above, that is, the need for an increased intervention 
of the state in the economy. The need to generate domestic capital, support 
the emergence of an indegenous capitalist and thereby give the development 
of post-colonial capitalism a nationalistic outlook, was a historical imperative. 
5> Since this paper was written, the government has published the 
Report of the Civil Service Review Committee, 1979-80, which was chaired by 
S.N. Waruhiu. The Report recommends inter alia that the public officers should 
declare their private interests, and should resign if they did not do so 
within a specified period of time. It also recommends the definition and 
demarcation of areas that public officers and their families can participate 
in with approval. 
The observations of the Waruhiu Report ( as the report is commonly 
known) and the recommendations on private interest thereof do not alter the 
substance of the argument of this paper, but rather strengthens the observations 
we have made. We regret however that because of limitations of time we cannot 
consider the recommendation of this report in the details that it requires. 
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The nature and extent of state intervention in the economy in this period 
stemmed from the weakness of the indigenous capitalist class to challenge on its 
own the existing Asian and European capital. Their weakness in relation to 
Asian and European capital, and the international capital is a reflection of 
the existing class formation in the transition to post-colonial Kenya. 
It is in light of these factors that the recommendations of the 
Ndegwa Commission and subsequent statements on the issue of involvement of public 
servants in private enterprises should be analysed and evaluated. 
Below we provide some relevant quotations on this debate: 
(a).. . there ought in theory to be no objection to the ownership of property 
or involvement in business by members of the public services to a point where 
their wealth is augmented perhaps substantially by such activities. But common 
with many other African countries the achievement of independence in Kenya 
brought with it great opportunities for individual advancement both as to main 
careers and in other rather less orthodox ways . It is understandable that 
public servants should have taken their opportunities like other citizens but 
if the benefits in some cases seem to be out of proportion to the opportunities 
which have been available to them in common with other citizens it is inavitable 
that questions should be asked as to how this has come about. 
Report of the Commission of inquiry (Public Service Structure and 
Remuneration Commission) Ndegwa Report 1971.p.14 (emphasis added) 
(b) Since the Ndegwa Report....Allowed civil servants to own any kind 
of property and take part in any kind of business, no-one can stand up and argue 
that the efficiency of individual civil servants who took uncontrolled advantage 
of this relaxation of tradition was not affected somewhat adversely. Human beings 
are basically selfish and are more able to look after their own interests than 
those of other people. Civil servants should not, in my opinion, be encouraged 
to spend public time and equipment looking after their material interests during 
official hours. It is not possible for policy makers or any persons who contribute 
to the formulation of policy to remain fair and just if they are placed in 
positions where they are able to benefit from the execution of those policies, 
(emphasis added). 
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H.J. Nyamu, The State of the Civil Service Today. Government 
Printer, 1975. 
... the / Ndegwa / Commission's recommendations involved acceptance that 
in Kenya's conditions - that is to say, the conditions of neo-colonialism 
- the public service had to be paid on a quasiprebendary basis. The 
higher civil servants would be allowed to "take their opportunities 
like other citizens; and so acquire a stake in the profits of the 
system". 
Colin Leys, Underdevelopment in Kenya: The Political Economy of 
Neo-Colonialism London Heinemann 1975 p. 250. 
That the national ethic be established through discussions and debate 
to provide a basis and a social context within which political and administration 
acts of Kenyans can be judged and that the values embodied in such ethic should 
help provide a commonly shared reference point for the behaviour of Kenyan 
leadership in the course of national development, and also that the code of 
ethics for the civil service should be revitalised and applied. 
That in order to avoid conflict of interest and the exploitation of 
their positions for their own private ends, public officers i.e. ministries, 
MPs, civil servant and senior executives in statutory bodies shall be required 
to register their interests, and these should be monitored regularly so as 
to ensure accuracy of the information. 
K.I.A. Leaders' Conference Resolutions No.4 and 5 1978. The Weekly Review, 
January 30, 1978. 
This report breeds and encourages corruption. I have never believed 
in that Commission and with what is going on now I am even more opposed to it. 
The time has come for us to practice the philosophy of one man one job if the 
national cake is to be fairly distributed among our people. Rich civil servants 
should be removed from office to go and build the nation as full time landlords, 
farmers or matatu owners. 
Hon. J.M. Shikuku MP for Butere, The Weekly Review, January 11, 1980. 
Evaluating the impact of Ndegwa Commission today, two aspects of 
its recommendations stand out as significant in influencing the social and 
economic changes that have taken place in Kenya since the report was issued 
nine years ago. As it will become evident later on, these recommendations 
have had an impact on the ideology and reward structure adopted in the 
management of public enterprises. 
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The first important aspect of the Commission's report was the 
formulation of an ideological and functional justification of differential 
rewards and incentives in the public service (paras. 89-115). The report 
emphasized the functional necessity of rewarding "skill, resourcefulness and 
dedication which will shape the future of the country," and in particular the 
public service. As Kenneth Prewitt (19 72) has pointed out the Ndegwa 
Commission report gave functional justification for income inequality not 
only in the salary structure, but in the society in general. Although this 
aspect of the report has not been a subject of academic or popular debate, it 
is nevertheless an aspect which has influenced the reward system in the public 
institutions and to a large extent become the ideological basis for justifying 
salary and income differentials in the society. The functionalist ideology, 
its emphasis on individual merit, ability and skills as determinants of 
income differential in public service and the society was well articulated in 
this report thereby codifying the capitalist reward system as part of the 
national ethic. 
The second aspect of the Ndegwa Commission relates to the 
recommendation allowing public servants in permanent employment to engage in 
accumulation in private enterprises. This is the recommendation which has 
preoccupied a great deal of academic and popular expression in the last nine 
years. /Leys 1975; Cowen and Kinyanjui, 1977; Members of Parliament 1972; 
Nyamu, 1975; and Shikuku 1980_7-
The academic and popular expression that has been focused on this 
aspect of the report has tended to emphasise three points. First, the report 
has been criticised for encouraging corruption and inefficiency in the public 
service. Apart from politicians, the most systematic and clear articulation 
of this line is that carried by A.J. Nyamu, the Principal of Kenya Institute 
for Administration in 1975. On this issue of corruption he says: 
Let us begin by agreeing with the many newspaper allegations that 
corruption exists in the Civil Service. Let us also acknowledge 
that the courts have often meted out severe sentences on 
convictions for acts that amounted to corrupt practices. 
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He critically also observes that "the private sector has 
made tremendous inroads into the policy-formulation spheres of the Civil 
Service relating to business" and in the administration of the public sector. 
In this vein he argues the boundary between public service work and private 
business activities is masked, with serious consequence to government policies 
and decision making process. 
The resolutions of the last two leaders' Conference (1978 and 1980) 
have also accepted corruption in public service as a serious problem that 
should be dealt with. We must however note that existence of corruption 
in the public service cannot entirely be attributed to the Ndegwa Report 
recommendation although in public pronouncements, this distinction is not 
usually made. 
The second point emphasised in the criticisms of this report is 
the contention that it encourages some segments of the salariat class to hold 
more than one job. This, they argue deprives some unemployed people the 
opportunity of being employed. In forefront of this crusade has been the 
Hon. Martin Shikuku (1980) who has often articulated that he calls "the 
philosophy of one man one job" as a means of distributing the national cake 
equitably. While recognising the Ndegwa Commission allowed these in permanent 
employment to engage in private business, it does not follow, that if this 
practice was discontinued the number of available jobs would increase. The 
weakness of the arguments of the advocates of one man one job should be 
recognised in terms of employment generation and its lack of appreciation of 
the dynamics of the distribution of income and wealth in the society. Indeed 
it is necessary to evaluate contribution of public servants straddling into 
accumulation in private enterprise, in terms of employment creation and income 
generation. My hypothesis is that this phenomenon has created employment o 
opportunities rather than minimised the available positions. The impact of 
investment of the revenue available to the salariat class engaged in private 
enterprises needs to be critically assessed like capitals emanating from elsewhere. 
The third point which emerges from the evaluation of Ndegwa Commission 
Report in the past relates to the contribution phenomenon of straddling 
between permanent employment and private enterprise makes on one hand, in the 
development of an indigenous capitalist class and specifically domestic. 
Capital and on the other hand complements the efforts of the state in the 
Africanisation of commerce and industry. Looked at from the other angle, then 
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it becomes a question of how the Ndegwa commission sanctioned an ongoing 
historical process of capitalist accumulation and class formation. 
Although Nyamu does not view this phenomenon as part and parcel 
of the development of an indigenous capitalist class, he nevertheless points 
the critical characteristics of this fraction of the salariat class. He 
writes, 
When the policy of Africanizing business premises and 
business without premises, became a reality in this country, 
the majority of the people who had the know-how and the necessary 
financial skills were civil servants. They were also among those 
who had the means, like capital to take advantage of this policy. 
They had more than this . They were the people in positions of 
power and influence, so that where capital was a problem, they 
were well placed to use this power and influence to have standard 
requirements relaxed by finance houses in order to enable them 
to take advantage of this policy. From this point of view, nir 
and in the prevailing circumstances, we could not realistically' 
say that the civil servants did anything'out of the ordinary., 
Once a policy had been formulated and officially approved, it was 
those who were in a position to take advantage of it that benefi-
ted more than those who were not so well placed. Secondly, and 
in defence of the Civil Service, it would have been unfair to 
exclude them from the list of nationals of this country, because 
they are in fact leading citizens of Kenya. pp4-5 (emphasis added). 
The critical characteristics of this group was that it was educated 
had revenue and know-how, and above all power and influence which could be 
translated into economic advantages, These are important factors in the 
emergence of an indigenous capitalist class which depends on the state for 
accumulation. The emergence and indeed the aims of public enterprises such as 
Kenya .National Trading Corporation (KNTC), Industrial and Commercial Development 
Corporation (ICDC) and Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) were essentially 
for the furtherance of the creation of an African capitalist which could 
replace Asian businessmen and to some extent challenge the dominance of 
metropolitan capitals in the economy. The dynamics of this process is what 
has attracted academic attention (Leys 1972, Wasserman 1976, Cowen and Kinyanjui 
1977 and Swainson 1980), rather than allegations of inefficiency and 
corruption. Viewed from the wider perspective of capitalist accumulation, what 
has to be decried as misuse of public positions funds and institutions are 
but crude forms of accumulation of capital - which in more advanced'capitalist 
states have been replaced by more sophisticated forms of accumulation of capital. 
This approach to Ndegwa Commission Report, then call for locating 
the recommendations in the context of political, economic and historical 
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development of capitalist mode of production in colonial and post-colonial 
Kenya. Thus, instead of viewing the public service as entity by itself, 
attention should be focused on its place in the process of production and 
particularly in the creation of an indigenous capital. 
2. THE BACKGROUND TO THE EMERGENCE OF NDEGWA COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS 
At the outset, it is necessary to point out that the phenomenon of 
straddling between permanent employment in state apparatuses and accumulation 
in private enterprise, which the Ndegwa Commission sanctioned, is not a 
consequence of Africanisation which occured at the transition from colonial 
to post—colonial state 1960—1970, but something that has deep roots in the 
colonial period. It is essentially a phenomenon noticeable in the process of 
transition from pre-capitalist mode of production to capitalist mode of production 
which was dominant in the colonial period, is the level at which Africas 
participated in the process. 
In the colonial period, the dominance of settler capital in commerce, 
farming, industry and in control of state apparatuses excluded Africans from 
many avenues of accumulation of capital. Hence, the levels and areas in which 
they were allowed to operate were strictly controlled. Therefore the Africans 
who were employed as clerks, teachers, artisans, court elders and chiefs were 
straddling between permanent employment and private accumulation, thereby 
accumulating revenue which enabled them to acquire land by purchase and to 
establish trading ventures. By 1970 the position and revenue available to 
teachers clerks and artisans had changed dramatically. At independence, Africans 
had moved into positions of power in state apparatuses which enabled them to 
obtain necessary revenue for engaging in private enterprise not merely to 
supplement means of subsistence, but for the purpose of accumulation. 
The attainment of independence and the Africanisation which followed 
removed the restrictions which prohibited African entry into some sectors of 
commerce and industries, and at the same time propelled Africans into positions 
in the state apparatuses which had revenue and power to enable them to engage 
into private accumulation with relative ease and personal benefits. 
The present phenomenon of straddling between permanent employment 
and private enterprise had been boosted by two complementary social forces 
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namely the gradual sweeping away of the code of regulations which governed 
the acquisition of private property by public servants - the Ndegwa Commission 
being the culmination of a process of easing the code regulating acquisition 
of private interests by public servants while in public service. And 
secondly, the freeing of indigenous people from colonial restrictions 
(which were imposed for the benefit of settler capital) which hindered their 
participation in commodity production and engaging in commerce and industry 
on equal basis with Europeans and Asians. 
The changes which are observable in the code of regulation 
governing acquisition of private property by public servants should therefore 
be evaluated in the light of the transformation of colonial political 
economy and the transition to post-colonial social formation. 
Below we examine the changes in regulations and the incorporation 
of Africans into the colonial capitalist economy. 
a) Changes in regulations governing Acquisition of private property 
by public servants'," 1922-1971. 
Our analysis start with the code of regulations for public officers 
in the colonial government service. The first code of regulations adapted 
in the colony came into effect in 192 2 and the relevant regulations for 
discussion were numbers 285-287. These are the regulations which were changed 
gradually in the colony and finally in 1971 to allow public officers to 
engage into private enterprise. Below we reproduce the regulations as for-
mulated in 1922 and thereafter we show how they were changed to take into 
consideration changed circumstances in the colonial and post-colonial Kenya. 
1922 Regulation 285: 
(i) Salaried public officers, whose remuneration is fixed on the 
assumption that their whole time is at the disposal of the government, are 
prohibited from engaging in trade or employing themselves in any commercial 
or agricultural undertaking. 
(ii) No public officer on leave of absence is permitted to accept 
any paid employment without previously obtaining the express sanction of the 
Secretary of State, or if his leave is spent in the colony, of the Governor. 
(iii) No public officer is to undertake any private agency in any 
matter connected with exercise of his public duties. 
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Regulation 286; All salaried public officers, whether or not their whole 
time is at the disposal of the government, are prohibited from directly 
or indirectly i, making or holding anylocal investment, speculation in s 
shares, or being connected with any company, occupation or undertaking, which 
might bring private interests into real or apparent conflict with their 
public duties, or in any way influence them in the discharge of their duties, 
without"previous permission of the Government-in-colonial, (This also 
prohibited possessing private interests in Uganda and applied \to officers' 
wives and families,) Officers owning land locally should not ji.f? possible 
be posted for service to the districts in which their land is situated, 
Regulation 287: An officer having an interested in any commercial 
under taking which transacts any business with a government department shall 
disclose the details of the particular transaction or transactions to the 
head of his department, and to any head of a department who may be the second 
party to the contract, the details of his- interest in the transaction„' 
1931: Three conditions were set out which were to be considered 
in deciding whether or not private employment would be undertaken by govern-
ment officers: 
(a) was there in existence of capable private individuals to do 
the work: 
(b) was it in public interest for a public officer to take private 
employment; and 
(c) whether to grant a particular priviledge to a public officer 
could l&nd others claiming similar treatment, 
194-8: The regulations remained as in 1931, but the permission of 
Government-in-Council, was required for a public officer to engage in private 
employment, A disclosure of private interests an appointment or assumption 
of public office was required and then the Governor was to decide whether 
there was a conflict of interests involved, 
1966: The regulations remained basically unchanged from 1948 until 
this period. One important change was instituted in 1966 which relaxed the 
acquisition of private interests by public servants. The Permanent Secretary 
(P.,S,) was authorized to approve the acquisition or holding of. investments, 
or purchase of land of class than 30 acres. The P.S, in turn has to seek 
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permission for acquisition of land of any extent from Permanent Secretary 
in the Office of the President. Here we should note that this authority in 
the colonial period was.vested with the governor. In the period between 
1966 and 1971 this authority was vested in the hands of public servants. The 
significance of this change should not escape attention in view of the 
changes which occured in 1971. 
1971: The Ndegwa Commission Report called for amendment of code of 
regulations which restricted the participation of public servants in private 
enterprises, and then recommended that "all senior officers should make a 
complete statement of their interests as required by the amended rules on 
basis that failure to have done so hitherto will not of itself count against 
them". 
The changes in code of regulations can be interpreted as resulting 
from increased power of public servants in the state matters in relation to 
elected leaders. This, it can be argued is particularly so after independence 
when the local civil servants were not under control and scrutiny of imperial 
parliament, and other metropolitan interests which tended to check the excess 
of colonial administrators. 
B 
While the above may be the case, the internal dynamics of the 
colonial and post-colonial society must be evaluated, for it is within this 
context of social and economic forces operating here that the changes outlined 
above can be understood. 
(b) Changes in the Political-Economy of Colonial and Post-Colonial Kenya. 
By 1948, the material and institutional foundation for the 
development of peripheral capitalism were firmly established. But in-built 
in this framework were contradictions which generated conflicts that threatened 
the continuation, and indeed the expansion of the process of capital accumu-
lation. The Mau Mau armed struggle was the main threat to this structure in 
the 1950s. 
The existing conflicts revolved around the way the immigrant groups 
monopolised and controlled land, production of agricultural commodities, 
participation in trade and commerce and above all access to state power. 
The main contradiction in this phase of colonial development was between the 
indigenous people, and the immigrant groups (Europeans and Asians) who consti-
tuted the dominant colonial capitalist class. 
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The challenge of transition to post-colonial economy was therefore 
an attempt to resolve this contradiction by incorporating and accelerating 
the emergence of an indigenous capitalist class with interest and commitment 
to maintenance of a capitalist economy. The strategy was implemented in the 
period between 1952 to 1969 , and involved the transfer of state power into 
hands of African nationalist (independence in 196 3) , and incorporation of 
indigenous capitalist class in large-scale agriculture (through institution 
like Agricultural Finance Cooperation (AFC), World Bank and Commonwealth 
Development Corporation) and in Commerce (through Kenya National Trading 
Cooperation) (KNTC) ICDC and more recently through Industrial Development Bank 
(IBD). The Africanisation of business was also effected through regulation 
and control of the former dominant group in this sector, Asians, as from 
1967. Through institutional and financial support of the African commercial 
class, the Asian were edged out of the lucrative trade. The competition of 
capital in this sector is by no means over. 
It is in the light of this that we should note that the proportion 
of African private companies formed in Kenya increased from 19 per cent in 
1966 to 33 per cent in 1971 and 46 per cent in 1973. In the same period the 
proportion of companies, formed with mixed ownership (Africans, Asians and 
Europeans) increased from 15 per cent in 1966 to 20 per cent in 1970 and 
then dropping to 15 per cent in 1973. (Swaison 1980). The application of 
Trade licensing Act of 1967 had an impact on these changes. 
By 1970 therefore, the transition from colonial to post-colonial 
economy was secured. The main features of the emergent post-colonial political 
economy were, first, the expanded role of the state with a powerful bureau-
cracy. The state had expanded its state apparatuses to penetrate into the 
economic sector. Thus the state had become a critical and leading institution 
in the continued development of indigenous peripheral capitalism. The second 
feature of this period was the expansion of domestic and foreign capital in 
commodity production, commerce and in the process of industrialisation. The 
public servants straddling between permanent employment and private accumulation 
found their place in this expansion. 
It is this context that the changes in code of regulations of civil 
service discussl''ibove should be evaluated and understood. It was not therefore 
a conspiracy on part of civil servants to engage into private business, but 
the dynamics of capitalist development propelled the changes experienced in 
the sixties and early seventies. The forces at work had their roots in the 
colonial political economy. 
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3. PRIVATE ACCUMULATION AND PUBLIC ENTERPRISE 
The debate on public servants involvement in private accumulation 
while holding public service positions has often been viewed as breeding 
corruption, inefficiency misuse of state power and overall mismanagement 
of public institutions. But it should be questioned whether these evils are 
a result of the Ndegwa Commission recommendations. To answer this question, 
the Kenyan experience in management of public enterprises should be measured 
in the light of experience of other countries where private accumulation by 
public servants is checked by the existing ideology and institutions. The 
experience of Tanzania and Zambia is particularly relevant in this respect. 
The evidence available from the two countries, seem to indicate that these 
countries have not faired any better than Kenya. Comparison of this kind 
is to some extent subjective but there is substance to this general observation. 
What needs to be recognised as a major contribution of the straddling 
phenomenon sactioned by the Ndegwa Commission is the contribution it makes to 
the process of private accumulation, a necessary step in the emergence of 
indigenous capital. The activities of public servants which are usually 
condemned by some politicians are in essence part and parcel of accumulation 
process in the peripheral capitalism. The state and state apparatuses are 
therefore essential instruments of this process of private accumulation. 
One of the measures of dealing with the excess of this capitalist 
accumulation is to establish the rules of the game which all the interests 
involved in the game will follow: This is what seems to have been advanced 
by Hon. Mwai Kibaki in 1978 when he told the leaders conference that 
there are... questions of structural and procedural streamlining 
of the public sector. For example, we all abhor violations of import 
restrictions which we have placed for certain specific economic 
reasons. Are we satisfied that import restrictions are sufficiently 
enforced? Is there sufficient autonomy and authority to permit the 
officers who are charged with this duty to plug all loopholes? 
Similarly we have designed work permits to ensure that our local 
manpower grows steadily. Is the power to regulate such permits 
properly located? Does the authority include sufficient autonomy 
and security from intimidation? 
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These questions can be raised virtually for every state institution 
in Kenya. The exposures that have surfaced in the recent few years have 
led the public to raise similar questions to those raised by Mr. Mwai Kibaki, 
It is possible a solution can be found to these problems by establishing 
rules of the game which members of the class in control of state institutions 
should follow and expect others to follow . 
But while inter-class conflicts and competition can be expected to 
be resolved without serious threat to the process of accumulation, the 
question remains of how the subordinated classes can deal with the excesses 
and abuses which are inherent in the capitalist accumulation. Two alternatives 
seem to be open to the subordinated classes in Kenyan. First, they can 
struggle for strengthening of the safeguards which exist within the capitalist 
structure. Given the popularist tendencies in the Kenyan politics, some 
measure of concessions can be obtained which will protect the ordinary people 
from excess of small segments of the ruling class. This would involve the 
strengthening of the existing democratic institutions and in some cases 
establishing of new ones to cope up with new situations. 
The second alternative calls for the transformation of the 
capitalist structure that has become entrenched in post-colonial Kenya. The 
main question this alternative rises is what are the forces that can bring 
this transformation, A casual analysis of the present status of the working 
class movement in Kenya does not indicate that this class is at present 
organised or articulate enough to spearhead this struggle. Thus in the present 
Kenyan circumstances, this alternative seems to have limited chances of 
success. What therefore remains as a viable alternative is to strengthen 
and where possible to start new institutions to safeguard the interests; 
of subordinated classes. 
CONCLUSION 
The recommendations of the Ndegwa Commission report cannot be • 
blamed for corruption and inefficiency which is said to exist in the public 
service. What the Ndegwa Commission has done is to allow the public servant 
to engage m private accumulation, thereby strengthening the emergence of 
an indigenous capital class. This process however did not arise out of the 
recommendations of this report such, but more from the dynamics arid nedds 
for capitalist accumulation, The Ndegwa report recognised this social 
force and called for official sanctioning of it. 
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Looked at from the perspective of the emergence of indigenous capital, 
the Ndegwa Commission gave the process an ideological justification and removed 
the bureaucratic regulations that hindered its full sway. In this way it paved 
for the Africanisation of the post-colonial economy, a task which the late 
colonial and post-colonial state wanted to see accompalished as part of 
bringing the indigenous people into the mainstream of capitalist development 
in Kenya. 
From this capitalist perspective we can conclude with words of 
William Shakespe ar (King Henry V) when he says: 
O 
The strawberry gros underneath the nettle, 
And wholesome berries thrive and ripen best 
Neighbour'd by fruit of baser quality. 
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CONFERENCE 
ON THE ROLE OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISES IN DEVELOPMENT IN 
EASTERN AFRICA 
4TH 'TO 7TH NOVEMBER, 1980 
P R O G R A M M E 
4th November, 1980 9,00 a.m. 
9.30 a,m. 
10.30 a.m. 
11.00 
12.00 
14.00 p.m. 
15.00 p.m. 
15.30 p.m. 
5th November, 1980 9.00 a.m, 
10.00 a.m, 
10.30 a.m. 
11.30 a,m< 
Key Note Address, Prof. W = M, Senga, Director, 
Institute for Development Studies, 
Mrs. I, Heidermann, Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation, 
Bonn, West Germany, Public Enterprises and 
Economic Sciences in Africa, 
Tea Break 
David Wainaina Gachuki, Department of Commercial 
Law: University of Nairobi, 
Lunch Break 
R„B„ Mabele, University of Daij-es-Salaam, 
Tanzania, "Some Issues on the Political Economy 
of Public Enterprises in Tanzania". 
Tea Break 
Dr. J, Kinfu, Addis Ababa University, Planning 
Office, Ethiopia, "Towards Better Understanding 
the Development and Performance of State 
Corporations and State Enterprises - with 
Reference to Ethiopia Experience". 
Dr„ Wo Oyugi, University of Nairobi, Department 
of Government, Kenya, "Government and Public 
Enterprises: Some Lessons from Kenya". 
Tea Break 
C„P. Atikoro, Makerere University, Department of 
Commerce, Uganda, "The Role of Government in Public 
Enterprises: A Case for Uganda Advisory Board". 
Mr. Thomas Byatike, Ministry of Finance, Uganda, 
"Independence and Accountability in State Enter-
prises in Uganda". 
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6th November, 1980 
(Thursday) 
7th November, 1980 
(Friday) 
12.30 p.m. Lunch 
14.00 p.m. Dr. K. Kinyanjui, IDS, University of Nairobi, 
Kenya, "Public Enterprises and the Effects of 
the Ndegwa Report". 
14.30 p.m. Tea Break 
15.30 p.m. Dr. H.G, Klaus, IDS, University of Nairobi, 
Kenya, "Managerial Problems and Strategies 
of Parastatals in the Kenyan Horticultural 
Industry", 
16,30 p.m. Dr. L, Msambichaka, University of Dar-es-Salaam, 
Tanzania, "The State Farm Sector and Agricul-
tural Production in Tanzania", 
9,00 a.m, Dr, P. Hopcraft, Mr. Ogutu, IDS, University of 
Nairobi, Kenya,"Parastatal Industrial Banks 
and Their Relationship with the Private 
Sector", 
10.00 a.m. Tea Break 
10.30 a.m. Mr. Moshi, E., University of Dar-es-Salaam, 
Tanzania, "Financial Performance of Public 
Enterprises in Tanzania". 
11.30 a.m. Lunch Break 
13,00 p.m. Participants visit one of Kenya Tea Development 
Authority's Tea Factories, 
Free Morning 
14,00 p.m, Dr. E, Suruma, Makerere University, Kampala, 
Uganda, "An Assessment of the Profitability 
of Major State Enterprises in Uganda from 
1962 - 1980", 
15.00 p.m. Tea Break 
15.30p.m. Dr, Bruening, Dietrich, C., CAFRAD, Morocco, 
The Internal Structure and Performance of 
Public Enterprises, 
Closing Session 
18.30 p.m. RECEPTION 
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